

Vimaladāsa's
SAPTABHAṄGĪ-TARAṄGIṆĪ
सप्तभंगी-तरंगिणी

English Translation

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Introduction

Jaina philosophy occupies a prominent place among the system of Indian Thought and Reality. Along with its richness of vast coverage of the field of study it is very much suggestive of the newer ideas to crop up within and outside the borders of India. Its consonance with the researches and concepts by scientists, so far as it goes, it equally encouraging. *Anekāntavāda* (theory of Non-absolutism), *Syādvāda* (theory of Relativity) and *Saptabhaṅgīvāda* (theory of Sevenfold Expression or Predication) are its foundational principles which, in essence, imply a conditioning of existents and knowledge under the governance of reference frames, both subjective and objective. *Anekānta* is held be the enlightenment or manifestation of two contradictory traits (*dharmas*) in an entity (*vastu*) with no possibility of inconsistency.¹ Jaina thinkers do not find any inconsistency in the co-existence of contradictory traits in a real. According to Jaina philosophy the contradictory traits like existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*ahāva*), unity (*eka*) and diversity (*aneka*), permanence (*nitya*) and impermanence (*anitya*), distinct (*prthak*) and non-distinct (*apṛthak*) etc. are held to reside in the same real peacefully and even to the extent of making such a contradiction vital to the very existence of the real. Thus it makes *Anekāntavāda* a two-planked theory of Relativity. The prefix *Syāt* (meaning somehow) in the term

(*Syādvāda*), besides covering the contradiction of *Anekāntavāda*, makes *Syādvāda* more general by introducing the need of reference-frames, and goes to bracket even the relational (*sāpekṣa*) and the non-relational (*nirpekṣa*) into its ambit. *Saptabhaṅgīvāda* is the further extension of *Anekāntavāda* to sevenfold traits of a real under the pressure of the theory of expression (*vaktavyatā* or *vachanīyatā*). It is certainly a unique Jaina contribution, not evidently available elsewhere.

The title of the work *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* also denotes that the main and only theme of the unique work in the exposition of the Jaina theory of Sevenfold Expression of Predication, Vimaladāsa, the author of the work, was a *Digambara* Jaina by faith as he himself mentions in the Sanskrit text of the book. As regards his time he has made a reference to *plavaṅga saṁvat* (*Plavaṅga era*), which being not identified as yet, nothing can be said with certainty as to when he graced this country with his presence. The mention of his place therein is Tanjā where he completed the composition of his work. Nothing more about Tanjā is seen there. In the book he also mentions a number of scholar-saints of Jainism, from which some idea about his time may be constructed. He begins with an aphorism of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* of Umāswāmī (3rd-4th century). He produces a verse from *Svarūpa saṁbodhana* of Aklaṅka (8th-9th century). He also quotes aphorisms from *Parīkṣāmukha sūtra* of Māṇikyanandi (9th-10th century), and also recalls Prabhā Chandra (10th-11th century) the commentator of *Parīkṣāmukha sūtra*. The names of scholars-saints mentioned above will certainly enable us to draw the conclusion that Vimaladāsa was later than the last of them, that is later than the 11th century.

The above survey of the literary field made use of by

Vimaladāsa is very much conducive to convince the readers about his deep and extensive studies of *Saptabhaṅgī-vāda* of the Jaina system. He must have been closely and critically acquainted with the text of *Āptamīmāṃsā* wherein Samānta bhadra has initiated the theory in its widest context in respect of number of duos (*dyads*). He must have equally critically gone through the commentatiers of *Āptamīmāṃsā* entitled as *Aṣṭaśatī* by Akalaṅka and as *Aṣṭasahasrī* by Vidyānanda. He must have collected necessary information about the subject from sources both Jaina and others to make his composition exhaustive and convincing.

It will not be out of place of remember Anantavīrya (11th-12th century). In his *Prameyaratnamālā* he pays his tribute to Māṇikyanandi (9th-10th century) as 'I bow to Āchārya Māṇikyanandi who churned out the nectar of *Nyāya-vidyā* (science of Logic) from the ocean of the expressions of Āchārya Akalaṅka'. It was Āchārya Māṇikyanandi who composed *Parikṣāmukha Sūtra* — a very important and original work on Jaina Logic on the foundation laid down by Āchārya Akalaṅka. Similar seems the situation with Vimaladāsa who composed his *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅginī*—a unique and core-touching work on the seven-planked theory of formulating *bhaṅgas* or propositions. It is certainly a rare contribution of Vimala dasa to reveal and elucidate the theory. This similarity of situations between Āchārya Māṇikyanandi and Vimaladāsa is exemplary and encouraging even for the modern scholars for building the necessary ground and basis for their themes and projects. Actually speaking this *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅginī* prescribes and gives us a practical course of discipline as to how we obtain the seven-fold predication as a necessity for expression.

The seven *bhaṅgas* (break-ups) or propositions, admitted universally in Jaina literature on the subject are enumerated in

Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī as under :

1. Somehow the pitcher certainly is — *Syādistiyeva ghaṭaḥ*.
2. Somehow the pitcher certainly is not — *Syānnāstyeva ghaṭaḥ*.
3. Somehow the pitcher certainly is and is not — *Syādisti-nāsti ghaṭaḥ*.
4. Somehow the pitcher certainly is expressible — *Syād-avakatavya eva*.
5. Somehow the pitcher is and is inexpressible — *Syādisti-chāvaktavyaścha*.
6. Somehow the pitcher is not and is inexpressible — *Syānnāsti-chāvaktavyaścha*.
7. Somehow the pitcher is, is not and is inexpressible — *Syādisti-nāsti-chāvaktavyaścha*.

After establishing the first two *bhaṅgas* with detailed arguments Samantabhadra advanced to the third and the fourth ones with lesser details. The advancement has been repeated a number of times in connection with all the *syāds* he chose deal with. Regarding the remaining *bhaṅgas* he has stated “The experts in the science of *Naya*-logic may formulate the remaining three *bhaṅgas* by applying the technique of *Naya*-logic i.e. by supplying contexts and references considered suitable.”² Thus for him the number of *bhaṅgas* (break-ups) or propositions is exactly seven, neither less or more. So it is for Vimaladasa too in his *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī*.

The first two *bhaṅgas* have been designated as the primary (*mūla*) ones as they provide ground for the other ones called the secondary or the derived ones (*uttara bhaṅgas*). To obtain this result the Jaina scholars have resorted to a practical process — a most evident technique leading to a strong conviction. The same may be brought under treatment in accordance with

the mathematical theory of combination. Following the mathematical notations the total number of combinations out of three elements is expanded as $({}^3C_1 = 3) + ({}^3C_2 = 3) + {}^3C_3 = 1) = 7$, or also as $2^3 - 1 = 8 - 1 = 7$. This makes our conviction in the theory of Sevenfold predication still stronger. We are forced to note the difference between the above two positions. The mathematical procedure requires three elements to make a start; while the Jaina accepts first two positions as primary. To reconcile the above two situations one more position i.e. the fourth one, is required to stand parallel to the first two ones, though not declared primary. These three positions or propositions may be said to involve single elements; the third, fifth and sixth ones to involve two element each. Finally, we are able to uphold the rigidity of the *bhaṅgas* as seven only as discussed in *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅginī*.

The concept of the traits or *dharma*s is clearly seen to lie in the very root of the theory of Sevenfold predication. The search for a trait or *dharma* starts with an urge to know (*jijñāsā*) and through factors like doubt (*saṁsaya*), question (*praśna*), answer (*uttara*), impulsion to speak (*vivakṣā*) culminates in traits (*dharma*) followed by a proposition (*bhaṅga*). It is also held that the holistic cognitions (*pramāṇa*) and partial cognitions (*naya*) are both subject to such a treatment in the form of seven propositions under *Saptabhaṅgīvāda*.³ It also means that the Sevenfold predication is admitted of all types of cognitions. Again, retracing the passage backward in *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅginī* there is a discussion of various types of cognitions implied by the seven propositions of *Saptabhaṅgīvāda*. These various types of cognitions just point to the objects so cognized along with reference frames in which they are placed. Thus the Sevenfold predication keeps itself tied to the Order of Existence on one side and to the

Order of Knowledge on the other, and, in itself, embodies the Order of Expression.

The determination of traits or the *dharma*s has been further reinforced and explained at a larger length by introducing the ideas of *sva-chatuṣṭaya*—the quaternary of substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and manifestation (*bhāva*) belonging to an entity and that of *para-chatuṣṭaya* — the quaternary of substance (*Dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), and manifestation (*bhāva*) belonging to the other. An entity is considered in its four aspects and is also referred to the four aspects of others. It may be clearly noted that the two traits, position and negation so distinguished, belong to the self same entity. It has been clearly asserted that we also do not assign a different locus for the negative trait. Hence it becomes logically necessary to locate a negation for every position and *vice versa*. Samantabhadra very clearly and firmly announces. ‘*Astitva* or position is necessarily concomitant with *Nāstitva* or negation; and negation or *Nāstitva* is necessarily concomitant with *Astitva* or position in the same entity.’⁵ He finds no fallacy of mutual dependence in such a situation. So in *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* we find that strenuous effort is made in favour of the search for opposition. Vimaladāsa takes up the instances of the ultimate universal, the son of a barren lady, the horn of a hare, the sky-flower, the hair on the back of a tortoise to establish the truth of negation. Thus the non-existent and the imaginary entities are also shown as equipped with their positive and negative traits. In this way the basis for the formulation of the first two *bhaṅga*s or propositions and that of *para-chatuṣṭaya* the quaternary of substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and manifestation (*bhāva*) belonging to the other is established. As already mentioned, the rest of the *bhaṅga*s result from the combinations of the primary *bhaṅga*s.

The third, *bhaṅga* emerges from the successive consideration of traits behind the first two *bhaṅgas*. Its identity may be gainfully compared with Mill's Joint method of Agreement and Difference which holds its individuality inspite of its dependence on the first two methods of agreement and dependence in the field of Inductive Logic.⁶ 'So the third *bhaṅga* is also singular, and may not be taken as a return to the first and the second ones. The fourth *bhaṅga* is evidently necessary, as the first three *bhaṅgas* covered under the expressible ones, leave scope for inexpressibility. The individuality of the fourth *bhaṅga* lies in the failure of language to present and convey the opposition and contradiction by a single term simultaneously. The fourth *bhaṅga* thus, being singular and individual, is capable of effecting its combination with the former three *bhaṅgas* along with its own individuality. Thus the possibility of only seven *bhaṅgas*, neither of more nor of less, turns into a certainty under the *Saptabhaṅgīvēda* of Jaina philosophy.

It may be noted that none of the seven *bhaṅgas* yield an absolute commitment. Every *bhaṅga* finds its validity in a limited sphere by being governed by and fitted into a relevant reference-frame. So in case of the *bhaṅgas* resulting from the process of combination of the first two *bhaṅgas* and the fourth one, the binary and trinary application of reference-frames comes out not only justified; but, with Vimaladāsa too, finds detailed explanations as essential to the theory of Sevenfold predication. The linguistic expression of every *bhaṅga* involves the use of *Syāt* (somehow) and *Eva* (certainly) to indicate the need of a reference for the certainty of the statement under consideration. This situation may be interpreted as introducing a type of absolutism within non-absolutism. It may be happily

held so, but it is only a partial absolutism to give meaning to the restrictive terms. In view of the assertion that the 'a Naya—a partial and referenced cognition—refers to an example along with its negation'⁷. Such a meaning becomes expedient for communication and practicality (*saṁvyavahāra*).

This *Saptabhaṅgi-taraṅginī* of Vimaladāsa, a treatise written in Sanskrit prose, has created for itself a very important and special place in the realm of philosophy in general and Jaina philosophy in particular. The entire Sanskrit text of the work has been divided into paragraphs, and each paragraph is followed by its English translation. The plan of its simple literary translation has been intentionally adopted so as to present the contents of the work before the readers in their original form as understood and expressed by the author. This will certainly allow them freedom to frame their views, opinions and conclusions about the theme of the work. It is earnestly wished and hoped that this humble attempt at English version of *Saptabhaṅgi-taraṅginī* may open further avenues to reveal the deeper meaning of *Anekāntavāda*, *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhaṅgīvāda* of Jaina philosophy.

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S. C. Jain

सप्तभङ्गी-तरङ्गिणी SAPTABHAṄGĪ-TARAṄGINĪ

वन्दित्वा सुरसन्दोह-वन्दिताडिभ्रसरोरुहम् ।
श्रीवीरं कुतुकात्कुर्वे सप्तभङ्गीतरङ्गिणीम् ॥ १ ॥

1. Having bowed to Shri Vira (*Tīrthaṅkara*) whose lotus-feet are venerated by the host of gods (heavenly beings), I (Vimaladāsa) compose the *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* (rivulet with ripples of seven propositions) spontaneously (i.e. with a natural inspiration from within).

[Before making a start to compose the work entitled *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī*, Vimaldasa, the author, pays his homage to Lord Mahāvīra, the last of the series of the twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* of the running aeon of time, thinking it an auspicious act of remembering the Lord and praying to him for a successful completion of the work. The holy feet of the Lord, in the state of Arhathood, are equally venerated and worshipped by the heavenly beings as well as the human beings. Lord Mahāvīra was adorned with spiritual splendour of infinite intuition, infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power resulting on the destruction of the destructive (*ghātī*) type of *karmas* and also with physical splendour of the association of the gods from heavens and human beings from the surrounding regions who assembled in the divine pavilion, known as the *samavasaraṇa* to listen to the holy and divine

speech and benefit themselves by it. Vimaladāsa must have surveyed a vast range of literature on the subject and the inspiration and impulsion to write the work must have risen from within as a natural phenomenon with no ulterior interest. The exposition of the seven-fold predication, an outcome of the *Syādvāda* theory, is the central subject of the presently works and it is the result of a deep and prolonged study on the part of the author. The *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* is mainly concerned with the problem of predication, its possibility and position, its extent and limitations and its value and truth.]

2. इह खलु तत्त्वार्थाधिगमोपायं प्रतिपादयितुकामः सूत्रकारः 'प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः' इत्याह। तत्राधिगमो द्विविधः—स्वार्थः परार्थश्चेति। स्वार्थाधिगमो ज्ञानात्मको मतिश्रुतादिरूपः। परार्थाधिगमः शब्दरूपः। स च द्विविधः—प्रमाणात्मको नयात्मकश्चेति। कात्स्न्यतस्तत्त्वार्थाधिगमः प्रमाणात्मकः। देशतस्तत्त्वार्थाधिगमो नयात्मकः। अयं द्विविधोऽपि भेदः सप्तधा प्रवर्तते, विधिप्रतिषेधप्राधान्यात्। इयमेव प्रमाणसप्तभङ्गी नयसप्तभङ्गीति च कथ्यते। सप्तानां भङ्गानां—वाक्यानां समाहारः समूहः सप्तभङ्गीति तदर्थः। तानि च वाक्यानि—

'स्यादस्त्येव घटः ॥ १ ॥ स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः ॥ २ ॥ स्यादस्ति नास्ति च घटः ॥ ३ ॥ स्यादवक्तव्य एव ॥ ४ ॥ स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च ॥ ५ ॥ स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च ॥ ६ ॥ स्यादस्ति नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च ॥ ७ ॥' इति एतत्सप्तवाक्य-समुदायः सप्तभङ्गी कथ्यते।

2. Here the author (Umāsvāmī) of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, desirous of exposing the ways of the comprehension of the nature of reality has said that this comprehension is achieved by synthetic knowledge and analytic cognitions. There this comprehension is of two kinds : for oneself and for others. The comprehension for oneself is cognitive in nature and is of the form of sensuous, perceptual ones, etc.; and that for others is expressible by words. That too is of two kinds, viz. synthetical and analytical. The synthetical one is to know a

real in its wholeness, and the analytical one is to know a real by division into its parts. This division of comprehension into two kinds takes seven forms by giving prominence to assertion and negation. This very process is called the synthetical *Saptabhaṅgī* and the analytical *Saptabhaṅgī*. The collection of (these) seven propositions or sentences is the *Saptabhaṅgī*. The seven sentences are (as under) :

1. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) the pitcher is (exists) certainly.
2. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) the pitcher is not (does not exist) certainly.
3. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) the pitcher is (exists) and is not (does not exist).
4. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) it is inexpressible exclusively.
5. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) it is (exists) and is inexpressible also.
6. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) it is not (does not exist) and is inexpressible also.
7. Somehow (In some respect or in a certain context) it is (exists), is not (does not exist) and is inexpressible.

The collection of these seven propositions is said to the *Saptabhaṅgī* (the *septad* of the seven forms of predication).

3. तत्लक्षणन्तु प्राश्निकप्रश्नज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वे सति, एकवस्तु-विशेष्यकाविरुद्धविधिप्रतिषेधात्मकधर्मप्रकारकबोधजनकसप्तवाक्यपर्याप्त-समुदायत्वम्। वर्तते चेदं लक्षणं दर्शितवाक्यसप्तके। तथाहि—प्राश्निक-प्रश्नज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वं हि परम्पराया प्राश्निकप्रश्नज्ञानजन्यत्वम्। तथा च प्राश्निकप्रश्नज्ञानेन प्रतिपादकस्य विवक्षा जायते, विवक्षया च वाक्यप्रयोग, इति प्राश्निकप्रश्नज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्व-मुक्तसप्तवाक्यसमुदायस्याक्षतम्। एवं घटादि-रूपैकवस्तुविशेष्यकाविरुद्धविध्यादि-प्रकारको यो बोधः घटोऽस्तीत्यादिरूपो बोधः तज्जनकत्वं च वर्तत इति।

3. Its definition is as follows : There arising the purpose of a question by the questioner, the group of the seven propositions (not more or less) is the sufficiency of the collection of seven sentences generating cognitions of the nature of assertion and negation about an entity as the qualified one without contradiction. This definition covers the septad of the propositions shown above. Further, the recognition of the purpose of the question by the questioner is held as generalizing the cognition of such a question by tradition. In this way by the cognition of the question by the questioner a desire to propound (the subject) is aroused for the exponent, by such a desire to expound the use of sentences is initiated. Thus, the collection of the above mentioned seven sentences is justified in respect of the mention of the purpose of the cognition of the question by a questioner. In this way the cognitions of uncontradicted assertion and negation about an entity like a pitcher, etc. as a qualified one, the cognition of the type the pitcher is (exists) etc. and the generation (of such a cognition) proceeds (consistently).

4. तदिदमाहुरभियुक्ताः—‘प्रश्नवशादेकत्र वस्तुन्यविरोधेन विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना सप्तभङ्गी’ इति ।

अस्यायमर्थः—‘प्रश्नवशात्’, इत्यत्र पञ्चम्याः प्रयोज्यत्वमर्थः । विधि-प्रतिषेधकल्पनेत्यस्य विधिप्रतिषेधप्रकारकबोधजनिकेत्यर्थः । अविरोधेनेति तृतीयार्थो वैशिष्ट्यं विधिप्रतिषेधयोरन्वेति । एकत्र वस्तुनीत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो विशेषत्वम् । तस्य कल्पनापदार्थबोधजनकत्वैकदेशे बोधेऽन्वयः सप्तभङ्गीत्यस्य सप्तवाक्य-पर्याप्तसमुदायत्वाश्रयोऽर्थः । तथा चास्मदुक्तलक्षणमेव पर्यवसन्नम् ।

4. The proponents had said so that on account of a question to hypothesize assertion and negation (of something) in a single entity without involving any contradiction is the *saptabhaṅgī*—the doctrine of seven-fold predication. Its

meaning is like this. Here in the use of the fifth declension (with *praśna*) is meant to indicate the purpose. To hypothesize assertion and negation means the generation of cognitions of the types of assertion and negation. Without contradiction (*avirodhena*)—the meaning refers to the third declension and goes with assertion and negation. In a single entity (*ekatra vastuni*)—here the use of the seventh declension refers to the qualified thing. It goes with the partial cognition (of one part) of the hypothesized entity. The use of the term *Saptabhaṅgī* (a group of seven sentences or propositions) is to provide a basis for the sufficiency to the group of the seven propositions. In this way (with the justification of every term used) certainly the aforesaid definition (of *Satapbhaṅgī*) is established.

5. अत्र च प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धविधिप्रतिषेधवाक्येष्वतिव्याप्तिवारणाय-
विरुद्धेति। घटोऽस्ति पटो नास्तीत्यादिसमुदायवारणाय एकवस्तुविशेष्यकेति।
स्यादस्ति घटः स्यान्नास्ति घटः, इति वाक्यद्वयमात्रेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
सप्तैति। घटमानयेत्युदासीनवाक्यघटितनिरुक्तवाक्यसप्तकेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय
सप्तवाक्यपर्याप्तेति।

5. Here again 'without contradiction' is meant to ward off the over-extension (over application) (of the definition) to the assertive and negative sentences found contradictory to the cognitions obtained by the perceptions of the direct type etc. To avoid the grouping of such an entity is meant. To ward off the over-extension only to two sentences as 'somehow the pitcher is and somehow the cloth is not' the (numerical term) seven (*sapta*) is mentioned. To ward off the under-extension (*avyāpti*) of the aforesaid septad of the sentences in indifferent sentences like 'bring the pitcher', expressive of the pitcher, there is the mention of the sufficiency of the seven sentences.

6. यद्यपि सत्यन्तनिवेशस्यातिव्याप्त्याव्यप्त्यादिदोषवारकत्वं न सम्भवति, तथापि प्रतिपाद्यप्रश्नानां सप्तविधानामेव सद्भावात्सप्तैव भङ्गा इति नियमसूचनाय तन्निवेशनम् । ननु—प्रश्नानां सप्तविधत्वं कथमिति चेत्; जिज्ञासानां सप्तविधत्वात् । प्राश्निकनिष्ठजिज्ञासाप्रतिपादकवाक्यं हि प्रश्न इत्युच्यते ।

6. Though in view of the mention of the questioner and his question as the last term (in the exposition), the problem of warding off the fallacies of over-application and under-application do not (actually) arise, still to expose the rule that there are only seven propositions possible on account of the seven types of questions worth discussion, the mention of the questioner and his seven questions has been made. Now the query is how the questions take seven forms; the answer is that inquisitiveness (about an entity) rises in seven ways. Verily, a question is said to be a sentence expressive of the inquisitiveness residing in the mind of the questioner.

7. ननु सप्तधैव जिज्ञासा कुत इति चेत्, सप्तधा संशयानामुत्पत्तेः । संशयानां सप्तविधत्वनु तद्विषयीभूतधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वात् । तादृशधर्माश्च कथञ्चित्सत्त्वं, कथञ्चिदसत्त्वं, क्रमार्पितोभयं, अवक्तव्यत्वं, कथञ्चित् सत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वं, कथञ्चिदसत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वं क्रमार्पितोभय-विशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वम् चेति सप्तैव । एवं च दर्शितधर्मविषयकाः सप्तैव संशयाः । अत्र घटः स्यादस्त्येव वा नवेति, कथञ्चित्सत्त्वतदभावकोटिकः प्रथमसंशयः ।

7. The query is how the inquisitiveness takes seven forms; the answer is that the doubts are generated in seven ways. And the sevenfoldness of doubts is due to the sevenfoldness of traits which are the subject-matter of doubts. Such traits are existence as modified by 'somehow'; non-existence as modified by 'somehow'; both applied in a successive order; inexpressibility; inexpressibility qualified by existence, as

modified by 'somehow'; inexpressibility qualified both applied by non-existence, as modified by somehow', and inexpressibility qualified by both applied successively. Thus the traits are only seven. In the same way with the above shown traits as subject-matter the doubts are also seven. Here somehow the pitcher is certainly existent or not (so), is the first doubt with alternatives of 'somehow' existent and the negation of the same.

8. ननु च—कथञ्चित्सत्त्वस्याभावः कथञ्चिदसत्त्वम्, तस्य न संशयविषयत्वसम्भवः, कथञ्चित्सत्त्वेन साकं विरोधाभावात्। एकधर्मिक-विरुद्धनानाधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानं हि संशयः नत्वेकधर्मिकनाना-धर्मप्रकारकज्ञानमात्रं, तथा सति अयं घटो द्रव्यमित्यादीदन्त्वावच्छिन्न-विशेष्यकघटत्व-द्रव्यत्वरूपनानाधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानस्यापि संशयत्वापत्तेः। तथा च कथं घटस्यादस्त्येव न वेति संशयः इति चेत्? उच्यते; —दर्शितसंशये कथञ्चिदस्तित्वसर्वथा-स्तित्वयोरेवकोटिता; तथा च नोक्तानुपपत्तिः, तयोश्च परस्परं विरुद्धत्वात्।

8. Further, but the negation of 'somehow' (conditional) existence is the 'somehow' (conditional) non-existence; (therefore) it is not possible for it to become the subject-matter of doubt, because it holds no contradiction (of it) with the 'somehow' conditionally existent. A doubt is a cognition of many (mutually) contractory traits in the same locus (the base for the traits), and (it is not) only the cognition of the type involving many traits in the same locus. If so, the cognition of the fact that it is a pitcher—an object with manifold traits—and so qualified by them it will also have to become a doubt. Under such a situation how can a doubt as the pitcher exists surely or not be upheld? If such is the difficulty, the solution follows. In case of the doubt as shown above it rests on 'somehow' (conditioned) existence and absolute (unconditioned) existence; and in this way the above objection

does not rise because the two are mutually contradictory.

9. अथ—कुत्रचित्प्रसिद्धयोरेव संशयकोटिता, यथा—स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोः, इह च कथञ्चित्सत्त्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वेऽपि सर्वथाऽसत्त्वस्य कुत्राप्यप्रसिद्धतया कथं संशयकोटित्वम्? इति चेन्न। वस्तुतोऽप्रसिद्धस्यापि प्रसिद्धत्वेन ज्ञातस्य संशयविषयत्वसम्भवात्। घटत्वावच्छिन्नसत्त्वस्यैकं कोटित्वं सर्वप्रकारावच्छिन्नत्वप्रकारेण सत्त्वस्य चापरं कोटित्वमिति वस्तुनः सत्त्वे सर्वप्रकारावच्छिन्नत्वस्यासत्त्वेपि न क्षतिः। एवं द्वितीयादिसंशयप्रकारा अप्यूह्याः। निरुक्तसंशयेन च घटे वास्तवसत्त्वनिर्णयस्सम्पादनीय इति जिज्ञासोत्पद्यते; जिज्ञासां प्रति संशयस्य कारणत्वात् तादृशजिज्ञासया घटः किं स्यादस्त्येवेति प्रश्नः; प्रश्ने च जिज्ञासाया हेतुत्वात्। तादृशप्रश्नज्ञानाच्च प्रतिपादकस्य प्रतिपादयिषा जायते। प्रतिप्रपादयिषया चोत्तरम्। इत्युक्तप्रणाल्या धर्मसप्तविधत्वाधीनं भङ्गानां सप्तविधत्वमिति बोधयितुं सत्यन्तनिवेश इति ध्येयम्। तदुक्तम्—

‘भङ्गास्सत्त्वादयस्सप्त संशयास्सप्त तद्गताः।

जिज्ञासास्सप्त सप्त स्युः प्रश्नास्सप्तोत्तराण्यपि॥’

9. Then, the situation of doubt arises only in case of two alternatives well known somewhere, just as that in case of the trunk of a tree and a man. Here also, the conditioned existence being well-known and absolute non-existence being not known, how does the situation for doubt arise? If so upheld, it is not like this. There is, in a real sense, a possibility of becoming an object of doubt for the unrecognized entity becoming known by recognition. There is one pole of existence comprehended as pitcher-type; and the the pole of existent consists of its being comprehended in all other ways. In this way there is no incongruence for the existence of an entity inspite of the non-existence comprehended in all the ways. Similarly even the other forms of doubt like the second one, etc. are to be conceived. And, by the doubt so explained the inquisitiveness as to the decision regarding the realistic existence in case of the pitcher is generated, for doubt is a cause of inquisitiveness.

By such inquisitiveness a question as to the pitcher is somehow existent certainly arises, for in case of the question the inquisitiveness works as a cause. By the knowledge of such a question a desire to expound arises in the mind of the exponent and by the same desire an occasion for the answer is created. Thus, by following the system so explained in order to make home the seven types of propositions controlled by the seven types of traits, a reference is made to the suitability of the use of the knowledge of the question from a questioner in the very definition. The same has been said as—

“The propositions as ‘exists’ etc. are seven, there are seven doubts behind them, inquisitiveness takes seven forms, the questions must be seven and also the answers must be seven.

10. नन्विदं सर्वं तदोपपद्यते, यदि धर्माणां सप्तविधत्वमेवेति सिद्धं स्यात्; तदेव न सम्भवति। प्रथमद्वितीयधर्मवत्प्रथमतृतीयादिधर्माणां क्रमाक्रमार्पितानां धर्मान्तरत्वसिद्धेस्सप्तविधधर्मनियमाभावात्; इति चेन्न।

10. All this can be consistent, if seven types of traits are established; this very contention is not possible. Like the first and the second traits there is no rule assigning individuality to the first and the third and the like ones applied successively or simulataneously. If so held, it is not so.

11. क्रमाक्रमार्पितयोः प्रथमतृतीयधर्मयोर्धर्मान्तरत्वेनाप्रतीतेः। स्यादस्ति घट इत्यादौ घटत्वावच्छिन्नसत्त्वद्वयस्यासम्भवात्, मृण्मयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नसत्त्वान्तरस्य सम्भवेऽपि दारुमयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नस्यापरस्यासत्त्वस्यापि सम्भवेनापरधर्मसप्तक-सिद्धेस्सप्तभंग्यन्तरस्यैव सम्भवात्। एतेन द्वितीय-तृतीयधर्मयोः क्रमा-क्रमापितयोर्धर्मान्तरत्वमिति निरस्तम्; एकरूपावच्छिन्ननास्तित्वद्वयस्यासम्भवात्।

11. The reason is that the successive and simultaneous

use of the first and the third traits is not popularly known as a trait distinct from them. In the proposition 'somehow the pitcher is' etc. the possibility of the two forms of existence in the form of existence as a pitcher, does not exist. If some other existence is possible in case of the pitcher cognized as of earth, then the other non-existence of the pitcher as of wood etc. will also be possible. Then for the existence determined as made of wood etc. (in case of a pitcher) another set of seven traits will be established; and for this reason it will only give rise to another septad of propositions for there being the septad of other seven traits. By this, the distinct individuality of the second and third traits applied in succession or simultaneously is also refuted, as the double negation known as one is not possible.

12. नन्वेवं—प्रथमचतुर्थयोर्द्वितीयचतुर्थयोस्तृतीयचतुर्थयोश्च सहितयोः कथं धर्मान्तरत्वम् अवक्तव्यत्वं हि सहापिर्तास्तित्वनास्तित्वोभयम्, तथा च यथा क्रमापिर्तास्तित्वोभयस्मिन्नस्तित्वस्य योजनं न सम्भवति, अस्तित्वद्वयाभावात्; तथा सहापिर्तोभयस्मिन्नपीति चेन्न । यतोऽवक्तव्यत्वं सहापिर्तोभयमेव न, किन्तु सहापिर्तयोरस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोस्सर्वथा वक्तुमशक्यत्वरूपं धर्मान्तरमेव; तथा च सत्त्वेन सहितमवक्तव्यत्वादिकं धर्मान्तरं प्रतीतिसिद्धमेव ।

12. If so, then how will a distinct individuality of a trait be assigned to the first and the fourth, the second and the fourth, and the third and the fourth traits when combined? The trait of inexpressibility is really a dyad of position and negation applied simultaneously. And, just as the application of position and negation is not possible, because two forms of existence cannot be there, in the same way the situation is the same in case of the simultaneously applied dyad. If so considered, it is not like this. Because the trait of inexpressibility is not only the simultaneous application of position and negation; but it is a

distinct trait of the form of absolute inability to express the simultaneously applied position and negation. And further, the distinct individuality as a trait is well known in case of inexpressibility etc. as applied along with position.

13. प्रथमे भङ्गे सत्त्वस्य प्रधानभावेन प्रतीतिः, द्वितीये पुनरसत्त्वस्य, तृतीये क्रमार्पितयोस्सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः, चतुर्थे त्ववक्तव्यत्वस्य, पञ्चमे सत्त्वविशिष्टा-वक्तव्यत्वस्य, षष्ठे चासत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वस्य, सप्तमे क्रमार्पित-सत्त्वासत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वस्येति विवेकः । प्रथमभङ्गादावसत्त्वादीनां गुणभावमात्रं, न तु प्रतिषेधः ।

13. In the first proposition, position is mainly cognized; in the second, negation; in the third position and negation applied successively; in the fourth, inexpressibility; in the fifth, inexpressibility qualified by position; in the sixth, inexpressibility qualified by negation, in the seventh, the cognition of inexpressibility qualified by the successively applied position and negation, are cognized. In the propositions like the first etc. there only the secondary position is assigned to non-existence, etc. and their negation is not meant.

14. ननु—अव्यक्तव्यत्वं यदि धर्मान्तरं तर्हि वक्तव्यत्वमपि धर्मान्तरं प्राप्नोति, कथं सप्तविध एव धर्मः ? तथा चाष्टमस्य वक्तव्यत्वधर्मस्य सद्भावेन तेन सहाष्टभङ्गी स्यात्; न सप्तभङ्गी इति चेन्न ।

सामान्येन वक्तव्यत्वस्यातिरिक्तस्याभावात् । सत्त्वादिरूपेण वक्तव्यत्वं तु प्रथमभङ्गादावेवान्तर्भूतम् । अस्तु वा वक्तव्यत्वं नाम कश्चन धर्मोऽतिरिक्तः, तथापि वक्तव्यत्वावक्तव्यत्वाभ्यां विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पनाविषयाभ्यां सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यामिव सप्तभङ्ग्यन्तरमेव प्राप्नोति न सत्त्वासत्त्वप्रमुखसप्तविधधर्मव्याघातः । तथा च धर्माणां सप्तविधत्वात्तद्विषयसंशयादीनामपि सप्तविधत्वमिति सप्तभङ्ग्या अधिकसंख्याव्यच्छेदसिद्धः ।

14. There is a query. If inexpressibility is a distinct trait, then expressibility also attains the (the status of a) trait. How,

then, are traits of seven kinds only? Thus in the presence of the trait of expressibility as the eighth trait and along with it there would be the *octad* of prepositions, and not the *septad* of propositions. If so held, it is not like this.

In general, there is no distinct trait of expressibility. Expressibility in the shape of position is already covered under the first proposition and so on. Or, there may be an additional trait under the name expressibility, then, too, with expressibility and inexpressibility, made object of assertion and negation, another *septad* of proposition is obtained as is done with the dyad of existence and non-existence; and there is no refutation of the seven traits like existence and non-existence etc. Thus traits being of seven types, there are seven kinds of doubts etc. as their objects. And so the possibility of greater number (than seven) of the *septad* of the seven propositions is also turned down.

15. नन्वेवं रीत्याऽधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेदेऽपि न्यूनसंख्याव्यवच्छेदः कथं सिद्ध्यति? तथाहि—

यदि घटादावस्तित्वप्रमुखास्सप्तधर्माः प्रामाणिकास्स्युः, तदा तद्विषयसंशयातिक्रमेण सप्तभङ्गी सिद्ध्येत्। तदेव न, सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्भेदाभावात्। यत्स्वरूपेण सत्त्वं तदेव पररूपेणासत्त्वम्। तथा च न प्रथमद्वितीयभङ्गौ घटेते। तयोरन्यतरेणैव गतार्थत्वात्। एवं च तृतीयादिभङ्गाभावात्कुतस्सप्तभङ्गी?—इति चेत्।

15. Thus, there arises a question. In this way inspite of the possibility of a greater number (than seven) being turned down, how can the possibility of a lesser number (than seven) be established? Then further, if in case of picther etc. seven traits beginning from existence are consistently possible, then by transgressing their objects like doubts etc. the *septad* of seven propositions may be proved. But it is not so proved, for

there is so distinction between existence and non-existence. The self-identity which accounts for existence accounts, for non-existence, from the point of view of the other's identity under such a situation the first two propositions are not consistently maintained, because one includes the other as regards the reality behind them. In this way, the possibility of the prepositions like the third etc. being refuted, where is the scope for the septad of prepositions? If it so held.

16. अत्रोच्यते । स्वरूपाद्यवच्छिन्नमसत्त्वमित्यवच्छेदकभेदात्तयोर्भेदसिद्धेः । अन्यथा स्वरूपेणैव पररूपेणापि सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । पररूपेणैव स्वरूपेणाप्यसत्त्व-प्रसङ्गाच्च ।

किं च सत्त्वं हि वृत्तिमत्त्वं, भूतले घटोऽस्तीत्यादौ भूतलनिरूपितवृत्तित्ववान्धत् इति बोधात् । असत्त्वं चाभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादौ भूतलनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगी घट इति बोधात् । तथा च सत्त्वासत्त्वयोस्स्वरूपभेदोऽक्षत एव ।

16. The position is explained here. Here existence and non-existence mean existence as determined by the tetrad of one's identity and non-existence, as determined by the tetrad of other's identity. Thus there is a distinction between them on account of their (distinct) determinants. Otherwise, like the identity by one's determinants, there would be existence by the other's determinants; and like the non-existence by other's determinants, there would be non-existence by one's own determinates.

Further, existence is of the nature of pervasion. In the statements, like the pitcher is on the ground' the pervasion implied by the ground is also implied by the pitcher. Such a cognition is effected by the proposition. Non-existence is implied by the object (i.e. pitcher) by a relation of negation. In the statements like the 'pitcher is not on the ground' the object

implied by the negation pervading the ground is again the pitcher. Such a cognition is effected by the preposition. Moreover, the difference between the identities of existence and non-existence remains there undisturbed.

17. अपि च—ये त्रिरूपं हेतुमिच्छन्ति सौगतादयः । ये वा पञ्चरूपमिच्छन्ति नैयायिकादयः, तेषामुभयेषामपि हेतोस्सपक्षसत्त्वापेक्षया विपक्षासत्त्वं भिन्नमेवाभिमतम् । अन्यथा स्वाभिमतस्य त्रिरूपत्वस्य पञ्चरूपत्वस्य वा व्याघाताद् इति ।

17. Furthermore, for both the Buddhists etc. who prefer the three-limbed definition of a cause and for the Naiyayikas etc. who prefer the five-limbed definition of a cause with respect to the agreement among similar instances, the difference among the opposing instances is distinctively admitted; or there would be the turning down of the three-limbed and the five-limbed definitions (of a cause) accepted by them.

18. अथैवमपि कथञ्चित्सत्त्वापेक्षया क्रमार्पितोभस्य को भेदः ? न हि प्रत्येकघटपटापेक्षया घटपटोभयं भिन्नम्—इति चेन्न;

प्रत्येकापेक्षयोभयस्य भिन्नत्वेन प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् । अतएव—प्रत्येकघटकारापेक्षया क्रमार्पितोभयरूपं घटपदमतिरिक्तमभ्युपगम्यते सर्वैः प्रवादिभिः । अन्यथा प्रत्येकघटकारापेक्षया घटपदस्याभिन्नत्वे घटकाराद्युच्चारणेनैव घटपटज्ञानसम्भवेन घटत्वावच्छिन्नोपस्थिति-सम्भवाच्छेषोच्चारणवैयर्थ्यमापद्यते । अतएव प्रत्येकपुष्पापेक्षया मालायाः कथञ्चिद्भेदस्सर्वानुभवसिद्धः । इत्थं च कथञ्चित्सत्त्वासत्त्वापेक्षया क्रमार्पितोभयमतिरिक्तमेव ।

18. And under such a situation what is the difference of the dual application of the two as compared with the application of existence as a mode qualified by 'somehow'? The dual (undistributed) application of the pitcher and the cloth is certainly not different from the application of (distributed)

pitcher and cloth taken singly. If so thought, it is not so. The dual application is commonly experienced as different from the application taken singly. It is why all contenders accept the distinct identity of the term (*ghaṭa* in Sanskrit) pitcher which is of the dual nature applied in succession and compared with the application of 'gha' and 'ṭa' taken distributively. Or, on the non-distinction between the term *ghaṭa* and the letter 'gha' etc. the cognition of *ghaṭa* (pitcher) and 'paṭa' (cloth) will be possible, and hence, on the generation of the cognition of the position determined as the pitcher, there would occur the redundancy of the pronunciation of the remaining (letters). Therefore, the distinction in some respects (somehow) between a garland as compared with the single flowers is established by general experience. And thus the dual of existence and non-existence applied in succession is distinct from existence and non-existence modified by 'somehow' and applied as such.

19. स्यादेतत् । क्रमार्पितोभयापेक्षया सहार्पितोभयस्य कथं भेदः ? क्रमाक्रमयोः शब्दनिष्ठत्वेनार्थनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । न हि घटादौ क्रमार्पितसत्त्वा-सत्त्वोभयापेक्षयाऽक्रमार्पितसत्त्वासत्त्वोभयमतिरिक्तमस्ति । घटपटोभयाधिकरणे भूतले क्रमार्पितघटपटोभयमेकं सहार्पितघटपटोभयं चापरमिति न केनाप्यनुभूयते ।

19. It may be so, but how the dual applied successively is different from the dual applied simultaneously, the terms 'in succession' and simultaneously being rooted in word (expression) and not in reality. Verily, in case of the pitcher etc. the simultaneous application of existence and non-existence is not distinct from the successive application of existence and non-existence. On the surface of the ground as locus for the pitcher, the cloth and the both, the pitcher, the cloth and the two, as considered in succession, and the pitcher, the cloth and the

two as considered simultaneously are not experienced by anyone as one in the first case and the other, in the second case.

20. अथ क्रमार्पितसत्त्वासत्त्वोभयापेक्षयाऽक्रमार्पितसत्त्वासत्त्वोभयस्य भेदाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः । अपुनरुक्तवाक्यसप्तकस्यैव सप्तभङ्गीपदार्थत्वेन सप्तधा वचनमार्गप्रवृत्तेर्निराबाधत्वात् । सत्त्वासत्त्वधर्मविषयता सप्तधैव वचनमार्गाः प्रवर्तन्ते नातिरिक्ताः, पुररुक्तात्वादित्यत्र सप्तभङ्गीतात्पर्यात् । स्वजन्यबोधसमानाकार-बोधजनकवाक्योत्तरकालीनवाक्यत्वमेव हि पुनरुक्तत्वम् । प्रकृते च तृतीयाचतुर्थयोर्नैदृशं पौनरुक्त्यं सम्भवति, तृतीयभङ्गजन्यबोधे अस्तित्व-विशिष्टनास्तित्वस्य प्रकारतया चतुर्थभङ्गजन्यबोधे चास्तित्वनास्तित्वोभयस्य प्रकारतया तृतीयचतुर्थजन्यबोधयोस्समानाकारत्वविरहात्-इति चेन्न । तथा सत्यधिकभङ्गस्य दुर्निवारत्वात् । तथाहि—यथा तृतीयचतुर्थयोरपौनरुक्त्यं विलक्षणबोधजनकत्वात् । तथा व्युत्क्रमार्पितस्य स्यान्नास्ति चास्ति चेति भङ्गस्य नास्त्यस्तित्व-सहितावक्तव्यत्वप्रतिपादकभङ्गान्तरस्य च न तृतीयसप्तमाभ्यां पौनरुक्त्यम् । अस्तित्वविशिष्टे नास्तित्वप्रकारकबोधस्य तृतीयेन जननात्, व्युत्क्रमप्रयुक्तेन नास्तित्वसहितास्तित्वप्रकारकबोधस्य जननाच्च विशेषणविशेष्यभावे वैपरीत्येन तादृशबोधयोस्समानाकारत्वाभावात् । एवं सप्तमेनापि व्युत्क्रमार्पितोभय-सहितावक्तव्यत्वप्रतिपादकभङ्गस्येति नवभङ्गीं प्राप्नोति । इति चेत् ।

20. Further, there being no distinction between existence, non-existence and the two applied in succession, and existence, non-existence and the two applied simultaneously, no harm occurs there. There is no inconsistency in the process of expression in seven ways for the septad of the unrepeated propositions in the shape of the principle (doctrine) of sevenfold predication. The ways of the process of expression, making existence and non-existence as their object, ensure only seven ways, and no more ways. The mention of the unrepeated proposition is meant to point to the doctrine of sevenfold predication. Repeated expression means the proposition announced later on, generating a cognition similar to one generated by the former proposition. In the present context,

such repetition in respect of the third and the fourth propositions is not possible, for in the cognition generated in the third proposition the type being 'non-existence qualified by existence' and in the cognition generated in the fourth proposition the type being 'existence, there is immunity of non-existence and the two' from similarity between the cognitions generated in the third and the fourth propositions. If held so, it is not the case, because then the possibility of more than seven propositions cannot be avoided. Further, just as there is no non-repetition in the third and the fourth propositions, because of generating distinct cognitions; in the same way there will be no non-repetition in the third-existence applied in succession, and the other proposition with generation of cognition of non-expression along with non-existence qualified by existence is effected by the third proposition; and the generation of a cognition of the type 'existence qualified by non-existence' by reversing the order of succession and the position of the qualification and the qualified, there is no similarity between the two cognitions so generated. In this way there is no similarity with the seventh proposition and the one generating cognition of inexpressibility along with the two applied with reversed order of succession. Thus we get the nine fold theory of prediction. If so held,

21. अत्राहु। तृतीयेऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वोभयस्य प्रधानत्वम्। चतुर्थे चावक्तव्यत्वरूपधर्मान्तरस्येति न तयोरभेदशंका। अव्यक्तव्यत्वं चास्तित्व-नास्तित्वविलक्षणम्। नहि सत्त्वमेव वस्तुनस्स्वरूपं, स्वरूपादिभिस्सत्त्वस्येव पररूपादिभिरसत्त्वस्यापि प्रतिपत्तेः। नाप्यसत्त्वमेव। स्वरूपादिभिस्सत्त्वस्यापि प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात्। नापि तदुभयमेव, तदुभयविलक्षणस्यापि जात्यन्तरस्य वस्तुनोनुभूयमानत्वात्। यथा—दधिगुडचातुर्जातकादिद्रव्योद्भवं पानकं हि केवलदधिगुडाद्यपेक्षया जात्यन्तरत्वेन पानकमिदं सुस्वादु सुरभीति प्रतीयते। न चोभयविलक्षणत्वमेव वस्तुनस्स्वरूपमिति वाच्यम्; वस्तुनि कथञ्चित्सत्त्वस्य

कथञ्चिदसत्त्वस्य च प्रतीतेः । दधिगुडचातुर्जातकाद्युद्भवे पानके
 दध्यादिप्रतिपत्तिवत् । एवमुत्तरत्रापि बोध्यम् । तथा च विविक्तस्वभावानां
 सप्तधर्माणां सिद्धेस्तद्विषयसंशयजिज्ञासादिक्रमेण सप्तप्रतिवचनरूपा सप्तभङ्गी
 सिद्धेति ॥

21. (then) here they say. In the third proposition the predominance is of the dual of existence and non-existence. In the fourth proposition the predominance is of a separate trait of the nature of inexpressibility, there is no doubt about the two being one. Inexpressibility is distinct from existence and non-existence. Certainly existence alone is not the identity of an entity, because it is obtained with the help of the determinants of the other entities like one obtained by the determinants of the one itself. Even the non-existence is not the identity of an entity, because it is also obtained with the help of its own determinants. Nor is even the dual of the two the identity of an entity, because the identity of an entity is experienced as transcendent beyond (and different from) the dual of the two, as the drink prepared with curd, sugar and the group of the four consisting a the '*Chāturjātaka*' yields a pleasant taste and smell of a different type as compared with (that of) curd, sugar etc. taken singly. Nor can we hold this transcendence beyond and different from the two as the sole identity of an entity, because 'somehow' existence and 'somehow' non-existence are also experienced in a thing like the experience of curd, sugar, and the group of the four (ingredients) in the drink prepared with them. Such should be our comprehension regarding the latter (three) positions. And further, on account of the establishment of the seven traits with (their) distinct identifications, the septad of sevenfold predication of the form of the counter statements of their subject-matter in the form of doubts, inquisitiveness etc. taken in order (as already

mentioned) is proved.

22. इयं च सप्तभङ्गी द्विविधा—प्रमाणसप्तभङ्गी नयसप्तभङ्गी चेति । किं पुनः प्रमाणवाक्यम्, किं वा नयवाक्यमिति चेत् ?

22. This *septad* of sevenfold predictions is of two kinds as related with comprehension (*pramāṇa*) and partial (*naya*) types of knowledge. Again, now what is the proposition of the comprehensive type of knowledge and what is the proposition of the partial type of knowledge?

23. अत्र केचित्—सकलादेशः प्रमाणवाक्यं, विकलादेशो नयवाक्यम् । अनेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं सकलादेशत्वम्, एकधर्मात्मक-वस्तुविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वम् विकलादेशत्वम् इत्याहुः ।

23. Here some hold that comprehensive proposition refers to comprehensiveness of knowledge and a partial (*naya*) proposition refers to (only) partial (analytical) knowledge. The reference to a comprehensive knowledge means a proposition causing emergence of knowledge covering many aspects of the multifaceted reality, and a proposition causing emergence of knowledge covering (only) a single aspect taking reality to be (limited to) only that aspect (of reality)

24. तेषां प्रमाणवाक्यानां नयवाक्यानां च सप्तविधत्वव्याघातः । प्रथमद्वितीयचतुर्थभङ्गानां सत्त्वासत्त्वावक्तव्यत्वरूपैकैकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयक-बोधजनकानां सर्वथा विकलादेशत्वेन नयवाक्यत्वापत्तेः तृतीयपञ्चमषष्ठ-सप्तमानामनेकधर्माप्तकवस्तुविषयकबोधजनकानां सदा सकलादेशत्वेन प्रमाणवाक्यतापत्तेः । न च त्रीण्येव नयवाक्यानि चत्वार्येव प्रमाणवाक्यानीति वक्तुं युक्तं सिद्धान्तविरोधात् ।

24. For them the sevenfold division of the comprehensive

propositions and also of the partial propositions comes out to be untenable. The reason is that the first, the second and the fourth propositions which generate solely the cognition of the existence, the non-existence and the inexpressible as the single individual trait of an entity, so they become the partial (*naya*) propositions; and the third, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh propositions become comprehensive ones for generating cognitions of many traits (more than one) of an entity. And it is not consistent to say that neither the partial propositions are only three, nor are the comprehensive propositions only four, for such a position will stand contradictory to the established principle (and the truth regarding the situation under consideration).

25. यत्तु धर्माविषयकधर्मविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं सकलादेशत्वं, धर्म्यविषयकधर्मविषयक-बोधजनकवाक्यत्वं विकलादेशत्वमिति—तन्न । सत्त्वाद्यन्यतमेनापि धर्मेणाविशेषितस्य धर्मिणश्शाब्दबोधविषयत्वासम्भवात् धर्मिवृत्तित्वाविशेषितस्य धर्मस्यापि तथात्वादुक्तलक्षणस्यासम्भवात् ।

25. If comprehensiveness means a proposition not dealing with the traits but the possessor (locus) of the traits and the fragmentariness (*vikalādesha*) means a proposition not making the possessor of the traits but the (single) traits (only) as its object, such a position (too) cannot be maintained. The reason is that verbal cognition is impossible to be assigned to the locus not qualified (even) by any of the traits like existence, etc. and also the position of even a trait with no pervasion with the locus (*dharmī*) comes out to be impossible in the same (above mentioned) way.

26. न च स्याज्जीव एवेत्यनेन धर्मिमात्रविषयकबोधस्य जननात् स्यादस्त्येवेत्यनेन केवलधर्मविषयकबोधस्य जननाच्च नासम्भव इति वाच्यं; यतो

जीवशब्देन जीवत्वरूपधर्मावच्छिन्नस्यैव जीवस्याभिधानम्—नतु केवलधर्मिणः, अस्तित्वशब्देन च यत्किञ्चिद्धर्मिवृत्तित्वविशेषितस्यैवास्तित्वस्याभिधानम्—न तु केवलधर्मस्येति सर्वानुभवसाक्षिकम्।

26. And by the proposition that somehow a *jīva* certainly is, the generation of a cognition of the locus (*dharmī*) alone is meant; and by the proposition that somehow the pitcher is certainly existent, the generation of a cognition of the trait alone is meant, the definition of comprehensiveness and fragmentariness is not rendered impossible. Such a position cannot be upheld. The reason is that by the term '*jīva*' the *jīva* as determined by the trait of *jīvatva* (i.e. being a *jīva*) is expressed, and not only the locus (thereof) is expressed. So also by the term *asti* (is existent), is-ness or existence as something qualified by its pervasion in the locus (*dharmī*) is expressed, and not the trait alone is expressed. Such a position is evidenced by the popular experience.

27. न चैवं—द्रव्यशब्दस्य भावशब्दस्य च विभागानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; — यतो मुख्यतया द्रव्यप्रतिपादकशब्दो द्रव्यशब्दः, यथा जीवशब्दः, जीवशब्देन हि जीवत्वरूपधर्मो गौणतया प्रतिपाद्यते, जीवद्रव्यं मुख्यतया। एवं मुख्यतया धर्मप्रतिपादकशब्दो भावशब्दः, यथा—अस्त्यादिशब्दः, तेन हि अस्तित्वरूपधर्मस्य मुख्यतया प्रतिपादनम्, धर्मिणश्च गौणतया, इति द्रव्यभावशब्दयोर्विभाग उपपद्यत इति।

27. Nor can it be held that a division (distinction) between the words *jīva* and being a *jīva* cannot be effected, for the word implying primarily substance is the 'substance' word. For example (there is) the word *jīva*. By the term *jīva* the trait of being a *jīva* is verily implied secondarily, and the substance of (*jīva*) is mainly implied. Thus, the terms which imply the traits are abstract ones (derived therefrom); for example there

are the terms *asti*, etc. By it the traits like *astitva* (is-ness) are mainly implied, the locus (thereof) is secondarily implied. Thus the division (distinction) between an entity and its entitiveness is effected.

28. यदपि-पाचकोऽयमिति द्रव्यशब्दः, पाचकत्वमस्येति भावशब्दः, इति द्रव्यभावशब्दयोर्विभागनिरूपणम्; तदपि न सङ्गच्छते। पाचकशब्देनापि पाचकत्वधर्मविशिष्टस्यैव पुरुषस्याभिधानात्; पाचकत्वमित्यनेनापि पाचकवृत्तित्वविशेषितस्यैव धर्मस्य बोधनात्, इति ॥

अपरे तु—स्यादस्तीत्यादिवाक्यं सप्तविधमपि प्रत्येकं विकलादेशः, समुदितं सकलादेशः,—इति वदन्ति।

28. If it is said that the word 'cook' (*pāchaka*) is the word implying substance, and the abstract noun corresponding to it implies the functions of cooking (*pāchakatva*), and thus the distinction between the words implying substance and function is explained; this too does not go consistently. The reason is that even by the word 'cook' certainly the person qualified by the trait or function of cooking is implied and even by the 'term' cook the trait or function qualified by the functionary, as pervaded by the trait as being the cook, is cognized.

Some other thinkers hold that the propositions like somehow (the pitcher) is etc. even being of seven kinds, when taken distributively, are said to be a partial implication; and when taken collectively (comprehensively) are said to be a comprehensive implication.

29. अत्र चिन्त्यते—कुतस्स्यादस्तीत्यादिवाक्यं प्रत्येकं विकलादेशः ?

ननु—सकलार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावाद्विकलादेश इति चेन्न। तादृश-वाक्यसप्तकस्यापि विकलादेशत्वापत्तेः, समुदितस्यापि सदादिवाक्यसप्तकस्य सकलार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावात्; सकलश्रुतस्यैव सकलार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्।

एतेन—सकलार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्सप्तभङ्गीवाक्यं समुदितं सकलादेशः, इति

निरस्तम्; समुदितस्यापि तस्य सकलार्थप्रतिपादकत्वासिद्धेः, सदादिसप्तवाक्येन एकानेकादिसप्तवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यधर्माणामप्रतिपादनात् ।

29. Here it is considered how the propositions somehow (the pitcher) is etc. taken distributively, are taken to be partial implication.

If it is held that the partial implication is there because such a proposition does not convey the full meaning. It is not so. The reason is that even the septad of such propositions will become (suffering from) the partial implication, and the septad of the propositions like the pitcher is existent taken collectively will be wanting in cognizing the totality of an entity, because only the complete scriptural knowledge is potent to cognize an entity in its totality or fullness.

By this it is also refuted that the propositions of the sevenfold prediction, taken collectively, yield the comprehensive implication. The reason is that the (above) septad, taken collectively, will not admit of a cognition of the totality (of an entity); and the septad of the propositions (like the pitcher is existent) will not be potent to convey the cognition of the traits of oneness and manifoldness made object of the (other) septad of propositions.

30. सिद्धान्तविदस्तु एकधर्मबोधनमुखेन तदात्मकानेकाशेष-धर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयबोधजनकवाक्यत्वम् सकलादेशत्वम् । तदुक्तम्—
'एकगुणमुखेनाशेषवस्तु-रूपसङ्ग्रहात्सकलादेशः' इति ।

तस्यार्थः—यदा अभिन्नं वस्तु एकगुणरूपेणोच्यते । गुणिनां गुणरूपमन्तरेण विशेषप्रतिपत्तेरसम्भवात्; तदा सकलादेशः, एको हि जीवोऽस्तित्वादिष्वेकस्य गुणस्य रूपेण अभेदवृत्त्या, अभेदोपचारेण वा, निरंशस्समस्तो वक्तुमिष्यते, विभागनिमित्तस्य तत्प्रतियोगिनो गुणान्तरस्याविवक्षितत्वात् । कथमभेदवृत्तिः कथं चाभेदोपचारः? इति चेत् । द्रव्यार्थत्वेनाश्रयणे तदव्यतिरेकादभेदवृत्तिः, पर्यायार्थत्वेनाश्रयणे परस्परव्यतिकरेऽप्येकत्वाध्यारोपादभेदोपचारः इति ।

अभेदवृत्त्यभेदोपचारयोरनाश्रयणे—एकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयबोधजनकं वाक्यं
विकलदेशः इति प्राहुः ॥

30. Those (well) versed in the principles (of philosophy) also hold that the comprehensive implication means the generation of a cognition having all the traits of an entity identical with the totality of all the remaining traits by means of cognition of a single trait. So it has been said that a comprehensive implication means the collection (cognition) of the entire identity of an object by means of an initiation of the cognition of one (particular) attribute or trait.

Its meaning is explained (here). When a non-distinct entity is expressed by means of a single attribute or trait, there being an impossibility of a special cognition of the possessor of attributes without the attributes, it is called a comprehensive implication. Verily, one single *jīva* is described as bereft of parts and as a totality through one single attribute from amongst (many) like existence etc. by means of non-distinct pervasion or of non-distinct convention, because (therein) the other opposite attribute responsible for division is not in the focus of our exposition. How is non-distinct pervasion possible? And how is the non-distinct convention possible? If such questions are raised, the answers follow. If the substantial point of view is resorted to, the attributes being non-distinct from the substance, the non-distinct pervasion is maintained. If the modal point of view is resorted to, inspite of mutual distinction, the convention of non-distinction is maintained by an ascription of unity or oneness. If a resort to non-distinct pervasion and the convention of non-distinction is not made, the proposition generating cognition of an entity identified by one single trait is the partial implication, so they say (hold).

31. तत्र धर्मान्तराप्रतिषेधकत्वे सति विधिविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यं प्रथमो भङ्गः। स च स्यादस्त्येव घट इति वचनरूपः। धर्मान्तराप्रतिषेधकत्वे सति प्रतिषेधविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यं द्वितीयो भङ्गः। स च स्यान्नास्त्येव घट इत्याकारः, तत्र प्रथमवाक्ये घटशब्दो द्रव्यवाचकः, विशेष्यत्वात्। अस्तीति गुणवाचकः, विशेषणत्वात्।

31. There results the first proposition (*bhanga*) generating the cognition of position of an entity without negating any other trait of it. That takes the form of expression as somehow the pitcher is certainly existent. The second proposition results by generating the cognition of negation of an entity without negating any other trait of it. That takes the shape of expression as the pitcher is certainly non-existent. There in the first proposition the term pitcher is expressive of substance, being an object of qualification. The term (existent) *asti* is expressive of an attribute, being an adjective.

32. ननु—घटस्य रूपम्। फलस्य माधुर्यम्। पुष्पस्य गन्धः। जलस्य शैत्यम्। वायोः स्पर्शः। इत्यादौ गुणस्यापि विशेष्यत्वम् दृश्यते; द्रव्यस्यापि विशेषणत्वं; इति चेत्सत्यम्। तथापि—समानाधिकरणवाक्ये नीलमुत्पलं, शुक्लः पटः, सुरभिर्वायुः, इत्यादौ द्रव्यवाचकस्यैव विशेष्यत्वं गुणवाचकस्यैव विशेषणत्वमिति नियमात्॥

32. Sometimes, in cases such as the colour of a pitcher, the sweet taste of a fruit, the odour of a flower, the coldness of water and the touch of air, the attributes are seen as the objects of qualification; hence the qualifying function is admitted of the substance as well. If so held, it is true (consistent). Still, in the sentences with equal denotation of the subject and the predicate (hence mutually convertible) like the lotus is blue, the cloth is white, the air is sweet-smelling, etc. there is a rule that the terms expressive of substance are objects

of qualification and those expressive of qualification alone are adjectives.

33. तत्र स्वरूपादिभिरस्तित्वमिव नास्तित्वमपि स्यादित्यनिष्ठार्थस्य निवृत्तये स्यादस्त्येवेत्येवकारः । तेन च स्वरूपादिभिरस्तित्वमेव न नास्तित्वमित्यवधार्यते । तदुक्तम्—

‘वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्ठार्थनिवृत्तये ।
कर्तव्यमन्यथानुक्तसमत्वात्तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥’

ननु नानार्थस्थले गौरेवेत्यादौ सत्यप्यवधारणेऽनिष्ठार्थनिवृत्तेरभावात्, गामानयेत्यादावसत्यप्यवधारणे प्रकरणादिनानिष्ठार्थनिवृत्तेर्भावाच्च, नावधारणाधीनाऽन्यनिवृत्तिः । किञ्च अन्यनिवृत्तिं कुर्वन्नेवकार एवकारान्तरमपेक्षते वा ? न वा ? आद्येऽनवस्थापत्तिः । द्वितीये यथैवकारप्रयोग एवकारान्तराभावेऽपि प्रकरणादिनाऽन्यनिवृत्तिर्लभ्यते तथा सर्वशब्दप्रयोगेऽपि प्रकरणादिनाऽन्यनिवृत्तेर्लाभसम्भवादेवकारप्रयोगोऽनर्थक इति ॥

33. There, like position determined by the self-identity etc. of an entity the negation of the same may also come in. To avoid the unwanted situation the determining term ‘eva’ meaning exclusively is supplied in the proposition in ‘some respect the pitcher is exclusively existent’. By so doing it is established that existence alone (of the pitcher) is determined by the self-identity etc. and not (its) non-existence. It is said:-

To avoid the intervention of an undesired meaning the use of the determining term (eva) must be made; otherwise the intervention of the same may find a place somewhere being similar to one not expressed or mentioned.

There is no safeguard against the avoidance of the undesired meaning at places having multiple meaning like the cow alone is, inspite of the determining word ‘eva’; and at an occasion like ‘bring the cow’, etc, the avoidance is effected without the determining term ‘eva’ on account of the (related)

reference. Thus, the avoidance of the other is not controlled by the determining term. And further, does the determining term (i.e. *eva*), effecting the avoidance of the other, stand in need of another determining term '*eva*' or not? In the first case, the objection in the form of 'argument *et infinitum*' occurs. In the second case, just as by the use of the determining term '*eva*', in the absence of the other such term, the avoidance of the other is obtained with the help of the context; in the same way in spite of the use of all the terms the avoidance of the other (undesired) can be obtained reducing the use of the determining term '*eva*' as purposeless or redundant.

34. मैवम् । यतश्शब्दाम्नायपरिपाटी विरुद्धयते । तत्र हि ये शब्दास्स्वार्थमात्रेऽनवधारिते संज्ञेतितास्ते तदवधारणविवक्षायामेवकारमपेक्षन्ते । तत्समुच्चयादिविवक्षायां चकारम् । यथा—घटमेवानय, पटं चानय, इति । यस्त्ववधारणे संज्ञेतितास्तस्य च नावधारणबोधन एवकारान्तरापेक्षा । यथा—चकारस्य समुच्चयबोधने न चकारान्तरापेक्षा ।

34. In this way, we cannot think, because the traditional system of the usage of words is contradicted. There verily, the words, indicated only in their unfixed own meaning, require the use of '*eva*' for the fixing of their meaning on the emergence of a need of such expression; and in case of a need for expression to include them the conjunction '*cha*' (and) is required. For example there, bring the pitcher and (also) bring the cloth, Whatever (word) is indicated in its fixed meaning there is no need of another '*eva*' for fixation of meaning, just as there is no need of another conjunction '*cha*' (and) on the cognition of the inclusion by the first conjunction '*cha*' (and),

35. न च निपातानां द्योतकत्वादेवकारस्य वाचकत्वं न सम्भवतीति वाच्यम् । निपातानां द्योतकत्वपक्षस्य वाचकत्वपक्षस्य च शास्त्रे प्रदर्शनात् ।

“द्योतकाश्च भवन्ति निपाताः” इत्यत्र च शब्दाद्वाचकाश्च, इति व्याख्यानात् ॥

35. nor can it be held that adverbs (*nipatas*) being indicators (of meaning) cannot be expressive (of meaning), because the position of adverbs as indicators as well as expressives has been upheld in the works (on the subject). It has been reexplained (therein) that the adverbs are (also) indicators. Here the use of *cha* (also) confirms that the adverbs are also expressives.

36. परे तु—“निपातानां द्योतकतया न द्योतकस्य द्योतकान्तरापेक्षेत्यवधारणद्योतने नैवकारस्यैवकारान्तरापेक्षा; यथा प्रदीपस्य न प्रदीपान्तरापेक्षा, वाचकस्य च घटादिपदस्य युक्ताऽवधारणबोधनायैवकारापेक्षा। ननु—द्योतकस्यापि द्योतकान्तरापेक्षा दृश्यते, एवमेवेत्यादौ एवमिति मान्तिनिपातस्यैवकारापेक्षणात्; तथा च सर्वोऽपि द्योतको द्योत्यर्थे द्योतकान्तरापेक्षस्यादित्यवनस्था दुर्निवारेति चेन्न, तत्र एवं शब्दस्य स्वार्थवाचकत्वादित्यन्यनिवृत्तौ द्योतकापेक्षोपपत्तेः, निपातानां वाचकत्वस्यापि शास्त्रसम्मतत्वात्, अतएव उपकुम्भमित्यादावुपशब्देन कुम्भशब्दस्य समासः सङ्गच्छते, अन्यथा-उपशब्दस्य द्योतकत्वेन समासो न स्यात्, द्योतकेन समासासम्भवात्” इत्याहुः ॥

36. Others hold that the adverbs, by virtue of being indicators, there is no need of other indicators for these indicators for fixing their indication by means of another ‘eva’ to be attached with the first one, just as there is no need of another lamp for the first one, and for the expressive words like pitcher, etc. the need of the use of *eva* to effect their fixed cognition is justified. But also, for the indicators the need of another indicator is also seen. In the expression ‘*evam eva*’ (exclusively it is so), etc. only the advert ‘*evam*’ (so), ending with ‘*ma*’, requires the advertb ‘*eva*’. And further, if all the indicators, in case of entities indicated, need other indicators, then it is difficult to avoid the fallacy of *argumentum et*

infinitum. If held so, it is not the position. There the word 'evam', being expressive of its own meaning, needs the reference of the indicator for excluding the other (entity); and expressiveness is also held consistent in case the adverbs in the authoritative works. There in the terms like 'upakumbha' the compounding of the word 'kumbha' with the word 'upa' (near) is found consistent. Or, the word 'upa' being an indicator, the (above) compounding would not have been possible, for (such) compounding with an indicator is impossible. It is held thus.

37. अत्र सौगताः—“सर्वशब्दानामन्यव्यावृत्तिवाचकात् घटादिपदैरेव घटेतरव्यावृत्तिबोधनान्न तदर्थमवधारणं युक्तम्” इति वदन्ति ।

तन्; —घटादिशब्दाद्विधिरूपतयाप्यर्थबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । यदि च शब्दाद्विधिरूपतयार्थबोधो नानुभवसिद्ध इति मन्यते तदा कथमन्यव्यावृत्तिशब्दो विधिरूपेणान्यव्यावृत्तिं बोधयति । न च—अन्यव्यावृत्तेरपि तदितरव्यावृत्तिरूपेणैवान्यव्यावृत्तिशब्दाद्बोध इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति तदन्यव्यावृत्तेरपि तदितरव्यावृत्तिरूपेण बोधस्य वक्तव्यतयाऽनवस्थापत्तेरिति । तथा च 'वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्टार्थनिवृत्तये' इति सिद्धम् ॥

37. Here the Saugatas (Buddhists) say (so) that all the terms being expressive of exclusion of the other, the cognition of the exclusion (avoidance) of entities other than the pitcher by the words like pitcher etc. themselves is accomplished. Therefore the certainty of their meaning (by 'eva') is not justified. It is not so, because the cognition of an entity by way of its positive aspect by words like pitcher etc. themselves is accomplished. Therefore the certainty of their meaning (by 'eva') is not justified. It is not so because the cognition of an entity by way of its positive aspect by words like pitcher is certified by (general) experience. If the cognition of an entity in a positive form is not held to be proved by experience, then

how does the word or term 'exclusion of the other' generate the cognition of exclusion of the other in a positive manner? Nor can we say that the cognition of the 'exclusion of the other' is effected by way of exclusion of the other by some other word denoting exclusion of the other. If so held, the cognition of the exclusion of the other being expressible by way of some other exclusion there will occur the fallacy of *argumentum et infinitum*. And thus the position that for the fixing of meaning in a proposition by using 'eva' for the sake of avoiding any other unwanted meaning, is established.

38. अयं चैवकारस्त्रिविधः, अयोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकः अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद-
बोधकः अत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकश्च इति ।

38. This fixation of meaning by the use of 'eva' takes three forms : one, determining cognition of exclusion of no relation, two, generating the cognition of relation with other's exclusion and three, generating cognition of absolute non-relation.

39. तत्र विशेषणसङ्गतैवकारोऽयोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकः, यथा—शङ्खः पाण्डुर एवेति । अयोगव्यवच्छेदो नाम—उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणाभावाप्रति-
योगित्वम् । प्रकृते चोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकं शङ्खत्वं, शङ्खत्वावच्छिन्नमुद्दिश्य पाण्डुरत्वस्य विधानात्, तथा च—शङ्खत्वसमानाधिकरणो योऽत्यन्ताभावः न तावत्पाण्डुरत्वाभावः, किन्त्वन्याभावः, तदप्रतियोगित्वं पाण्डुरत्वे वर्तत इतत् शङ्खत्व-
समानाधिकरणाभावाप्रतियोगिपाण्डुरत्ववान् शङ्ख इत्युक्तस्थले बोधः ।

39. There, where 'eva' goes with the adjective, it is the first form (i.e. *ayoga vyavachheda bodhaka*). The example is the conch is only white. This first form means the non-opposition of the negation of the same locus with the determinant of the subject. In the (present) context, the being of the conch

is the determinant of the being of the subject. Keeping in view the entity determined by the being of the conch, whiteness has been mentioned. And further, what is absolute negation of the entity with the same lives with the being of the conch is not the negation of being white, but it is the negation of others. Its non-opposition exists in being white. Thus in the aforesaid context the (resulting) cognition is that the conch is possessed of whiteness which in non-opposed to the entity with the locus identical with that of the being of the conch.

40. विशेष्यसङ्गतैवकारोऽन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकः । यथा—पार्थ एव धनुर्धर इति । अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदो नाम विशेष्यभिन्नतादात्म्यादिव्यवच्छेदः । तत्रैवकारेण पार्थान्यदातात्म्याभावो धनुर्धरे बोध्यते । तथा च पार्थान्यतादात्म्याभाववद्बोधधराभिन्नः पार्थ इति बोधः ॥

40. Where the 'eva' goes with the qualified entity (it is the second form (i.e. *anyayoga vyavachcheda bodhaka*). The example is that Pārtha alone is the archer—warrior with a bow. This second form means the exclusion of the identity of all different from the qualified one. There the use of 'eva' is indicative of the negation of the relation of identity of every entity other than Pārtha as the archer. And, the (resulting) cognition is that Pārtha is non-distinct from the archer like the negation of identity of all different from Pārtha.

41. क्रियासङ्गतैवकारोऽन्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकः, यथा नीलं सरोजं भवत्येवेति । अत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदो नाम—उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकाभावाप्रतियोगित्वम् । प्रकृते चोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकं सरोजत्वम्, तद्धर्मावच्छिन्ने नीलाभेद-रूपधात्वर्थस्य विधानात् । सरोजत्वव्यापको योऽत्यन्ताभावः, न तावन्नीलाभेदाभावः, कस्मिंश्चित्सरोजे नीलाभेदस्यापि सत्त्वात्, अपि त्वन्याभावः, तदप्रतियोगित्वं नीलाभेदे वर्तते इति सरोजत्वव्यापकात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगि नीलाभेदवत् सरोजमित्युक्तस्थले बोधः ।

41. Where the 'eva' goes with the verb, it is the third form (*atyantāyoga vyavachcheda bodhaka*). The example is that the lotus is exclusively blue. This third form consists in the non-opposition of the negation of the expansion of the determinant of being the subject. In the present context, the being of the lotus is the determinant of being of the subject. The meaning of the root identical with blue is the lotus determined by the trait of being in a lotus, because non-distinction from blue is also existent in some lotus, but it is also the negation of the other. Its non-opposition is found in the non-distinction of blue. Thus the resulting cognition is that the lotus is possessed of the identity of non-distinction from blue which is non-opposed to the absolute negation of the pervasion of the being of the lotus.

42. नन्वेवं—स्यादस्त्येव घट इत्यादावत्यन्तायोगव्यच्छेदबोधकेनैवकारेण भवितव्यम्, क्रियासङ्गत्वात्; एवं च विवक्षितार्थासिद्धिः, कस्मिंश्चिद् घटेऽस्तित्वस्याभावेऽपि तादृशप्रयोगसम्भवात्। यथा कस्मिंश्चित्सरोजे नीलत्वस्याभावेऽपि नीलसरोजं भवत्येवेति प्रयोगः, इति चेन्न,—प्रकृतेऽयोगव्ययच्छेदबोधकस्यैवैवकारस्य स्वीकृतत्वात्, क्रियासङ्गतस्यैवकारस्यापि क्वचिदयोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकत्वदर्शनात्। यथा—ज्ञानमर्थं गृह्णात्येवेत्यादौ ज्ञानत्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावा-प्रतियोगित्वस्यार्थग्राहकत्वे धात्वर्थे बोधः। तत्रापि अत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेद-बोधस्योपगमे ज्ञानमर्थं गृह्णात्येवेतिवज्ज्ञानं रजतं गृह्णात्येवेति प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः। सकलज्ञानेषु रजतग्राहकत्वस्याभावेऽपि यत्किञ्चिज्ज्ञाने रजतग्राहकत्वसत्त्वेनैव ज्ञानं रजतं गृह्णात्येवेत्यत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदबोधकैवकार-प्रयोगस्य निर्बाधत्वात्। तद्वत्प्रकृते क्रियासङ्गतोऽप्ययोगव्यवच्छेदबोधक एवकारः। स्यादस्त्येव घट इत्यादौ घटत्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्यैवकारार्थस्य धात्वर्थेऽस्तित्वेऽन्वयेन घटत्वसमानाधिकरणोऽत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोग्यस्तित्ववान् घट इति बोधः। घटत्वसमानाधिकरणो याऽत्यन्ताभावः, न तावदस्तित्वात्यन्ताभावः, किन्त्वन्याभावः, तदप्रतियोगित्वस्यास्तित्वे सत्त्वात् ॥

42. If so held, in the propositions 'somehow the pitcher exists', only etc., the third form of the use of 'eva' must be there, because (there) it goes with the verb. Thus, the desired meaning is not established, because such a use is possible inspite of the negation of existence (is-ness) is some pitcher. For example, the use that the blue lotus exclusively exists inspite of the negation of existence in some pitcher (is there). If so considered, it is not like this, because in the present context only the first form of the use of 'eva' is accepted. At places the third form of the use of 'eva' by its going with the verb is seen to generate the cognition of the first form of the use of 'eva'. For example, in the statements like 'knowledge comprehends (its) object the meaning of the root as comprehending the object is cognized as non-opposed to the absolute negation residing in the same locus with the being of knowledge determined as the subject. There also the usage that knowledge, also comprehends silver will come in like the usage that knowledge comprehends (its) object in spite of the gain of the cognition as after the third form of the usage of 'eva'. Even in all the cognitions bereft of the prehension of silver, by the presence of prehensions of silver in any form of knowledge also prehends silver, the usage of the third form of the use of 'eva' is seen free from inconsistency. After the same manner, the use of 'eva' takes the first form inspite of its going with the verb. In the propositions, somehow the pitcher is etc., the cognition is that the pitcher is possessed of is-ness (existence) which is non-opposed to the absolute negation of an entity having the same locus with the being of the pitcher. It is because the root meaning of the 'eva' as non-opposition of the absolute negation of an entity having the same locus with the being of the pitcher. Whatever is the absolute negation of an entity with the same locus as the being of the pitcher, it

is not the absolute negation of existence (is-ness) but it is the negation of others and its non-opposition resides in existence (of the pitcher).

43. अथ—घटत्वसमानाधिकरणो योऽत्यन्ताभाव इत्युक्तेऽस्ति-
त्वात्यन्ताभावोऽपि भवितुमर्हति, अस्तित्वात्यन्ताभावस्य नास्तित्वस्य घटे सत्त्वात्;
तादृशाभावाप्रतियोगित्वं चास्तित्वे बाधितम्, इति निरुक्तवाक्येनास्तित्वाभावस्य
नास्तित्वस्य घटे निषेधः प्राप्नोतीति चेत्।—उच्यते, प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणा
भावाप्रतियोगित्वमेवकारार्थः, तादृशाभावे—उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्यं
चोद्देश्यबोधकपदसमभि-व्याहारलभ्यम्। शङ्खः पाण्डुर एवेत्यादौ प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणा
-भावाप्रतियोगित्वरूपैवकारार्थेकदेशोऽभावे शङ्खत्वसामानाधिकरण्यस्य
शङ्खपदसमभिव्याहारलभ्यत्वात्। एवं च प्रकृतेऽप्येवकारार्थः
प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रतियोगित्वम्, अभावे घटत्वसामानाधिकरण्यन्तु
घटपदसमभिव्याहारलभ्यम्। तथा च घटत्वसमानाधिकरणः प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणो
योऽभावः, न तावदस्तित्वाभावरूपं नास्तित्वं, तस्य प्रतियोगिनाऽस्तित्वेन
समानाधिकरणत्वात्। किन्त्वन्याभावः, तदप्रतियोगित्वं चास्तित्वे निर्बाधमिति ॥

43. Further, on the mention of the absolute (extreme, total) negation of the entity with the same locus with the being the pitcher, the absolute negation of existence too becomes admissible because the non-existence, which is the absolute non-existence of the existence, is present in the pitcher. Such non-opposition of negation is contradicted in existence. Thus, we get the negation of non-existence of the existence by the sentence of explanation. If so, it is further explained. The meaning of 'eva' is the non-opposition of the negation of the special locus of the opposed (entity). In case of such a negation the community of the locus of the determinant of being the subject is obtainable by the use of the term generating cognitions of being the subject. In the propositions like the conch is white alone etc. the meaning of 'eva' as the non-opposition of the negation of the opposition of the opposing locus being only in

the past, the gain of the community of the locus with the conch is obtainable by the use of the term pitcher. And further whatever is the negation as the locus of the opposite, and in the negation the community of the locus with the being of the pitcher is obtainable by the use of the term pitcher. And further whatever is the negation as the locus of the opposite and as the same with the locus of the being of the pitcher is not the non-existence of the form of the negation of existence, because it has the same locus as existence - the opposite of non-existence. But it is the negation of the other. The non-opposition of it is seen uncontradicted in existence too.

44. अत्र प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्याप्रवेशे पूर्वोक्तरीत्या सर्वप्रकारेणाप्यस्तित्वप्रसक्त्या नास्तित्वनिषेधे प्राप्तेऽस्तित्वैकान्त्यनिवृत्तिपूर्वक-मनैकान्त्यद्योतनाय स्यात्कारः । स्यात्कारप्रयोगाधीनमेवैवकारार्थं प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्यं पूर्वं प्रवेशितम् ।

44. Here in the manner explained before, on the reference of the special locus of the opposition being not made, and on the negation of the non-existence by the existence from all the means being obtained, the use of 'eva' is made to indicate non-absolutism with the exclusion of the absolutism of existence. It has already been shown that having a special locus with the opposition is placed in the meaning of 'eva' under the governance of the term 'syāt' meaning somehow (under certain condition only and not absolutely).

45. स्याच्छब्दशस्य चानेकान्तविधिविचारादिषु बहुष्वर्थेषु सम्भवत्सु इह विवक्षावशादनेकान्तार्थो गृह्यते । अनेकान्तत्वं नामानेकधर्मात्मकत्वम् । अन्तशब्दस्य घटादावभेदेनान्वयः । तथा चानेकधर्मात्मको घटस्तादृशास्तित्वानितिवोधः ।

45. Among the many possible meanings in the consideration of (many) ways of non-absolutism, the meaning of the term 'syāt' has been chosen as non-absolutism here

under the pressure of expression. Being non-absolute is certainly an identity with the manifold traits. The term *anta* (trait) goes with the pitcher, etc. in a non-distinctive way. The cognition of the pitcher which is identical with manifold traits is that it is possessed of similar existence.

46. न च—स्याच्छब्देनैवानेकान्तस्य बोधनेऽस्त्यादिवचनमनर्थकमिति वाच्यम्। स्याच्छब्देन समानान्यतोऽनेकान्तबोधनेऽपि विशेषरूपेण बोधनायास्त्यादिशब्दप्रयोगात्। तदुक्तम्—

“स्याच्छब्दादप्यनेकान्तसामान्यस्यावबोधने।

शब्दान्तरप्रयोगोऽत्र विशेषप्रतिपत्तये ॥” इति ॥

यथा—वृक्षो न्यग्रोधः, इति वृक्षत्वेन रूपेण न्यग्रोधस्य बोधनेऽपि न्यग्रोधत्वेन रूपेण न्यग्रोधबोधनाय न्यग्रोधपदप्रयोगः। स्याच्छब्दस्य द्योतकत्वपक्षे तु न्यायप्राप्त एवास्त्यादिप्रयोगः। अस्त्यादिशब्देनोक्तस्यानेकान्तस्य स्याच्छब्देन द्योतनात्। स्याच्छब्दाप्रयोगे सर्वथैकान्तव्यवच्छेदेनानेकान्तप्रतिपत्तेरसम्भवात्, एवकारावचने विवक्षितार्थाप्रतिपत्तिवत्।

46. And also, this also cannot be said that non-absolutism being known by the term *syāt* (somehow), it is useless to mention terms like exists (*asti*). In spite of non-absolutism being known in general the use of the terms like exists (*asti*) is meant to know it specially. It has been said :

Non-absolutism being known in general by the term *syāt* (somehow), the use of other terms (like *asti* etc.) in this context is meant for its special comprehension.

For example, in the sentence ‘it is a banyan tree’, having known the banyan tree as a tree, the use of the term ‘banyan’ is meant to know the banyan tree in its (own) identity. With the use of the term *syāt* (some how) as indicatory the use of terms like exists (*asti*) certainly comes out logically consistent, because the term *syāt* indicates non-absolutism expressed by the terms

the term *syāt* indicates non-absolutism expressed by the terms like exists (*asti*) etc. In the absence of the use of the term *syāt*, the comprehension of non-absolutism becomes impossible by excluding absolutism in all its forms like the non-comprehension of the desired object in the absence of the use of 'eva'.

47. नन्वप्रयुक्तोऽपि स्याच्छब्दो वस्तुनोऽनेकान्तस्वरूपत्वसामर्थ्यात्प्रतीयते, सर्वत्रैवकारवत्, इति चेत्सत्यं; प्रतिपाद्यानां स्याद्वादन्यायकौशलाभावे वस्तुसामर्थ्यात्तदप्रतीत्या तेषां प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं तदावश्यकत्वात्। प्रतिपाद्यानां स्याद्वादकौशले च स्यात्कारप्रयोग इष्ट एव। प्रमाणादिनाऽनेकान्तात्मके समस्तवस्तुनि सिद्धे कुशलानामस्ति घट इति प्रयोगेऽपि स्यादस्त्येव घट इति प्रतिपत्तिसम्भवात्। तदुक्तम्—

“सोऽप्रयुक्तोऽपि वा तर्ज्जस्सर्वत्रार्थात्प्रतीयते।
यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः ॥” इति ॥

ननु योऽस्ति घटादिस्स सर्वोऽपि स्वायत्तद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः, नेतरैः। तेषामप्रस्तुतत्वादेव निराससम्भवात्। तथा च स्यात्कारप्रयोगो व्यर्थ इति चेत्सत्यम्। स तु तादृशोऽर्थेऽशब्दात् प्रतीयमानः कीदृशात्प्रतीयत इति चिन्तायां स्यात्कारः प्रयुज्यते। स च तिङन्तप्रतिरूपको निपातः।

47. A question may be raised here. In spite of being not used, the term 'syāt' (somehow) is acknowledged by the force of reality of the nature of the non-absolute as is effected everywhere by the use of 'eva'. If so, it is true. Such a use (of *syāt*) becomes necessary in case of the learners to enable them to comprehend (it) in the absence of the expertise of judging it by *syādvāda* by its being not known by the force of reality. It is desirable to use *syāt* in case of learners even in the presence of expertise to draw judgements in accordance with *Syādvāda*. The entire (range of reality), being established as non-absolutistic, the usage 'the pitcher is (exists)' may generate a

cognition that the pitcher is (exists) exclusively' for the well-versed in *Syādvāda*.

It has been said : Or the term 'eva', without being used is cognized everywhere by dint of (the force of) a real by the knowers of that (*Syādvāda*), just as the term 'eva' is known (without its use) with a purpose of excluding the forms of the use of 'eva' like the first form etc. (of the use of 'eva').

Again a query is raised (there) and answered thus. Whatever reality like the pitcher, etc. is there it is (so) by virtue of its own (obtained) substance, place, time and mode, and not by those of other's. Their (others') exclusion is (already) there because of the absence of their context. And the use of *syāt* (somehow) becomes meaningless or redundant. If so, it is true for that type of meaning being known by the term itself to determine the type of the term, the use of *syāt* is made under the necessity of the type of the term. This form (grammatical) of *syāt* results from the root 'as' meaning existence in some inflexion implying blessing. It is an adverb of the form of *tiñanta* verb form.

48. ननु स्याच्छब्दस्य द्योतकत्वपक्षे केन पुनश्शब्देनोक्तानेकान्तस्स्याच्छब्देन द्योत्यते इति चेत्—

अस्त्येव घट इत्यादिवाक्येनाभेदवृत्त्याऽभेदोपचारेण वा प्रतिपादितोऽनेकान्त-
स्स्याच्छब्देन द्योत्यत इति ब्रूमः । सकलादेशो हि यौगपद्ये- नाशेषधर्मात्मकं
घटादिरूपमर्थं कालादिभिरभेदवृत्त्याऽभेदोपचारेण वा प्रतिपादयति, सकलादेशस्य
प्रमाणरूपत्वात् । विकलादेशस्तु क्रमेण भेदप्राधान्येन भेदोपचारेण वा सुनयैकान्तात्मकं
घटादिरूपमर्थं प्रतिपादयति । विकलादेशस्य नयस्वरूपत्वात् ।

48. Again a query is raised and answered. Indicatory aspect of the term *syāt* being accepted, again by what term being announced non-absolutism is indicated? The reply follows. In propositions like 'the pitcher is (exists) exclusively'

etc. by non-distinctive pervasion or by concession of non-distinction the term *anekānta* (non-absolutism) is indicated. So we say, verily, comprehensiveness propounds the real like the pitcher, etc. with the totality of its traits by non-distinctive pervasion with time etc., or comprehensiveness is of the nature of *pramāṇa* or knowledge of the total object. And partial comprehension propounds the real like the pitcher etc. identical with true partial absolutisms or vaild *nayas* in sucession mainly with distinctiveness or (mainly) by a concession of distinctiveness. becasue the partial comprehension is of the nature of *naya* (analytic cognitions of the object).

49. कः पुनः क्रमः किं वा यौगपद्यम् ? इति चेदुच्यते । यदा तावदस्तित्वाधिर्माणां कालादिभिर्भेदविवक्षा, तदाऽस्त्यादिरूपैकशब्दस्य नास्तित्वाद्यनेकधर्मबोधने शक्त्यभावात्क्रमः । यदा तु तेषामेव धर्माणां कालादिभिरभेदेन वृत्तमात्मरूपमुच्यते, तदैकेनाप्यस्त्यादिशब्देनास्तित्वादिरूपैकधर्मबोधनमुखेन तदात्मकतामापन्नस्य सकलधर्मस्वरूपस्य प्रतिपादनसम्भवाद्यौगपद्यम् ॥

49. Then, what is sequence, or what is simultaneity? It is (now) being explained. When it is desired to discuss the traits like existence etc. with distinction of time etc., then for the single term like existence etc. there is the absence of capacity to generate cognition of the manifold traits like non-existence etc.; and therefore then a recourse to succession is adopted. But when its own identity constituted by the same traits is described by non-distinction with time etc., then by a single term like existence etc. the totality of all the traits, being identical with it, becomes describable by means of initiation of the cognition of the single trait of existence etc., and there is simultaneity.

50. के पुनः कालादयः ? इति चेदुच्यते । कालः, आत्मरूपम्, अर्थः,

सम्बन्धः, उपकारः, गुणिदेशः, संसर्गः, शब्दः, इति । तत्र स्यादस्त्येव घट इत्यत्र यादृशकालावच्छेदेन घटादावस्तित्वं वर्तते—तत्कालावच्छेदेन शेषानन्तधर्मा अपि घटे वर्तन्त इति तेषामेककालावच्छिन्नैकाधिकरणनिरूपितवृत्तित्वं कालेनाभेदवृत्तिः । यदेवास्तित्वस्य घटगुणत्वं स्वरूपं—तदेवान्यानन्तगुणानामपि स्वरूप-मित्येकस्वरूपत्वमात्मरूपेणाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव च घटद्रव्य-रूपोऽर्थोऽस्तित्वस्याधारस्स एवान्यधर्माणामप्याधार इत्येकाधारवृत्तित्वमर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव चाविष्वग्भावः कथंचित्तादात्म्यलक्षणोऽस्तित्वस्य सम्बन्धस्स एवानन्तधर्माणामपीत्येक-सम्बन्धप्रतियोगित्वं सम्बन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव चोपकारोऽस्तित्वस्य स्वानुरक्तत्वकरणम् तच्च स्ववैशिष्ट्यसम्पादनं, यथा—नीलरक्तादिगुणानां नीलरक्ताद्युपरि नञ् नीलरक्तत्वादिगुणवैशिष्ट्यसम्पादनमेव, तदपि स्वप्रकारकधर्मविशेष्यकज्ञानजनकत्वपर्यवसन्नम् । अस्तित्वस्य स्वानुरक्तत्वकरणं हि अस्तित्वप्रकारकघटविशेष्यज्ञानजनकत्वम्, तादृशोपकार एव नास्तित्वादिभिरशेषधर्मैः क्रियत इत्येककार्यजनकत्वमुपकारेणाभेदवृत्तिः । यद्देशावच्छेदेन घटादावस्तित्वं वर्तते—तद्देशावच्छेदेनैव घटे नास्तित्वादिधर्माः, न तु कण्ठावच्छेदेनास्तित्वं, पृष्ठावच्छेदेन नास्तित्वमिति देशभेदः, इत्येकदेशावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वं गुणिदेशेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव चैकवस्त्वात्मनास्तित्वस्य संसर्गस्स एवापरधर्माणाम-पीत्येकसंसर्गप्रतियोगित्वं संसर्गेणाभेदवृत्तिः ॥

ननु—सम्बन्धसंसर्गयोः को विशेषः ? इति चेदुच्यते । कथंचित्तादात्म्यलक्षणे सम्बन्धेऽभेदप्रधानं भेदो गौणः, संसर्गे तु भेदः प्रधानमभेदो गौणः, इति विशेषः, कथंचित्तादात्म्यं हि कथंचिद्भेदाभेदोभयरूपम् । तत्र भेदविशिष्टाभेदस्सबन्ध इत्युच्यते । अभेदविशिष्टभेदश्च संसर्ग इत्युच्यते । य एवास्तीति शब्दोऽस्तित्व-धर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो वाचकस्य एवाशेषानन्तधर्मात्मकस्यापि वस्तुनो वाचक इत्येकशब्दवाच्यत्वं शब्देनाभेदवृत्तिः । एवं कालादिभिरष्टविधाऽभेदवृत्तिः पर्यायार्थिक-नयस्य गुणभावे द्रव्यार्थिकनयप्राधान्यादुपपद्यते ।

50. What are the time, etc. (in this context)? It is described as (follows). They are time, self identity, the real, the internal relation, the auxiliary work, the place of the possessor of attributes, the external relation (contact) and the word. There in the situation 'somehow the pitcher exists' just as existence pervades the pitcher etc. by excluding time, then by excluding time the remaining infinite traits also pervade the pitcher. It is

the non-distinctive temporal pervasion by pervasion of the nature of co-spatiality excluding the community of time for them (those traits). When the identity of existence is the being an attribute of the pitcher, the same is its identity of the nature of its infinite attributes. Thus it is the non-distinctive pervasion by self-identity. Whatever entity of the form of a pitcher is the locus of existence, the same is the locus of the other traits also. This oneness of identity is the 'somehow' identity, the same is also the opposite of the same (one) relation of even infinite traits. It is non-distinctive pervasion by relation. Whatever is the auxiliary work of existence in the form of absorption of reddening itself, the same is the accomplishment of spatiality for itself, for example, as in case of attributes like blueness, redness, etc. The colouring as blue, red, etc. is the accomplishment of spatiality for itself, the same is the attainment of the generating cognition related with the qualified entity possessed of traits of its own kind. The auxiliary work of the trait of existence in the form of existence in the form of absorbing (colouring) itself is there, it is the generation of a cognition of the type of existence of the pitcher—the qualified entity. The same is also done by the totality of traits like existence and non-existence etc. Thus, the accomplishment of the same function (result) is the non-distinctive pervasion by the auxiliary work. Whatever existence is pervading the pitcher etc. by excluding spatiality, the traits like non-existence etc. also pervade it by excluding the same spatiality. It is not that existence is accomplished by excluding the neck (of the pitcher) and non-existence by excluding the back (outer surface). Such distinction of spatiality is there. Thus, it is the non-distinctive pervasion by the spatiality of the possessor of the attributes by excluding the occupation of the same space. Whatever is the connection (contact) of existence by singleness

of an entity, the same is opposition of the one (contact) of the other traits. Thus, it is the non-distinctive pervasion by contact. Now the query is 'what speciality is there between relation and contact? It is being explained. In the relation of the nature of conditional identity non-distinction is dominant, and distinction is secondary. Such is the speciality (between the two). Conditional identity is of the nature of conditional distinction-cum-nondistinction. There the relation is non-distinction qualified by distinction, and is said to be the relation, and that distinction qualified by non-distinction is said to be the contact. Whatever word is expressive of the trait of existence of a real, the same is expressive of the infinite remaining traits of the real. Thus, expressibility by the same word is the non-distinctive pervasion by word. Thus, the distinctive pervasion by the eight factors is generated by the dominance of substantial point of view on the recession of the modal point of view.

51. द्रव्यार्थिकगुणभावे पर्यायार्थिकप्राधान्ये तु नेयं गुणानामभेदवृत्तिस्सम्भवति । तथा हि—तत्र कालेन तावदभेदवृत्तिर्न सम्भवति, समकालमेकत्र नानागुणानां परस्परविरुद्धानामसम्भवात्; प्रतिक्षणं वस्तुनो भेदात् । सम्भवे वा तावदाश्रयस्य तावत्प्रकारेण भेदप्रसङ्गात् ॥ नाप्यात्मरूपेणाभेदवृत्तिस्सम्भवति नानागुणानां स्वरूपस्य भिन्नत्वात्; स्वरूपाभेदे तेषां परस्परभेदस्य विरोधात् ॥ नाप्यर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः, स्वाश्रयार्थस्यापि नानात्वात्, अन्यथा नानागुणाश्रयस्यैकत्वविरोधात् ॥ नापि सम्बन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः, सम्बन्धस्यापि सम्बन्धभेदेन भेददर्शनात्; यथा दण्डदेवदत्तसम्बन्धादन्यश्छत्रदेवदत्तसम्बन्धः ॥ नाप्युपकारेणाभेदः, अनेकगुणैः क्रियमाणस्य चोपकारस्य प्रतिनियतरूपस्यानेकत्वात्, अनेकैरुपकारिभिः क्रियमाणस्योपकारस्यैकत्वविरोधात् ॥ नापि गुणिदेशाभेदः, गुणिदेशस्यापि प्रतिगुणं भेदात्, तदभेदे भिन्नार्थगुणानामपि गुणिदेशाभेदप्रसङ्गात् ॥ नापि संसर्गेणाभेदः, संसर्गस्यापि संसर्गभेदेन भेदात्, तदभेदे संसर्गभेदविरोधात् ॥ नापि शब्देनाभेदः, शब्दस्यार्थभेदेन भिन्नत्वात्, सर्वगुणानामेकशब्दवाच्यतायां सर्वार्थानामेकशब्दवाच्यतापत्त्या शब्दान्तरवैफल्याण्ते । एवं तत्त्वतोऽस्तित्वादीनामेकत्र वस्तुन्यभेदवृत्तेरसम्भवे कालादिभिर्भिन्नानामपि गुणानामभेदोपचारः क्रियते ।

51. In case of recession of the substantial side and the dominance of the modal side this non-distinctive pervasion of attributes (traits) is not possible. Further, verily, the non-distinctive pervasion by time is not possible in case of mutually opposed manifold attributes in the same locus, for a real becomes distinctive every moment (of its existence). In case that is supposed to be possible, the distinctions in the locus will also have to be accepted in the same way. And also, the non-distinctive pervasion by self-identity is possible, because the identity of the manifold attributes is mutually distinctive. If non-distinction is supposed to be there in the manifold attributes, their mutual distinction becomes inconsistent (contradictory). Nor is there the non-distinctive pervasion by reality, because its own locus takes distinctive forms, or to hold the locus as the same for manifold attributes will become contradictory. Nor is there the non-distinctive pervasion by relation, because distinction from it is seen through the relata. For example, the relation that is between the staff and Devadutta is different from the relation between the umbrella and Devadatta. Nor is there non-distinction by auxiliary work, because the virtual work done by manifold attributes according to their fixed identity takes manifold forms, and there is contradiction between the oneness of the auxiliary work and the varied factors responsible for the auxiliary work. Nor is there non-distinction by the space occupied by the possessor of the attributes, because such space too is distinct in accordance with the individual attributes. On admission of non-distinction the non-distinction of the space occupied by the possessor of attributes in respect attributes belonging to different entities has to be admitted. Nor is there the non-distinction by contact, because the contact is also distinct from the agent of the contact. On

admission of non-distinction (between them) contradiction will result in respect of the agents of contact. Nor is there the non-distinction by word (expression), because the word also assumes distinction by distinction among entities. On admission of the possibility of expression of all the attributes by one word the use of varied words will become useless on account of the expressibility of all the entities by one word alone. Thus the non-distinctive pervasion of traits like existence etc. in the same entity being impossible in the real sense, a concessional acceptance of non-distinction of attributes is effected about the attributes though distinct by time etc. (i.e. the eight factors mentioned earlier).

52. एवं निरूपिताभ्यामभेदवृत्त्यभेदोपचाराभ्यामेकेनास्तिनास्त्यादि-
शब्देनोपात्तस्याशेष- धर्मात्मकस्य घटादिवस्तुनः स्यात्कारोद्योतकस्समवतिष्ठते । इत्येवं
पदार्थो निरूपितः ।

52. Thus, the term 'syāt' (somehow, conditionally) is consistently used as an indicator of a real like the pitcher, etc. obtained with totality of traits through one (single) term like existence, non-existence, etc. described by non-distinctive pervasion and by a concession of non-distinction. In this way the implication of terms is explained.

53. वाक्यार्थो निरूप्यते । स्यादस्त्येव घटः, स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः, इत्यस्य
स्वरूपाद्यवच्छिन्नास्तित्वाश्रयो घटः, पररूपाद्यवच्छिन्ननास्तित्वाश्रयो घटः, इति
च बोधः । घटादिरूपे वस्तुनि स्वरूपादिना सत्त्वम् पररूपादिनाऽसत्त्वञ्चाङ्गी-
करणीयम् । अन्यथा वस्तुत्वस्यैव विलयापत्तेः स्वरूपरूपोपादानापोहनव्यवस्थाप्यं
हि वस्तुनो वस्तुत्वम् ।

53. The implication of a proposition is described (hereafter). The cognition resulting from the propositions

'somehow the pitcher is exclusively, and somehow the 'pitcher is not exclusively' is that the pitcher is the locus of existence as isolated by its (own) factors of identity; and that the pitcher is the locus of non-existence as isolated by the factors of others' identity. In the reals of the form like the pitchers etc. existence is to be admitted by the factors like self-identity, and non-existence, by the factors like others' identity; otherwise, the being of a real (the capacity of a real to perform function), will meet its extinction. The being of a real is verily maintained by establishment of its own identity and by its differentiation from the identity of others.

54. तत्र घटस्य किं स्वरूपम्? किंवा पररूपम्? इति चेत्,—घट इत्यादिबुद्धौ प्रकारतया भासमानो घटपदशक्यतावच्छेदकीभूतसदृशपरिणाम-लक्षणो यो घटत्वनामको धर्मस्स घटस्य स्वरूपं, पटत्वादिकं पररूपम्। तत्र घटत्वादिरूपेणेव पटत्वादिरूपेणापि घटस्य सत्त्वे घटस्य पटात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः, पटत्वादिनेव घटत्वादिनाप्यसत्त्वे सर्वथा शून्यत्वापत्तिः, शशविषाणवत्।

54. There, what is the self-identity of the pitcher, or what is the other-identity for it? The query is like this, the answer follows. The trait of the name '*ghaṭava*' (being of the pitcher), illumined in the intellect on the mention of the word 'pitcher' is the self-identity of the pitcher. It has the differentia of similar manifestations implied by the term 'pitcher' and describable by it and also excluding it from others. Being cloth, etc. is the other-identity (in this context). On admission of the existence (of the pitcher) by the being of cloth like the being of the pitcher too, the being of pitcher has to be accepted (as) of the nature of the being of cloth. On admitting non-existence of the being of a pitcher like that of the cloth, there would be absolute (by all ways) void like the horns of a hare.

55. अथवा—नामस्थापनाद्रव्यभावानां मध्ये यद् विवक्षितं तत्स्वरूपं, इतरत्पररूपम्। तत्र विवक्षितेन रूपेणास्ति अविवक्षितेन नास्ति। यदि विवक्षितेनापि रूपेण नास्ति, तर्हि शशविषाणवदसत्त्वमेव घटस्य प्राप्नोति। यदि चाविवक्षितेनापि रूपेणास्ति, तदा नामादीनां परस्परभेदो न स्यात्।

55. Or, whatever, from amongst name, conditioning, substance and mode (i.e. the *svachatuṣṭaya*), is made the object of statement is (its) self-identity, and the other is the other-identity. There an entity is (exists) quâ the identity as made object of expression, and it is not (does not exist) quâ identity as not made object of expression. If it is not (does not exist) even quâ identity made object of expression, then the non-existence of the pitcher is obtained like the horns of a hare. If it is (exists) even quâ identity not made object of expression, there the mutual distinction of the name etc. will not be there.

56. अथवा—घटत्वावच्छिन्नेषु मध्ये यादृशघटः परिगृह्यते, तन्निष्ठस्थौल्यादिधर्मः स्वरूपम्, इतरघटादिव्यक्तिवृत्तिधर्म एव पररूपम्। तत्र तादृशस्वरूपेणास्ति, पररूपेण नास्ति। स्वरूपेणाप्यस्तित्वानङ्गीकारेऽसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः पूर्ववत्। एवमग्रेऽपि। तादृशो घटो यदि निरुक्तपररूपेणाप्यस्ति, तदा सर्वघटानामैक्य-प्रसङ्गात्सामान्याश्रयव्यवहारविलोपापत्तिः।

56. Or, from amongst entities whatever type of a pitcher as differentiated by being as pitcher is prehended, the traits like volume. etc. are its self-identity, and the traits prevailing in the other individual pitchers are (its) other-identity. There it exists quâ that type of identity, and it does not exist quâ other-identity. On not holding the existence of the pitcher even quâ self-identity, there occurs non-existence for it as mentioned before. The same is the position in respect of further considerations. If the pitcher of that type exists even by the

identity of the other (pitchers), then on account of other pitchers obtaining oneness, the treatment or practice based on generality will be reduced to nullity.

57. अथवा—तस्मिन्नेव घटविशेषे कालान्तरावस्थायिनि पूर्वोत्तरकुसूलान्तकपालाद्यवस्थाकलापः पररूपं, तदन्तरालवृत्तिघटपर्यायस्वरूपं, तेन रूपेणास्ति। इतररूपेण नास्ति। यदि कुसूलान्तकपालाद्यात्मनापि घटोऽस्ति, तदा घटावस्थायां घटपर्यायस्येव कुसूलादिपर्यायस्याप्युपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः। कुसूलाद्यवस्थायामपि घटसत्त्वे घटपर्यायोत्पत्तिविनाशार्थं गुरुप्रयत्नवैफल्यं च। एवं अन्तरालवृत्तिघटपर्यायानामपि यदि घटो नास्ति, तदा तत्काले जलाहरणादिरूपं तत्कार्यं नोपलभ्यते।

57. Or, in the same particular pitcher, stable (continuous) in others times, the former and the later collocations of states like the lump of earth to the pieces of the pitcher are the other-identity, the modal forms intervening the interval among them are the self-identity. It is by that identity, and it is not by the other-identity. If the pitcher exists by modes of the lump of earth and its two hemispherical parts, then in the state of the pitcher, like the mode as the pitcher, the modes like the lump of earth and its two hemispherical parts will also have to exist. In the presence of the made as the lump of earth, if the pitcher is held to exist, then the heavy attempt to originate and destroy the mode of the pitcher will become useless. Thus, if the pitcher is not existent even by the forms of modes pervading during the interval (of time), then during that interval its functions like the fetching of water will not be found (seen).

58. अथवा—घटादौ प्रतिक्षणं सजातीयपरिणामो जायत इति तावत्सिद्धान्तसिद्धम्। तत्र ऋजुसूत्रनयापेक्षया वर्तमानक्षणवृत्तिघटपर्यायः स्वरूपम्, अतीतानागतघटपर्याय एव पररूपम्। तत्क्षणवृत्तिस्वभावेन सता घटोऽस्ति, क्षणान्तरवृत्तिस्वभावेन नास्ति, तथा प्रतीतेः। तत्क्षणवृत्तिस्वभावेनेव क्षणान्तरवृत्ति-भावेनाप्यस्तित्वे एकक्षणवृत्त्येव सर्वं स्यात्। क्षणान्तरवृत्तिस्वभावेन तत्क्षणवृत्ति-

स्वभावेनाप्यस्तित्वाभावे घटाश्रयव्यवहारस्यैव विलोपापत्तिः । विनष्टानुत्पन्नघट-
व्यवहाराभावत् ।

58. Or this much is already established by the current acceptance that homogeneous changes go on every moment in objects like the pitcher. There, from the point of view of the 'straight thread' or linear view or the standpoint of momentariness (*rjusūtra naya*), the mode of the pitcher existent in the present moment is its own identity, and the modes of the pitcher gone by and not yet emerged are its other-identity. The pitcher is (exists) by the present nature of existence at that moment, it is not (does not exist) by the nature of existence during other moments. Such is our experience. On the assumption of is-ness by the nature of existence at that moment and also by the nature of existence at other moments, all will become durable only for one moment. On the assumption of the negation of its is-ness by the nature of its existence at other moments and also by the nature of its existence at the same moment, the practical treatment (use) of the pitcher will be reduced to nullity because of the absence of the practical use of (the modes) the pitcher gone by and not yet emerged.

59. अथवा—तस्मिन्नेव तत्क्षणवर्तिनि रूपादिसमुदायात्मके घटे पृथुबुध्नो-
दराद्याकारः स्वरूपम्, इतराकारः पररूपम् । तेन पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारेण घटोस्ति,
इतराकारेण नास्ति; पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारसत्त्वे घटव्यवहारसत्त्वं तदभावे तदभाव
इति तादृशाकारनियतत्वात्तदव्यवहारस्य पृथुबुध्नोदराकारेणाप्यस्तित्वाभावे
घटस्यासत्त्वापत्तिः, इतराकारेणप्यस्तित्वे तादृशाकारशून्ये पटादावपि
घटव्यवहारप्रसंगः ॥

59. Or, in the same pitcher existing in the same moment as a collocation of corporality, the shape and colour as a big spherical shape like the stomach, is its own identity, and the shape other than this is its other-identity. The pitcher exists by

the shape as a big spherical stomach, it does not exist by (any) other (shape). (Thus) on this existence of the pitcher by the shape, as a big spherical stomach the practical treatment of the pitcher is possible, and in the absence it is not possible. The practical treatment (of the pitcher) being determined by the shape of that type, the negation of its existence, by a shape as a big spherical stomach, the pitcher (itself) will meet its non-existence. In the absence of the shape of that type and its existence by any other shape, its treatment as a pitcher will become possible even in case of the pitcher etc.

60. अथवा—रूपादिविष्टो घटश्चक्षुषा गृह्यते इत्यस्मिन्व्यवहारे रूपमुखेन घटो गृह्यत इति रूपं स्वरूपं रसादि पररूपम् । तत्र रूपात्मनास्ति, चक्षुरिन्द्रियमात्र-ग्राह्यत्वात् । यदि चक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं रसस्याप्यङ्गीक्रियते, तदा रसनादीन्द्रियकल्पना व्यर्था । यदि च रसादेरिव रूपस्यापि चक्षुरिन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानविषयता, न स्यात्तदा घटस्यैवाग्रहप्रसङ्गः, रूपादिज्ञाननियतत्वात् घटादिज्ञानस्य ।

60. Or, in the practice that the pitcher as differentiated by colour, etc. is perceived by the eye, the pitcher (as a whole) is perceived by the initiation of colour and shape (*rūpa*); hence colour (*rūpa*) is its own identity, and taste and the like are its other-identity. There the pitcher exists by way of the identity of colour, because it is perceptible only through the eye. If the perceptibility through the eye is accepted in respect of taste also, then the supposition of the sense of taste becomes futile. If, as in case of taste etc., the colour (*rūpa*) is not accepted as the object of ocular perception, then there will result the non-apprehension of the pitcher itself, because the perception of the pitcher etc. is determined by the perceptions of (its) colour, etc.

61. अथवा—शब्दभेदे ध्रुवोऽर्थभेद इति घटकुटादिशब्दानामप्यर्थ-

भेदस्समभिरूढनयार्पणात् । घटनात् घटः—कौटिल्यात्कुट इति तत्क्रियापरिणतिक्षण
एव शब्दस्य वृत्तिर्युक्ता । तत्र घटनक्रियाविषयकर्तृत्वं स्वरूपम्, इतरत्पररूपम् ।
तत्राद्येनास्ति, इतरेण नास्ति । इत्यादिरीत्या स्वरूपपररूपभेदा ऊह्याः ॥

61. Or with the change of words the change of the entities (expressed) is certain, because on the difference of words like pitcher (*ghaṭa*), mat (*kaṭa*) the difference of the entities is accepted under the *sambhirūḍha naya* (the fixation of meaning). The pitcher is a pitcher for its behaviour and the mat is a mat for its being capable for being rolled curved, thus the use of a word is justified only at the moment by its existence as modified by the action. There the doership of the action as a pitcher is its own identity, the other than (different form) this is its other-identity. There it exists by the former and does not exist by the latter. Thus by adopting such ways the self-identity and the other-identity are to be considered.

62. एवं घटस्य स्वद्रव्यं मृद्द्रव्यं, परद्रव्यं सुवर्णादि । घटो मृदात्मनास्ति, सुवर्णाद्यात्मना नास्ति । घटस्य स्वद्रव्यात्मनेव परद्रव्यात्मनापि सत्त्वे घटो मृदात्मको न सुवर्णात्मक इति नियमो न स्यात् । तथा च द्रव्यप्रतिनियमविरोधः ।

62. Thus the own substance of the pitcher is the substance of earth, and the other-substance (of the pitcher) is gold etc. The pitcher is (exists) by the identity of earth, it is not (does not exist) by the identity of gold etc. On the assumption of the existence of the pitcher by its other-substance, like that its own substance, the regulation that the pitcher is made of earth and not made of gold will not be possible. And then there will be the contradiction of the regulation regarding the substance (of things).

63. ननु संयोगविभागादेरनेकद्रव्याश्रयत्वेऽपि न द्रव्यप्रतिनियमो विरुद्धयत

इति चेन्न । तस्यानेकद्रव्यगुणत्वेनानेकद्रव्यस्यैव स्वद्रव्यत्वात्, स्वानाश्रयद्रव्यान्तरस्यैव परद्रव्यत्वात् । स्वानाश्रयद्रव्यात्मनापि संयोगादेस्सत्त्वे स्वाश्रयद्रव्यप्रतिनियमव्याघातस्य तदवस्थत्वात् । तथा परद्रव्यात्मनेव स्वद्रव्यात्मनापि घटस्यासत्त्वे सकलद्रव्यानाश्रयत्वप्रसंगेन निराश्रयत्वापत्तिः ।

63. If you hold that there is no contradiction regarding the rule of substances on account of the fact that union, division etc. are dependent on manifold substances, it is not so, because there the own substance is the manifold substances with manifold attributes and the (its) other-substance is that which does not admit of dependence on the own substance. On the acceptance of union etc. even by independence of the own substance, the violation of the rule regarding the existence of (its) own substance as dependent on itself will continue to occur in the same form. And on the admission of the non-existence of the pitcher by its own substance like the form of its other-substance the totality of substances will suffer from the lack of dependence, causing the fallacy of the absence of the basis (for them).

64. एवं घटस्य स्वक्षेत्रं भूतलादि, परक्षेत्रं कुड्यादि । घटः स्वक्षेत्रेस्ति, परक्षेत्रे नास्ति । घटस्य स्वक्षेत्र इव परक्षेत्रेऽपि सत्त्वे प्रतिनियतक्षेत्रत्वानुपपत्तिः । परक्षेत्र इव स्वक्षेत्रेऽप्यसत्त्वे च निराधारत्वापत्तिः ।

64. In this way the surface of the ground (below) is its own space for the pitcher, the other-space (for it) is the space (occupied by) the bowls, etc. The pitcher is in its own space, it is not in the other-space. On the assumption of the presence of the pitcher in the other-space like its own-space, there will be the absence of the regulation regarding the occupation of space. On the assumption of the non-existence (of the pitcher) in its own space like the other-space, there will be inconsistency

of its being without a basis.

65. तथा घटस्य स्वकालो वर्तमानकालः, परकालोऽतीतादिः। तत्र स्वकालेस्ति, परकाले नास्ति। घटस्य स्वकाल इव परकालेऽपि सत्त्वे प्रतिनियतकालत्वाभावेन नित्यत्वमेव स्यात्। परकाल इव स्वकालेऽप्यसत्त्वे सकल-कालासम्बन्धित्वप्रसंगेनावस्तुत्वापत्तिः। कालसम्बन्धित्वमेव हि वस्तुत्वम्। एवञ्च घटो घटत्वेनास्ति, पटत्वेन नास्ति, मृद्द्रव्येणास्ति, सुवर्णद्रव्येण नास्ति, स्वक्षेत्रादस्ति, परक्षेत्रान्नास्ति, स्वकालादस्ति, परकालान्नास्तीति पर्यवसन्नम्।

65. And the own-time for the pitcher is the present one (time), the other-time (for it) is the past etc. There (the pitcher) exists in its own-time, it does not exist in the other-time. On holding existence of the pitcher in the other-time, it will become eternal in the absence of the regulation of existence in time. In holding non-existence of the pitcher in its own-time like the other-time, it will become a non-entity because of the absence of all temporal relations. The entitive nature is verily a temporal relation. Thus the pitcher exists by its being a pitcher, (and) does not exists by being cloth; it exists as regards the substance of earth, (and) does not exist as regards the substance of gold; it exists with respect to its own-space, and does not exist with respect to the other-space; it exists with respect to its own-time, (and) does not exist with respect to the other-time. Thus the discussion comes to conclusion.

66. अत्रायं बोधप्रकारः — घटत्वेनेति तृतीयाथोऽवच्छिन्नत्वं धात्वर्थेन्वेति। असृधात्वर्थोऽस्तित्वं सत्त्वपर्यवसन्नम्। आख्यातार्थ आश्रयत्वम्। तथा च घटत्वावच्छिन्नास्तित्वाश्रयो घट इति प्रथमवाक्याद्बोधः। अभावानामधिकरणात्मकतया पटत्वावच्छिन्नाभावस्य घटस्वरूपत्वात्, तत्र नञ्समभिव्याहृतासृधातोरभावोर्थः, आश्रयत्वमाख्यातार्थः, इति रीत्या तादृशाभावाश्रयो घट इति बोधेऽपि तादृशाभावात्मकत्वमेव घटस्य सिद्ध्यति, अभावानामधिकरणात्मकत्वात्। तृतीयवाक्ये मृद्द्रव्यपदोत्तरतृतीयाया अवच्छिन्नत्वमर्थः। एवमग्रेऽपि बोधा ऊह्याः।

66. Here the type of cognition is like this. By being a pitcher it points to the differentiation by the third (grammatical) inflexion, and it follows (agrees with) the meaning of the root (*dhātu*). This meaning of the root 'as' is existence, exhausted by the mode of existence. The implication of the declension is the provision of a basis. (And) thus the pitcher is the basis of the pitcher differentiated as being a pitcher. This cognition is generated by the first proposition. The reason is that the negation (non-existence) differentiated as being cloth comes out to be identical with the pitcher because of the nature of negations being of the nature of the bases or the support. There the meaning of the root 'as' when accompanied by the support and used with a negative prefix 'nañ' is negation or non-existence. The inflexion (herein) implies a base or support. In this way even on the generation of the cognition of the pitcher as the base for that type of negation, the identity of the pitcher as the base of that very type of negation is proved (established) for the pitcher, because of the negations (non-existences) being identical with the base. In the third preposition, the use of the third inflexion after the term 'earth' means differentiation. In this way the other cognitions are to be discussed (considered).

67. ननु—सर्वपदाथानामपि स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयरूपादिचतुष्टयाभ्यां व्यवस्थायामंगीक्रियमाणायां स्वरूपादीनां स्वरूपाद्यन्तरस्याभावात्कथं व्यवस्था स्यात्? तेषामपि स्वरूपाद्यन्तरसद्भावेऽनवस्था प्रसंगात्, सुदूरमपि गत्वा स्वरूपाद्यन्तराभावेपि कस्यचिद्व्यवस्थायां किं स्वरूपाद्यपेक्षया सत्त्वासत्त्वसमर्थन-रूपया स्वगृहमान्यया प्रक्रियया? यथाप्रतीति वस्तुव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः, इति चेत्—अनभिज्ञो भवान् वस्तुस्वरूपपरीक्षायाः। वस्तुस्वरूप-प्रतीतिरेव स्वपररूपाद्यवच्छिन्नसत्त्वासत्त्वादिकं विषयीकरोतीति निरूपयितुमुपक्रान्तत्वात् अन्यथा नानानिरंकुशविप्रतिपत्तीनां निवारयितुमशक्तेः। वस्तुनो हि यथैवाबाधित-

प्रतीतिस्तथैव स्वरूपव्यवस्था, 'मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः' इति वचनात्। एवञ्च—स्वरूपादीनां स्वरूपाद्यन्तरं प्रतीयते वा न वा? अन्त्ये स्वरूपाद्यन्तरं नांगीक्रियत एव। एवमपि तेषामस्तित्वनास्तित्वव्यवस्थाऽग्रे प्रपञ्चयिष्यते। आद्ये स्वरूपादीनामपि स्वरूपाद्यन्तरमंगीक्रियते, प्रतीत्यनुरोधात्। चैवमनवस्था, यत्र स्वरूपाद्यन्तरस्य प्रतीतिस्तत्र व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। तत्र जीवस्य तावदुपयोगसामान्यं स्वरूपं, तस्य तल्लक्षणत्वात्। उपयोगो लक्षणमिति वचनात्। ततोऽन्योऽनुपयोगः पररूपम्। ताभ्यां सदसत्त्वे प्रतीयेते। उपयोगसामान्यस्य च ज्ञानदर्शनान्यतरत्वं स्वरूपम्, इतरत्पररूपम्। उपयोगविशेषस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वार्थाकारनिश्चयात्मकत्वं स्वरूपम्, दर्शनस्य किंस्विदित्यादिरूपेणाकारग्रहणम् स्वरूपम्। ज्ञानस्यापि परोक्षस्यावैशद्यं स्वरूपम्। प्रत्यक्षस्य वैशद्यं स्वरूपम्। दर्शनस्यापि चक्षुरचक्षुर्निमित्तस्य चक्षुरादिजन्यार्थग्रहणं स्वरूपम्। अवधिदर्शनस्यावधिविषयीभूतार्थग्रहणं स्वरूपम्। परोक्षस्यापि मतिज्ञानस्येन्द्रियानिन्द्रियजन्यत्वे सति स्वार्थाकारव्यवसायात्मकत्वं स्वरूपम्। अनिन्द्रियमात्रजन्यत्वं श्रुतस्य स्वरूपम्। प्रत्यक्षस्यापि विकलस्यावधिमनः—पर्ययलक्षणस्येन्द्रियानिन्द्रियानपेक्षत्वे सति स्पष्टतया स्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकत्वं स्वरूपम्। सकलप्रत्यक्षस्य केवलज्ञानलक्षणस्य सकलद्रव्य-पर्यायसाक्षात्करणं स्वरूपम्। ततोऽन्यत्सत्त्वं तु पररूपम्। ताभ्यां सदसत्त्वे प्रतिपत्तव्ये। एवमुत्तरोत्तरविशेषाणामपि स्वरूपपररूपे बुद्धिमद्भिरूह्ये। तद्विशेषप्रतिविशेषाणामनन्तत्वात्।

67. A question may arise here. On accepting the establishment of all the entities by the tetrad of own-identity and by that of the other-identity, how can the regulation of the own-identity etc. be possible in the absence of the own-identity, how can the regulation of the own-identity etc. be possible in the absence of the own-identity i.e. the (dimensions of its) own identity etc.? If in these cases the determination is due to the other self-identity, then there will be (the fallacy of) infinite regress, Even after going very long if any regularity (or orderliness) is accepted in the absence of the determination by self-identity, then what is the emergence of the orderliness in the form of the process (support rendered in favour of establishing existence (position) and non-existence (negation),

which is only a self assumption (and not a reasoned conclusion)? It is so because the orderliness among reals is generated in accordance with experience. If so held, you seem to be ignorant of the process of examining the identity of the reals. Only the experience of the identity of the reals makes the existence, non-existence etc. differentiated by the self-identity and the other-identity, for our effort is started with such an end in view. Otherwise, it will be difficult to ward off many a false cognition. The way by which uncontradicted experience about the reals is generated is the orderliness of the identity (of the reals), because it is said that the measurement dependent on cognitions leads to the establishment of the measurable. And further, is the distinction among self-identity etc. in case of the self-identity etc. (of a real) experienced or not? In the last (i.e. second) case the other (additional) self-identity etc. is certainly not accepted. In this way too the establishment of the orderliness regarding their existence, and non-existence is proposed to be discussed later on. In the former case the distinction (otherness) of self-identity etc. from the self identity etc. (of a real) is admitted under compulsion by experience. Thus, there is no infinite regress; for where there is the experience of self-identity etc., there alone such orderliness is established. There, the self-identity of the *jīva* is the general *upayoga* (consciousness in action), because it is its (*jīva*'s) differentia, as has been mentioned that '*upayoga*' is the differentia (of the *jīvas*). The other, i.e. absence of '*upayoga*' is (its) other-identity. Existence and non-existence are experienced (and determined) by the two. The identity of the general '*upayoga*' is either of knowledge (*jñāna*) and intuition (*darśana*), any entity other than these is (its) other-identity. The self-identity of knowledge i.e. a special type of '*upayoga*' is of the form of a firm determination of the particularity of its object, (and) the

self-identity of intuition is the indefinite apprehension of its object like one as 'something is there'. The self-identity of the direct knowledge (non-sensuous) is (its) vividness. The self-identity of intuition, generated by the eye and the other senses is the apprehension born of the instrumentality of the eye, etc. The self-identity of clairvoyant (*avadhi*) intuition is the apprehension of the objects specified for clairvoyant intuition. The self-identity of the indirect sensuous knowledge, though generated with the instrumentality of senses and the quasi-sense of *manas* (*no-indriya*), is the attainment of definite knowledge of its objects. The self-identity of 'śruta' (extended over sensuous knowledge) knowledge is (its) generation only by the quasi-sense of *manas*. The self-identity of the knowledge of the limited form of clairvoyance (*avadhi jñāna*) and telepathy (*manah-paryaya*), though independent of the instrumentality of the sense, is the vivid determination of their objects. The self-identity of the complete direct knowledge defined and differentiated as the type of omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is the direct perception of all the substances and modes; its other-identity is anything other than this. By these two the comprehension of (its) existence and non-existence may be obtained. In this way the self-identity and the other-identity of even the particulars (divisions) following one after the other may be discussed (reasoned) by the wise persons, for infinite is the number of these particulars following other particulars.

68. ननु—प्रमेयस्य किं स्वरूपं किंवा पररूपम्? याभ्यां प्रमेयं स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्तीति व्यपदिश्येतेति चेत्? उच्यते। प्रमेयस्य प्रमेयत्वं स्वरूपं, घटत्वादिकं पररूपम्। प्रमेयं प्रमेयत्वेनास्ति, घटत्वादिना नास्ति।

68. A query may be raised. What is the self-identity of the knowable, and also the other-identity (of the same), by which

the knowledge may be designated as somehow it is and somehow it is not? On this it is said. The self identity of the knowable is (its) knowability, and being the pitcher, etc. is (its) other-identity. The knowable exists by knowability, it does not exist by being the pitcher, etc.

69. अन्ये तु—“प्रमेयस्य स्वरूपं प्रमेयत्वं, अप्रमेयत्वं पररूपम्। न च—अप्रमेयत्वं प्रमेयत्वाभावस्य चाप्रसिद्ध इति वाच्यम्; प्रमेयत्वाभावस्य शशविषाणादौ प्रसिद्धत्वात्। न च—शशविषाणादीनां प्रमेयत्वाभावस्य च व्यवहारविषत्वेन प्रमेयत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; तत्साधकप्रमाणाभावेन प्रमेयत्वासिद्धेः। प्रमेयत्वं हि प्रमाणजन्यप्रमितिर्विषयत्वम्, तच्च प्रमाणाभावे नोपपद्यते। एवञ्च निरुक्तस्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां प्रमेयस्यास्तित्वनास्तित्वोपपत्तिः।” इत्याहुः ॥

69. But others hold that the self-identity of the knowable is (its) knowability, its unknowability is its other-identity. Nor can it be said that unknowability is the negation of knowability, because the negation of knowability is well known in case of the horns of the hare etc. Nor can we say that, because the horns of the hare, etc. are the objects of knowledge from the practical point of view and therefore the objection of the knowability is there. The reason is that, in the absence of an evidence to prove its existence, there is the absence of knowability. Knowability is being an object of knowledge (evidence) born of an evidence, and that too is not generated in absence of the evidence (*pramāṇa*). And thus existence (is-ness) and non-existence (not-is-ness) are generated by the (already) explained self-identity and other-identity. So they say.

70. ननु—जीवादिद्रव्याणां षण्णां किं स्वद्रव्यं किं वा परद्रव्यम्? याभ्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वे व्यवतिष्ठेते, द्रव्यान्तरस्यासम्भवात्, इति चेदुच्यते। तेषामपि शुद्धं सदद्रव्यमपेक्ष्यास्तित्वम् तत्प्रतिपक्षं सद्भावशुद्धद्रव्यमपेक्ष्य नास्तित्वं

70. There is a question. What is the own-substance of (all) the six substances or what is their other-substance, by which (their) existence and non-existence can be established, for there is no possibility of any other substance and of non-existence (beyond them)? If so, the reply follows. For them also existence is upheld with respect to the existent pure substance, and non-existence is upheld with respect to the existent impure substance.

71. ननु—महासत्त्वरूपस्य शुद्धद्रव्यस्य स्वपरद्रव्यादिव्यवस्था कथं ? तस्य सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालाभावात्मकत्वात् तद्व्यतिरेकेणान्यद्रव्याद्यभावात्; इति चेन्न;—शुद्धद्रव्यस्यापि सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालाद्यपेक्षया सत्त्वस्य, विकलद्रव्याद्यपेक्षयाऽसत्त्वस्य च व्यवस्थितेः । 'सत्ता सप्रतिपक्षैका' इति वचनात् ।

71. (Again) the question arises. How can the orderliness of the all-exhaustive grand existence of the pure form be established, because it is of the nature of all (complete) substance, place, time and mode, and there is no existence of substance etc. excepting this. If held so, it is not like this. The orderliness of existence of the pure substance is admissible in respect of the complete (*sakala*) substance, place, time and mode; and that of non-existence is admissible in respect of incomplete (*vikala*) substance, etc., for there is a saying that existence is (always) accompanied (attended) by an antithesis.

72. एतेन सकलक्षेत्रकालव्यापिनो गगनस्य सकलकालक्षेत्रापेक्षया सत्त्वं यत्किञ्चिदक्षेत्रकालापेक्षयाऽसत्त्वं च निरूपितं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

72. Following this chain of reasoning existence of the all pervading space is admissible with respect to the totality of

substance, time, place and mode, and the non-existence of space may be understood as explained with respect to partial place, time, etc.

73. ननु—अस्तित्वमेव वस्तुनस्स्वरूपं, न पुनर्नास्तित्वं, तस्य पररूपाश्रयत्वात्। यदि च पररूपाश्रितमपि नास्तित्वं वस्तुनः स्वरूपं, तदा पटगतरूपादिकमपि घटस्य स्वरूपं स्यात्, इति चेन्न; उभयस्यापि स्वरूपत्वे प्रमाणसद्भावात्। तथाहि—घटस्य स्वरूपाद्यवच्छिन्नास्तित्वं पररूपाद्यवच्छिन्न-नास्तित्वं च प्रत्यक्षेणैव गृह्यते। घटो घटत्वेनास्तीत्यबाधितप्रतीतेः। अनुमानप्रयोगश्च—अस्तित्वं स्वभावेनाविनाभूतं—विशेषणत्वात्, साधर्म्यवत्। यथा साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्येणाविनाभूतं तथास्तित्वं स्वभावेन नास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतम्। अविनाभूतत्वं च नियमेनैकाधिकरण-वृत्तित्वम्॥

73. Again, there is a question. Existence alone is the identity of a real, not the non-existence, for that depends on the other-identity. If non-existence, dependent on the identity of the other, is the identity of a real, then colour etc. belonging to cloth will also become the identity of the pitcher. If so held, it is not so (correct), because there is evidence (proof) in support of the two as the identity (of a real). And verily, the existence of the pitcher as differentiated by its own-identity and the non-existence of the pitcher as differentiated by its other-identity are apprehended directly by our perception. It is an uncontradicted experience that the pitcher exists as being a pitcher. The syllogistic usage (supporting it) is (also) there. Existence is naturally concomitant (in the real) being its adjective like the agreeing traits. Just as agreement of traits (in a real) is cocommitant with the disagreement of traits (in a real), in the same way existence is naturally concomitant with non-existence. (The relation of) concomitance is, as a rule, the pervasion in the same locus (real).

74. ननु—घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादित्यादिहेतौ वैधर्म्यविरहेऽपि साधर्म्यं दृश्यत इति साधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्याविनाभूतत्वाभावान्न दृष्टान्तसंगतिः, इति चेदुच्यते। साधर्म्यं नाम साध्याधिकरणवृत्तित्वेन निश्चितत्वम्। वैधर्म्यं च साध्याभावाधिकरणावृत्तित्वेन निश्चितत्वम्। एवं चाभिधेयत्वाभावाधिकरणे शशशृङ्गादाववृत्तित्वेन निश्चितत्वं प्रमेयत्वस्य वर्तत इति तादृशहेतौ वैधर्म्यमक्षतमिति।

एवं—नास्तित्वं स्वाभावेनास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतम्, विशेषणत्वात्। वैधर्म्यवत् इत्यनुमानेनापि तयोरविनाभावसिद्धिः।

74. (Again) a query arises. In the argument as the pitcher is predicable being knowable the agreement 'of traits is seen without disagreement' on account of the absence of concomitance with agreement in the absence of disagreement of traits, the illustration (given) is not consistent. If so held, the reply follows. The argument of traits means determination by pervasion in the locus of the entity to be established. Disagreement means determination by pervasion of the negation in the locus of the entity to be established. In this way the determination of knowability is pervasive in the negation of predictability like the non-pervasion of the horn of a hare etc. Thus for this reason the disagreement remains undestroyed. Thus goes the reply. In this way non-existence is by nature cocommitant with existence being an adjective like the disagreement. But by this syllogistic argument (*anumāna*) the concomitance between the two is established.

75. ननु—पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते, गन्धवत्त्वादित्यादिकेवलव्यतिरेकिहेतौ वैधर्म्यं साधर्म्येण विनापि वर्तत इति निरुक्तानुमाने दृष्टान्तासंगतिरिति चेन्न। केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतावपि साधर्म्यस्य घटादावेव सम्भवात्। इतरभेदाधिकरणे घटे गन्धवत्त्वरूपहेतौ निश्चितत्वेन साधर्म्यस्याक्षतत्वात्। पक्षभिन्न एव साधर्म्यं न पक्ष इति नियमाभावात्।

75. A question is raised (here). The earth is distinguished from other entities because of its possession of the quality

(cause or *hetu*) of smell. In such contexts the reason (cause) as disagreement works without agreement. In this syllogistic argument the inconsistency of the illustration is seen. If so held, it is not like this, because in case of the pitcher, etc. the agreement is possible in the presence of the disagreeing cause. In the locus of the pitcher as (admitted) of the other kind the agreement remains undestroyed by the determination of the argument from the possession of smell. There is no such rule that agreement is expected, only where the entity to be proved is different and is not the same.

76. अथ—शशविषाणादौ नास्तित्वमस्तित्वेन विनापि दृश्यते, इति चेत्? अत्र वदामः । गोमस्तकसमवायित्वेन यदस्तीति प्रसिद्धं विषाणं, तच्छशादिमस्तक-समवायित्वेन नास्तीति निश्चीयते । मेषादिसमवायित्वेन यानि रोमाणि सन्तीति प्रसिद्धानि, तान्येन कूर्मादिसमवायित्वेन न सन्तीति निश्चीयते । वनस्पतिसम्बन्धित्वेन यदस्तीति प्रसिद्धं कुसुमं, तदेव गगनसम्बन्धित्वेन नास्तीति निश्चीयते । तथा चास्तित्वं नास्तित्वं च परस्परमविनाभूतमेव वर्तते ।

76. Further, non-existence is seen in case of the horn of the hare etc. without existence. If so observed, here we say. The horn that is well known as existing by its association with the forehead of the cow is determined as non-existing by their association with rams etc. Whatever fine hair (fibre) are well known as existing by their association with rams etc., those very (hair) are determined as non-existent in respect of the tortoise, etc. The flower which is well known as existing by its association with (some) plant, the very one (flower) is determined as non-existent with its relation with the sky. In the same way existence and non-existence are found concomitant with each other.

77. अपरेतु—“यथा देवदत्तादिशब्दानां देवदत्तशरीरावच्छिन्नात्मन्येव शक्तिः,

(1) देवदत्तो जानाति सुखमनुभवतीत्यादिप्रयोगानुरोधात्, तथा मण्डूकादिशब्दनामपि मण्डूकादिशरीरावच्छिन्नात्मन्येव शक्तिरंगीकरणीया। एवं च कर्मदेशवशान्नाना-जातिसम्बन्धमापन्नस्य जीवस्य (1) मण्डूकभावावाप्तौ तत्पदवाच्यतामास्कन्दतः पुनर्युवतिजन्मन्यवाप्ते यश्शिखण्डकस्य एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानविषयैकजीव-सम्बन्धित्वात्स एव मण्डूकशिखण्ड इति तस्य प्रसिद्धत्वान्मण्डूकशिखण्ड-स्यास्तित्वम्; मण्डूकशरीरावच्छिन्नात्मसम्बन्धिनो मण्डूकशरीरसमानकालीन-शिखण्डस्याभावाच्च नास्तित्वम्। यदि च देवदत्तादिशब्दो मण्डूकादिशब्दश्च तत्तच्छरीरावाचक एव, देवदत्त उत्पन्नो विनष्ट इत्यादि व्यवहारात्, स च बन्धं प्रत्येकत्वेन वर्तमानस्य जीवस्यापि बोधको भवतीति मतम्। तदा मण्डूकशरीराकारेण परिणतपुद्गल-द्रव्यस्याप्यनाद्यन्तपरिणामस्य क्रमेण युवतिमुक्ताहारादि-केशभावान्तपरिणामाच्छिखण्डकनिष्पत्तेर्मण्डूकशिखण्डस्यास्तित्वम्, मण्डूकशरीररूपेण परिणतपुद्गलद्रव्यस्य तत्काले केशपरिणामाभावाच्च नास्तित्वं सिद्ध्यति। एवं वन्ध्यापुत्रशशनरखरविषाणकूर्मरोमादिष्वपि योज्यम्। आकाशकुसुमे तु अस्तित्वानास्तित्वोपपत्तिरित्थम्। यथा—वनस्पतिनामकर्मोदयापादितविशेषस्य वृक्षस्य पुष्पमिति व्यपदिश्यते, पुष्पभावेन परिणतपुद्गलद्रव्यस्य तादृशवृक्षापेक्षया भिन्नत्वेपि तेन व्याप्तत्वात्; तथाऽऽकाशेनापि पुष्पस्य व्याप्तत्वं समानमित्याकाश-कुसुममिति व्यपदेशो युक्तः ॥ अथ मल्लिकाकृतोपकारापेक्षया मल्लिकाकुसुममिति व्यपदिश्यते, नत्वाकाशकुसुममिति; कुसुमस्याकाशेनोपकाराचभावात्, इति चेन्न;—आकाशकृतावगाहन रूपोपकारमादायाकाशकुसुमिति व्यपदेशस्य दुर्वारत्वात् ॥ किञ्च—वृक्षात्प्रच्युतमपि कुसुममाकाशान्न प्रच्यवत इति नित्यमेवाकाशसम्बन्धो वर्तते ॥

77. But the contention of other thinkers in regard to the problem is (like this). Just as the potency of the words like Devadatta etc. lies only in the soul differentiated by the body of Devadatta under compulsion from the statements that Devadatta cognizes, experiences pleasure etc.; in the same way the potency of the words like frog, etc. must be accepted in the soul alone differentiated by the body of the frog, etc. And in this form the *jīva*, attaining various types of relation on account of the force of *karmas* and accepting expressibility by that word (or term). The existence of the frog with a crest is

admissible on attaining the form of a frog, and again attaining the female form in the birth as a demsel, and on being an object of recalling that it belongs to the bird with a crest, and its being known as the same frog with a crest. The non-existence is admissible on account of the negation (absence) of the crest contemporary with the body of the frog in case of the *jīva* related with the body differentiated as the body of the frog. If words like Devadatta and also frog are expressive of the connected bodies because of the practice as Devadatta is born and destroyed etc, that also becomes a cause of cognition of the present *jīva* because of its unity (oneness) in respect of bondage. Then for the substance, having potency for modes, beginningless and endlessness, now modified by the form of the body of the frog, and on account of accomplishing the internal modes by succession as the demsel, the garland of pearls, etc. and the hair etc. upto the absence of hair, of the female form, existence is admissible of the frog with a crest. Non-existence is established (of the same) on account of the absence of modification (of the substance of matter) as the hair at the same time on the destruction of the material substance modified in the form of the body of the frog at the same moment of time. In this way the same (plan) may be used in cases of the son of a barren lady, (the horn of) a hare, a man, an ass and the soft hair of a tortoise etc. But in case of the sky-flower the reference of existence and non-existence is like this. For example just as it is said that a flower belongs to a plant accomplished by the operation of the vegetable body-making (*nāma*) *karma*, as the matter to modified as a flower being distinct from the plant of that type but pervaded by it; in the same way the pervasion of the flower by the space is similar and therefore the name as the sky-flower is consistent. Further, it is called the flower of *mallikā* by virtue of the

auxiliary help by (the plant of) *mallikā*, it cannot be so called the sky-flower, for there is no virtual action of the sky for the flower. If so held, it is not like this. By taking the subsidiary action of accommodation of (the substance of) space it will be difficult to avoid the use of the term (nomenclature) as sky-flower. What more? The flower even fallen from the plant does not fall (away) from the sky. Thus there exists an eternal relation of the flower with the space or sky.

78. यदि च—मल्लिकालताजन्यत्वान्मल्लिकाकुसुममित्युच्यते, तदाऽऽकाशस्यापि सर्वकार्येष्ववकाशप्रदत्वेन कारणत्वादाकाशकुसुममिति व्यवहारो दुर्वारः। अथाकाशापेक्षया पुष्पस्य भिन्नत्वान्नाकाशकुसुममिति व्यवहार इति चेत्—भिन्नत्वं किं कथंचित् सर्वथा वा? आद्ये मल्लिकाकुसुममित्यपि व्यवहारो माभूत्, मल्लिकापेक्षया कथञ्चिद्भिन्नत्वात्पुष्पस्य। अन्ये त्वाकाशापेक्षया पुष्पस्य सर्वथा भिन्नत्वमसिद्धम्। द्रव्यत्वादिना कथंचिदभेदस्यापि सद्भावात्। तस्मान्मल्लिकाकुसुम-माकाशकुसुममित्यनयोर्न कोपि विशेष इति सिद्धान्त-स्यास्तिनास्त्यात्मकत्वम् इत्याहुः॥

78. And if it is said to be the flower of *mallikā* because of its birth from the creeper of *mallikā*, then the practice or usage of saying sky-flower is difficult to avoid, because space or sky is also the cause in all the actions by providing accommodation (to them). Or, if it is held that practice of saying that the sky-flower is not (possible) for the distinction of flower from space, then (a question can be raised) as, the distinction is admitted in some ways or absolutely. Under the first alternative the practice that it is the flower of *mallikā* must not be admitted, because the flower is, in some ways, different from *mallikā*. Under the last (second) alternative the distinction in all ways (absolutely) with respect to space is not established. Conditional (somehow) non-distinction by virtue of being a substance etc. is also seen existent. Therefore there is nothing

particular (extraordinary) between the flower of *mallikā* and the sky-flower. Thus the existent-non-existent nature of the (underlying) principle is established. So they say.

79. अथ—अस्त्येव जीव इत्यत्रास्तिशब्दवाच्यादर्थान्निस्वभावो जीवशब्दवाच्योऽर्थस्यात्? अभिन्नस्वभावो वा? यद्यभिन्नस्वभावस्तदा जीव-शब्दार्थोऽस्तिशब्दार्थश्चैक एवेति सामानाधिकरण्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावादिकं न स्यात्। घटः कलश इत्यादि सामानाधिकरण्याद्यभाववत्। तदन्यतरपदाप्रयोगप्रसंगश्च। किं च—सत्त्वस्य सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायविषयत्वात्तदभिन्नस्व-भावस्यापि जीवस्य तथात्वं प्राप्तमिति सर्वस्य तत्त्वस्य जीवत्वप्रसंगः। यदि पुनरस्तिशब्दवाच्यादर्थान्नि एव जीवशब्दवाच्योऽर्थः कल्प्यते, तदा जीवस्यासद्रूपत्वप्रसंगः। अस्तिशब्दवाच्या-दर्थान्नितात्वात्। प्रयोगश्च नास्ति जीवः, अस्तिशब्दवाच्यापेक्षया भिन्नत्वात् शशविषाणवत्। अस्तित्वस्य जीवान्नितात्ववत्सकलार्थेभ्योपि भिन्नत्वान्निराश्रय-त्वादभावप्रसंगः। न च जीवादिभ्यो भिन्नमप्यस्तित्वं समवायेन जीवादिषु वर्तत इति वाच्यं, तस्यान्यत्र निराकरणात्। इति चेत्, अत्रोच्यते। अस्तिशब्दवाच्यजीवशब्द-वाच्यार्थयोर्द्रव्यार्थदिशादभिन्नत्वम्, तयोः पर्यायार्थदिशादभिन्नत्वमित्यनेकान्तवादिनां न कोपि दोषः, तथा प्रतीतेः। इत्यग्रे व्यक्ती भविष्यति।

79. Further, in the statement that 'the *jīva* is (exists) certainly' is the entity expressible by the word '*jīva*' of a different nature from the entity expressible by the word '*asti*' (exists) or is it of non-distinct nature? If such an entity is of non-distinct nature, then the entity expressed by the word '*jīva*' and that expressed by the word '*asti*' (exists) are certainly one and the usage of the same locus (for the subject and predicate) and the relationship between the quality and the qualified will not be there like the use of words 'pitcher' (*ghaṭa*), 'jar' (*kalaśa*) etc. for the absence of the common (or same) locus, and there will remain no scope for the use of other words. And there what to say (further)? Because existence covers all the substances and modes, the *jīva* attains

the same status being of a non-distinct nature from it and thus all substances gain the status of being *jīva*. Again, if the entity expressible by the word *jīva* is supposed to be a different one expressible by the word ‘*asti*’ (exists), then the *jīva* will become non-existent, for being different from the entity expressible by the word ‘*asti*’ (exists). The logical usage also runs like this. This *jīva* is non-existent with reference to (its) being different from the entity expressible by the word ‘*asti*’ (exists), like the horns of the hare. Thus, existence (itself) suffers from negation (absence) by losing its basis, being different from all the entities like the (its) difference from the *jīva*. Nor can it be said that existence as different from the *jīva* etc. continues with the *jīva* etc. by the relation of association (*samavāya*), because such a position has been refuted in other contexts. If so held, here is the explanation. Between entities expressible by the word ‘*astitva*’ (existence) and by the word ‘*jīva*’ there is non-distinction from the substantial point of view between them; there is a distinction (between them) from the viewpoint of modes. Thus, there is no blemish or fallacy for the followers (upholders) of *anekānta* philosophy—a philosophy of multiple forms of existence and their perception, such being the experience. This will be made clear later on.

इति प्रथम-द्वितीयभंगद्वयं निरूपितम् ।

Thus the duel of the first and second propositions is described.

अथ तृतीयभंगस्तु निरूप्यते ।

Now the third proposition is being described.

80. घटस्स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चेति तृतीयः । घटादिरूपैकधर्मविशेष्यक-
क्रमार्पितविधिप्रतिषेधप्रकारकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं तल्लक्षणम् । क्रमार्पितस्वरूपपररू-
पाद्यपेक्षयाऽस्तिनास्त्यात्मको घट इति निरूपितप्रायम् ।

80. The third proposition implies existence and non-existence of the pitcher. Its differentia is the formation of a proposition implying cognition of the type of assertion and negation applied successively to the single qualified object like the pitcher etc. (the locus of traits) as the single identity of the nature of the pitcher, etc. The pitcher is of the nature of existence-cum-non-existence with reference to the successively applied self-identity and the other-identity. Thus, it has been already described.

81. सहापितस्वरूपपररूपादिविवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यो घट इति चतुर्थः ।
घटादिविशेष्यका वक्तव्यत्वप्रकारकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं तल्लक्षणम् ।

81. With respect to the application of simultaneous expression of the self-identity and the other-identity, the pitcher is somehow inexpressible. Thus runs the fourth proposition. Its differentia is the formation of a proposition implying cognition of the type of inexpressibility of the qualified entity like the pitcher etc.

82. ननु—कथमवक्तव्यो घटः इति चेदत्र ब्रूमः । सर्वोपि शब्दः प्रधानतया न सत्त्वासत्त्वे युगपत्प्रतिपादयति, तथा प्रतिपादने शब्दस्य शक्त्यभावात्, सर्वस्य पदस्यैकपदार्थविषयत्वसिद्धेः । अस्तीतिपदं हि सत्तावाचकं नासत्त्वं प्रतिपादयति, तथा नास्तीतिपदमसत्त्ववाचकं न सत्तां बोधयति । अस्त्यादिपदस्यास्तित्वनास्तित्वो-
भयधर्मवाचकत्वे च तदन्यतरपदाप्रयोगप्रसंगः ।

82. Now the question is how the pitcher is inexpressible. Regarding this we say (like this). All the words mainly do not express existence and non-existence at the same time, for such an expression the words do not possess the potency. It is so because all the words (taken singly) accept one entity as an

object of expression. The term 'asti' (exists) verily expresses existence, (and) does not express non-existence. And the term 'nāsti' (does not exist) expresses non-existence, it does not generate a cognition of existence. On accepting the expressibility about the terms like 'asti' etc, for the traits of existence, non-existence and the dual (of the two), the use of the other term will be redundant.

83. ननु—सर्वेषां पदानामेकार्थत्वनियमे नानार्थकपदोच्छेदापत्तिः, इति चेत् । गवादिपदस्यापि स्वर्गाद्यनेकार्थविषयतया प्रसिद्धस्य तत्त्वतोऽनेकत्वात्, सादृश्योपचारादेव तस्यैकत्वेन व्यवहरणात् । अन्यथा—सकलार्थस्याप्येकशब्दवाच्यत्वापत्तेरर्थभेदेनानेकशब्दप्रयोगवैफल्यम् । यथैव हि समभिरूढनयापेक्षया शब्दभेदाद्ध्रुवोऽर्थभेदस्तथाऽर्थभेदादपि शब्दभेदस्सिद्ध एव । अन्यथा वाच्यवाचकनियमव्यवहारविलोपात् ।

83. There arises a question. If there is a rule that one word is expressive of one entity, then there will be the difficulty of the breach of the words having many meanings. If so, it is not like this. The plurality of meaning as heaven etc. of the terms like 'go' (meaning a cow) is really well known, the practice of using it as one is occasionally accepted because of similarity. Otherwise, the entirety of objects being expressible by one word the use of many words for different entities will become futile. Just as under the 'samabhiūdha naya' (the etymological standpoint), the difference of entities is certainly there on account of the difference of words expressing them; in the same way the difference of words is established on account of the difference of entities. Otherwise the practice of the rule regarding the expressibility of entities and the terms expressing them will become extinct.

84. एतेन—एकस्य वाक्यस्य युगपदनेकार्थविषयत्वं प्रत्याख्यातम्,

स्यादस्तिनास्त्येव घटः—स्वरूपपररूपादिचतुष्टयाभ्यामिति वाक्यस्यापि क्रमार्पितो-
 भयविषयधर्मतयोररीकृतस्य उपचारादेवैकत्वांगीकारात्। अथवा—तत्र क्रमशो
 विवक्षितं यदुभयप्राधान्यमेकं, तदेवास्तिनास्तिशब्दाभ्यामभिहितमिति तादृशवाक्यस्यै-
 कार्थाभिधायित्वादेवैकवाक्यत्वमिति न दोषः सर्वस्य वाक्यस्यैकक्रियाप्रधानतयै-
 कार्थविषयत्वप्रसिद्धेरेकार्थबोधनशक्तिशब्दस्य सिद्धा। न हि शब्दानां वचन-
 सामर्थ्यं सूचनसामर्थ्यं वाऽतिक्रम्यार्थबोधने प्रवृत्तिस्सम्भवति। अस्तिशब्दस्य हि
 सत्त्वमात्रवचने सामर्थ्यविशेषो नासत्त्वाद्यनेकधर्मवचने। निपातानां वाचकत्वपक्षे
 स्यादिति शब्दस्यानेकान्तसामान्यवचने सामर्थ्यविशेषो न पुनरेकान्तवचने,
 नाप्यनेकान्तविशेषवचने, तेषां द्योतकत्वपक्षे चानेकान्तसूचने सामर्थ्यविशेषो
 नान्यत्रेति वचनसूचनसामर्थ्यमतिक्रम्य शब्दप्रयोगो वृद्धव्यवहारेषु क्वापि न दृष्टचर
 इति ॥

84. By this for one proposition the simultaneous apprehension of a plurality of entities (objects) is refuted. For the proposition 'somehow the pitcher is and in not' with reference to the tetrad of self-identity and that of the other-identity, accepted by way of a successive application of the dual traits, the admission as one is only from the practical point of view. Or, there the dominance of the singularity of the two expressed in succession is one. The same singularity is expressed by existence and non-existence, for this reason there is the singularity of one proposition an account of the expression of one entity by such a proposition. So there is no flaw (here). Thus for all the words (taken severally) the potency to generate cognition of one entity is proved, because every proposition mainly takes one entity as an object for expression by means of dominance of one action. In cognizing entities the action is not possible by going beyond the potency of words and their potency for yielding information. The word 'asti' is possessed of a special potency for expressing existence alone, and not for expressing many traits like non-existence etc. On the side of expression by the adverbs (*nipātas*) the word 'somehow'

(*syāt*) is possessed of a special potency to express *anekant* (mainfoldness) in general, and not for *ekanta* (one-sided) expression, and also not for expression of *anekānta* of a special type. For them (*nipātas*), on the side of indication, the special potency for pointing to the *anekānta* (mainfoldness) is admitted, and not in any other context. The use of words (terms) is nowhere perceptible in practice adopted by the senior (wiser) persons by going beyond the potency for indication and expression.

85. ननु—यथासङ्केतं शब्दप्रवृत्तिदर्शनाद्युपपत्तदसत्त्वयोस्सङ्केतितश-
शब्दस्तद्वाचकोऽस्तु, शतृशानचोर्द्वयोस्संकेतितसन्नितिसंज्ञाशब्दवत्; युगपच्चन्द्र-
सूर्ययोरसंकेतितपुष्पवन्तादिपदवद्वा। इति चेन्न;—संकेतस्यापि वाच्यवाचक-
शक्त्यनुरोधेनैव प्रवृत्तेः। न हि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यतिलङ्घनेन संकेतप्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टचरी।
यथा—कर्तुरयसो दारुलेखने शक्तिर्न तथा वज्रलेखनेस्ति, यथा वा वज्रलेखने
तस्याशक्तिर्न तथा दारुलेखने, यथा च दारुणः कर्मणोऽयसा लेख्यत्वे शक्तिर्न तथा
वज्रस्यास्ति, यथा वा वज्रस्य तत्राशक्तिर्न तथा दारुणोपीति निश्चयः। एवं
शब्दस्यापि सकृदेकस्मिन्नेवार्थे प्रतिपादनशक्तिरनेकस्मिन्नर्थे पुनः प्रतिपादनाशक्तिः,
तथा—एकस्यैवार्थस्यैकपदवाच्यता शक्तिर्न पुनरनेकस्यापीति निश्चयः।
पुष्पवन्तादिशब्दानामपि क्रमेणार्थद्वयप्रतिपादन एव सामर्थ्यमिति न दोषः ॥

85. A query may be raised (here). Because the use of the words is seen in accordance with the indication from them, the word meant for simultaneously indicating existence and non-existence should be expressive of the same like the two suffixes of *śatṛ* and *śānacha* (to denote possession), or like the terms *puṣpavanta*, meaning the sun and the moon simultaneously. If considered so, it is not like this, for beconing is also utilized under compulsion of the potency for expression of the potency possessed by the expressibility and the agent of expression (expressed). Just as a tool of iron as doer possesses the potency for engraving on wood, and, not in the same way, for engraving

on steel (*vajra*); or as there is its impotency for engraving on steel and, not in the same way, it is for engraving on wood; or as a wooden object possesses the capacity for being engraved by iron and not in respect of steel (as an object) for being engraved by and as there is a lack of potency in respect of steel (as an object) for being engraved by it, and as there is a lack of potency in respect of steel, so it is there in respect of wood also. It is so determined. In this way the word also possesses potency for simultaneous expression of one singular object, and it is impotent for simultaneous expression of manifold objects; in the same way one word is possessed of potency to express only one object, and not to express manifold objects. It is so determined. For the words like *puṣpavanta* etc. the potency for expression in succession (one after the other) only is admitted. So there is no flaw or fallacy.

86. ननु—सेनावनयुद्धपंक्तिमालापानकग्रामनगरादिशब्दानामनेकार्थ-
प्रतिपादकत्वं दृष्टमिति चेन्न । करितुरगरथपदातिसमूहस्यैवैकस्य सेनाशब्देनाभिधानात्,
वृक्षसमूहस्य वनशब्देन, पुष्पसमूहस्य मालाशब्देन, गुडादिद्रव्यसमूहस्य पानकशब्देन,
प्रासादादिसमूहस्य नगरशब्देन, चाभिधानान्नैकशब्देनानेकार्थप्रतिपादनं दृश्यते ।

86. (Again) there is a question. The (simultaneous) expression of many objects is seen in respect of words like army, forest, war, row, garland, drinks, village, town etc. If so held, it is not consistent. The reason is that only the collection of elephants, horses, chariots and foot-soldiers is expressed by the term army; the collection of trees, by the word forest; the collection of flowers, by the term garland; the collection of sugar (*guḍa*), etc. by the term drink and the collections of palaces, etc. by the term town. Thus, on account of such expressions, the expression of manifold objects by one word is not seen.

87. नन्वेवं—वृक्षावितिपदं वृक्षद्वयबोधकं वृक्षा इति च बहुवृक्षबोधकं कथमुपपद्यत इति चेत्? पाणिन्यादीनामेकशेषारम्भाज्जैनेन्द्राणामभिधानस्य स्वाभाविकत्वादिति ब्रूमहे। तत्रैकशेषपक्षे द्वाभ्यामेव वृक्षशब्दाभ्यां वृक्षद्वयस्य बहुभिरेव वृक्षशब्दैर्बहूनां वृक्षाणामभिधानानैकशब्दस्य सकृदनेकार्थबोधकत्वम्। लुप्तावशिष्टाशब्दयोः साम्याद्वृक्षरूपार्थस्य समानत्वाच्चैकत्वोपचारात्तत्रैक-शब्दप्रयोगोपपत्तिः। अभिधानस्य स्वाभाविकत्वपक्षे च वृक्षशब्दो द्विबहुवचनान्तः स्वभावत एव द्वित्वबहुत्वविशिष्टं वृक्षरूपार्थमभिदधाति। वृक्षावित्यत्र हि वृक्षत्वावच्छिन्नो वृक्षशब्दार्थः, द्वित्वं च द्विवचनार्थः, प्रत्ययार्थस्य प्रकृत्यर्थेऽन्वयात् द्वित्वविशिष्टौ वृक्षाविति बोधः वृक्षा इत्यत्र च बहुवचनार्थो बहुत्वमिति बहुत्वविशिष्टा वृक्षा इति बोधः।

87. Thus (again) a question has to be faced. How does then the term 'vṛkṣau' (in Sanskrit meaning two trees) generate cognition of two trees and the term 'vṛkṣaḥ' (in Sanskrit meaning many trees) generate the cognition of many trees? If so contended, we say that it is so, according the grammarians like Pāṇini, by the tradition of the remainder as one (out of the two or out of many); and according to the following of the *Jainendra* grammar, by being so naturally. In the acceptance of the rule of remainder as one, there is no simultaneous cognition of two trees by the expression of the double use of the word 'tree' and that of many trees by the manifold use of the word 'tree'. On the disappearance of the remaining words the use of one word becomes admissible (and correct) because of the qualitative and quantitative similarity among the entities of the nature of trees; and because being natural (in case of the followers of the *Jainendra* grammar) the word 'vṛkṣau' as being dual-numbered or vṛkṣaḥ being multiple-numbered express naturally the entity of the nature of trees as qualified by duality and by manifoldness. In the use as vṛkṣau (two trees) the entity meant by the term vṛkṣa is differentiated by

being a *vrkṣa* (tree), the duality is the meaning of its being dual-numbered. As the use of suffixes follows the original nature (of entities), the cognition, by the use of *vrkṣau* as qualified by duality of number is generated; and the cognition, by the use *vrkṣaḥ* as qualified by the plurality of number, is generated.

88. यद्यपि द्वितीयपक्ष एकस्यैव वृक्षपदस्यानेकवृक्षबोधकत्वं प्राप्तम् । तथाप्यनेकधर्मावच्छिन्नार्थबोधकत्वमेकपदस्य नास्तीति नियमः । एवं च वृक्षा इति बहुवचनान्तेनापि वृक्षपदेन वृक्षरूपैकधर्मावच्छिन्नस्यैव बोधो नान्यधर्मावच्छिन्नस्य । तथा चास्त्यादिपदेनाप्यस्तित्वादिरूपैकधर्मावच्छिन्नस्य बोधः सम्भवति, न तु नास्तित्वादिधर्मान्तरावच्छिन्नस्येति ॥

88. Though, in case of the second alternative, only the single term 'tree' generates the cognition of many trees, still there is a rule that the generation of cognition of the entities differentiated by a plurality of characteristics (or traits) is not (consistent) admissible of a single term. Thus, even by the term tree as plural by number, the cognition of an entity of the nature of tree and differentiated by a single trait is generated, it is not of the nature of entities differentiated by other traits. In the same way, by the terms like *asti* (exists) etc., the cognition of a single entity as differentiated by traits like *astitva* (existence) etc. is possible, but not of an entity differentiated by other traits like *nāstitva* (non-existence).

89. ननु—वृक्षा इति प्रत्ययवती प्रकृतिः पदम्, 'सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्' इति वचनात् । तथा च वृक्षा इति बहुवचनान्तेन बहुत्ववृक्षत्वरूपानेकधर्मावच्छिन्नस्य बोधादेकपदस्यानेकधर्मावच्छिन्नबोधकत्वं नास्तीति नियमस्य भंगप्रसंगः । तदुक्तम्—“अनेकमेकं च पदस्य वाच्यं वृक्षा इति प्रत्ययवत्प्रकृत्या ।” इति ।

89. Again there is a question. The term '*vrkṣaḥ*' is a word where the original form is supported by a suffix, because the

grammarians hold that a term must be followed by 'sup' (to be suffixed with nouns) and *tiñ* (to be suffixed with verbs). And thus by the term *vrkṣaḥ* with a number of plurality there is the cognition of the entity identified by being a plurality of trees differentiated by means of a plurality of traits, and therefore there is a breach of the rule that the cognition of an entity with manifold traits is not admissible of one single term. The same has been said as 'Many and one become admissible by a (single) term like the term *vrkṣāḥ* by the original term appearing with suffixes (*pratyaya*).

90. इति चेत्सत्यम्,—एकपदस्य प्रधानतयाऽनेकधर्मावच्छिन्नबोधकत्वं नास्तीति नियमस्योक्तत्वात्। प्रकृते च प्रथमतो वृक्षशब्दो वृक्षत्वरूपजात्यवच्छिन्नं द्रव्यं बोधयति। ततो लिंगं संख्यां चेति शाब्दबोधः क्रमेणैव जायते।

90. If so held, it is true. For one term, the cognition of manifold traits is not admitted mainly or dominantly, the rule has been so formulated. In the present context, firstly the term tree generates the cognition of the substance differentiated by the universal of being a tree. After this the cognition of the word regarding (its) gender and number follows in succession.

91. तदुक्तम्—

“स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षो द्रव्यमाह समवेतम्।
समवेतस्य तु वचने लिंगं संख्यां विभक्तियुक्तस्सन्।” इति।

एवं च प्रधानभावेन वृक्षत्वावच्छिन्नस्य प्रतीतिर्गुणभावेन बहुत्वसंख्याया इति न कश्चिद्दोषः।

91. It is said : The word, without a reference, having expressed independently the inherent substance as (its) own

knowable, goes to express the gender, number of the inherent (entity), by being followed by suffixes.

Thus mainly there is the experience of the entity differentiated by being a tree mainly, and in a secondary way there is the experience of the number being manifold so there is no flaw or fallacy (in the above explanation).

92. अथैकस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा प्रधानभावेनानेकधर्मावच्छिन्नवस्तुबोध-
कत्वानङ्गीकारे प्रधानभावेनाशेषधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनः प्रकाशकं प्रमाणवाक्यं
कथमुपपद्यते ? इति चेत्—कालादिभिरभेदवृत्त्याऽभेदोपचारेण वा द्रव्यपर्यायनयार्पितेन
सकलस्य वस्तुनः कथनात्। इति निरूपितं प्राक्।

92. Further, if for a word or sentence the cognition of an entity differentiated by manifold traits is not admitted mainly, then how is the comprehensive (*pramāṇa*) proposition enlightening an entity with a totality of traits mainly formulated? If so, the reply follows. An entity is expressed in its fullness by pervasion with time etc. or in a non-distinct way by a concession of non-distinction by applying the points of view of the mode and the substance. So it has been explained already (before).

93. ननु 'सत्त्वासत्त्वे' इति द्वन्द्वसमासपदं सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः प्राधान्येन बोधकम् ।
'उभयपदार्थप्रधानो द्वन्द्वः' इति वचनात्, एवं च कथमवाच्यत्वं
सदसत्त्वात्मकवस्तुनः ? इति चेन्न—द्वन्द्वस्यापि क्रमेणैवार्थद्वयप्रत्यायनसमर्थत्वेन
गुणप्रधानभावस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात्। अत एव—'अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम्' इति प्रधानभूतार्थस्य
पूर्वनिपातानुशासनं संगच्छते। अस्तु वा द्वन्द्व उभयस्यापि प्राधान्येन बोधः। तथापि
प्रधानभावेनास्तित्व-नास्तित्वोभयावच्छिन्नस्य धर्मिणः प्रतिपादकशब्दाभावादवाच्य-
त्वमक्षतम्।

93. Existence-non-existence is a term resulting from a combination in dual number by '*dvandva samāsa*', hence it

mainly generates the cognition of existence and non-existence, because it is said that the combination by *dvandva samāsa* evinces dominance of the two. Thus how is inexpressibility possible for an entity as one with existence and non-existence? If held so, it is not consistent. In case of even the combination by *dvandva samāsa* there being the potency for expression in succession, there is the context of dominance and secondariness. There according to the (grammatical discipline) the rule that the important one should appear first, the use of the important (main) entity first is found consistent. Or, let there be the cognition by dominance of the two in the compounding by *dvandva samāsa*. Still there being absence of a word potent to express an entity (*dharmī*) differentiated by existence, non-existence and the dual (of the two) mainly, (the thesis of) inexpressibility is not destroyed.

94. न च—‘सदसत्त्वविशिष्टं वस्तु’ इत्यनेन द्वन्द्वगर्भिततत्पुरुषेण सदसत्त्व-विशिष्टपदेन तदुभयधर्माविच्छिन्नस्य वस्तुनो बोधसम्भवादिति वाच्यं, तत्र सदसत्त्ववैशिष्ट्यस्यैव प्रधानतया तयोरप्रधानत्वात्। ‘उत्तरपदार्थप्रधानस्तत्पुरुषः’ इति वचनानात्। तस्मात्सकलवाचकरहितत्वात्स्यादवक्तव्यो घट इति सिद्धम् ॥

94. And nor can it be said that by the contention that an entity is qualified by existence and non-existence in the combination called ‘*tatpuruṣa*’ covering the combination by *dvandva* the generation of cognition of an entity mainly by a trait of the dual is possible by the term ‘qualified by existence and non-existence’. The reason is that the dominance of existence-cum-non-existence (as one single trait); and not of the two (taken severally) being subordinated. According to grammatical discipline, it is said that the combination by ‘*tatpuruṣa*’ the latter term (or entity) becomes dominant. Therefore, there being the absence of a word expressive of the

totality (of an entity), it is established that somehow the pitcher is inexpressible.

95. तच्च सर्वथैवावक्तव्यम्, अवक्तव्यशब्देनास्य वक्तव्यत्वात् । अतस्स्यादवक्तव्यो घट इति चतुर्थभङ्गः । इति केचिद् व्याचक्षते । तत्रेदं चिन्त्यम्, अवक्तव्यशब्दस्याभिधेयं किमिति ।

95. That inexpressibility (too) is not of the absolute type, because it is expressible by the term 'inexpressible'. Therefore, 'the pitcher is somehow inexpressible' is the fourth preposition. So some say. There what is predicated by the term inexpressible is to be considered.

96. न च—प्रधानभूतसदसत्त्वरूपधर्मावच्छिन्नं वस्तु अवक्तव्यशब्दे-
नाभिधीयत इति वाच्यम्; तथा सति तस्य सकलवाचकरहितत्वक्षतेः, अवक्तव्य-
शब्दस्य तद्वाचकस्य सत्त्वात्, एकपदस्य प्रधानभूतानेकधर्मावच्छिन्नवस्तुबोधकत्वं
नास्तीति नियमस्य भंगप्रसंगाच्च ।

96. And it cannot also be said that by the term 'inexpressibility' an entity differentiated (known) by existence and non-existence as main traits is expressed. On the thesis of such a supposition the thesis of its absence of expressibility by all (possible) words will be destroyed. It is so because there is the presence of the word 'inexpressible' to express it; and also the rule that for one word there is no cognition of an entity differentiated by many traits, held dominant, will also have to face a breach.

97. किञ्च—यथाऽवक्तव्यमिति पदं सांकेतिकं तादृशोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नस्य
वाचकं, तथा सांकेतिकमन्यदपि तद्वाचकं कुतो न भवति ?

97. And further, there will arise a question. Just as the indicative word inexpressible is expressive of an entity

differentiated by the dual traits of the type, in the same way why should some other indicatory word not be expressive of the same?

98. ननु—अन्यस्य सांकेतिकपदस्य क्रमेणैतादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नवस्तुबोधक-
त्वमिति चेत्; अवक्तव्यपदस्यापि युगपत्तद्वाचकत्वं माभूत्। यथा—सांकेतिक-
पदान्तरेण सत्त्वासत्त्वादिधर्मावच्छिन्नं वस्तु क्रमेण प्रतीयते, तथाऽवक्तव्यपदेनापि,
उभयोर्विशेषाभावात्। अवक्तव्यपदेन हि वक्तव्यत्वाभावरूपधर्मावच्छिन्नं वस्तु
प्रतीयते, न तु सत्त्वासत्त्वादिरूपानेकधर्मावच्छिन्नं वस्त्विति सर्वानुभवसाक्षिकमेतत्।

98. If for some other indicatory word, the generation of cognition of an entity differentiated by traits similar with it in succession is not accepted, then for the word inexpressible too the (its) simultaneous expressibility should not be there. Just as by some other indicatory word an entity differentiated by the traits of existence, non-existence and the dual (of the two) is known in succession, then in the same way (it should be known) by the word inexpressible, there being no distinction between the two. Verily, by the word inexpressible an entity differentiated by a trait of the nature of the absence of expressibility is known, and not an entity differentiated by manifold traits like existence, non-existence, the dual (of the two) ect., is known. It is evidenced by the experience of all.

99. अथैवम्—

“उक्तिश्चावाच्यतैकान्तेनाव्यामिति युज्यते।”

इति स्वामिसमन्तभद्राचार्यवचनं कथं संघटते? सत्त्वासत्त्वविशिष्टस्य
वस्तुनस्सर्वथाऽवाच्यत्वे तस्यावाच्यशब्देनापि वाच्यत्वं न स्यादिति तत्र प्रतिपादनात्,
इति चेन्न; तदर्थपरिज्ञानात्। अयं खलु तदर्थः, सत्त्वाद्येकैकधर्ममुखेन वाच्यमेव
वस्तु युगपत्प्रधानभूतसत्त्वासत्त्वोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वेनाव्याम्य, तादृशवस्तुनः
सत्त्वाद्येकधर्ममुखेनाव्याम्यत्वे वाच्यत्वाभावधर्ममुखेनाव्याम्यशब्देनापि वाच्यत्वं न

स्यादिति । एतादृशव्याख्यामपहाय सत्त्वासत्त्वोभयरूपेणावाच्यं वस्तु तादृशरूपेणैवावाच्यशब्देन वाच्यं भवतीति व्याख्याने येन रूपेणावाच्यं वस्तु तेनैव रूपेण वाच्यं प्राप्तमिति, येन रूपेण सत्त्वं तेनैव रूपेणासत्त्वमप्यंगीक्रियताम् । तथा च—

‘विरोधान्नोभयैकान्तं स्याद्वादन्यायवेदिनाम् ।’ इति तदीयवचनमेव विरुद्ध्यते ।

99. Further, in this way how can the statement made by Svāmī Samantabhadra as ‘On the absolute admission of inexpressibility the expression that it is inexpressible can be held consistent? On the admission of absolute inexpressibility of an entity specially qualified by existence and non-existence its expressibility by the term inexpressible will not be there. So it has been explained there. If so held, it is not like this because of the lack of knowledge of the entity.

This is its meaning. The entity is expressible by taking the traits severally; it is inexpressible by bringing to prominence the traits of existence, non-existence and the dual simultaneously and thus being differentiated by them. On holding inexpressibility of the entity of the type by bringing to prominence the manifold traits like existence, etc., the expressibility for it will not be there even by a term implying the trait of the absence of expressibility. Putting aside such an explanation and adopting the explanation that an entity inexpressible in the form of existence, non-existence and the dual becomes expressible by the term ‘inexpressible’ of the same nature, the conclusion reached is that an entity is expressible in a form, it is inexpressible in the same form. This should also be accepted. And further, his own statement that for the knower of the *Syādvāda* logic the absolutism of the two is not acceptable on account of contradiction.

100. सिद्धान्तविदस्तु—अवक्तव्य एव घट इत्युक्ते सर्वथा घटस्यावक्तव्यत्वं

स्यात्, तथा चास्तित्वादिधर्ममुखेनापि घटस्य प्रथमादिभंगैरभिधानं न स्यात्, अतः स्यादिति निपातप्रयोगः। तथा च सत्त्वादिरूपेण वक्तव्य एव घटो युगपत्प्रधानभूतसत्त्वासत्त्वोभयरूपेणावक्तव्य इति चतुर्थभंगार्थनिष्कर्ष इति प्राहुः।

100. The knowers of the true principles hold like this. On contending that the pitcher is inexpressible exclusively the inexpressibility will be upheld of the pitcher (absolutely) in all the ways, then the predication of the pitcher by the first and the other porpositions through the traits of existence, etc. will not be possible. Therefore the use of the adverb (*nipāta*) *syāt* (somehow) in there. An thus the pitcher is expressible alone by forms as existence, it is inexpressible alone (certainly) by the forms of existence, non-existence and the dual brought to prominence simultaneously. So they hold the essence of the meaning of the fourth proposition.

101. व्यस्तसमस्तद्रव्यपर्यायावाश्रित्य चरमभंगत्रयमुपपादनीयम्। तथा—हि व्यस्तं द्रव्यं समस्तौ सहापितौ द्रव्यपर्यायावाश्रित्य स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्य एव घट इति पंचमभंगः घटादिरूपैकधर्मिविशेष्यकसत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्व-प्रकारकबोध-जनकवाक्यत्वं तल्लक्षणम्। तत्र द्रव्यार्पणादस्तित्वस्य युगपद्द्रव्यपर्यायार्पणाद-वक्तव्यत्वस्य च विवक्षितत्वात्।

101. By resorting to the view point of substance and mode severally or collectively the last three prepositions (of the *saptabhaṅgī*) may be formulated. The fifth preposition as the pitcher is somehow existent and inexpressible alone arises by taking substance singly, and by taking substance and mode focussed simultaneously and collectively. The differentia of such a proposition is the generation of cognition of an entity as one qualified by the form of the possessor of the traits like the pitcher etc., the cognition being of the nature of qualification by existence and inexpressibility qualified by non-existence. The reason is that the focus for expressibility is on existence

by the simultaneous application of the substantial and the modal points of view.

102. तथा व्यस्तं पर्यायं समस्तौ द्रव्यपर्यायौ चाश्रित्य स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्य एव घट इति षष्ठः । तल्लक्षणं च घटादिरूपैकधर्मिविशेष्यकनास्तित्वविशिष्टा-वक्तव्यत्व-प्रकारकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वम् ।

102. In the same way the sixth proposition as the pitcher is somehow non-existent and inexpressible alone arises by resorting to the mode severally, and substance and mode collectively. The differentia of such a proposition is the generation of cognition of the type where inexpressibility is qualified by non-existence with the qualified entity as the single possessor (of traits) like the pitcher etc.

103. एवं व्यस्तौ क्रमार्पितौ समस्तौ संहर्पितौ च द्रव्यपर्यायावाश्रित्य स्यादस्ति नास्ति चावक्तव्य एव घट इति सप्तमभंगः । घटादिरूपैकवस्तु-विशेष्यकसत्त्वासत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वप्रकारकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं तल्लक्षणम् । इति संक्षेपः ॥

103. By following the same way the seventh proposition as 'the pitcher is somehow existent, non-existent and inexpressible alone' arises by resorting to the point of view of substance and mode taken severally, in succession, and collectively focussed together. The differentia of such a proposition is the generation of cognition of inexpressibility qualified by existence and non-existence having the possessor of the traits as one like the pitcher etc. In brief it is the exposition.

104. अत्र—द्रव्यमेव तत्त्वं, अतस्स्यादस्तीति भंग एक एवेति सांख्यमतमयुक्तम्; पर्यायस्यापि प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् । तथा—पर्याय एव तत्त्वम्, अतस्स्यान्नास्तीति भंग एवेति सौगतमतमपि युक्तिर्दुर्गतम्; द्रव्यस्यापि

प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् । एवमवक्तव्यमेव वस्तुतत्त्वमित्यवक्तव्यत्वैकान्तोपि स्ववचनपराहतः, सदा मौनव्रतिकोहमितिवत् । एवमेवान्येषामेकान्तानां प्रतीतिपराहतत्वाद्नेकान्तवाद एवावतिष्ठते ।

104. Here, substance alone is the reality, therefore there is only one proposition as it is (exists). So hold the Sāṅkhyas; but it is untenable, for the mode (as against substance) is also experienced. In the same way mode alone is the reality, therefore the only proposition is that it is not (does not exist). So hold the Saugatas, but it is also vitiated for substance (as against mode) is also proved by experience. Thus the absolutism of inexpressibility too as 'the total reality is inexpressible alone' becomes (destroyed) by one's own statement like saying that I am always observing the vow of silence. In this way other absolute philosophies being refuted by experience, only *anekāntavāda* or the philosophy of non-absolutism remains established.

105. ननु च—अनेकान्तेपि विधिप्रतिषेधरूपा सप्तभंगी प्रवर्तते वा न वा ? यदि प्रवर्तते तदाऽनेकान्तस्य निषेधकल्पनायामेकान्त एव प्राप्त इति तत्पक्षोक्तदोषानुषंगः, अनवस्था च । तादृशैकान्तस्याप्यपरानेकान्तकल्पनया विधिप्रतिषेधयोर्वक्तव्यत्वात् । यदि सा न प्रवर्तते, तदा सर्वं वस्तुजातं सप्तभंगी-संवलितमिति सिद्धान्तव्याघातः । इति चेन्न,—प्रमाणनयार्पणाभेदात्तत्रापि तदुपपत्तेः । तथा हि—एकान्तो द्विविधः—सम्यगेकान्तो मिथ्यैकान्त इति । अनेकान्तोपि द्विविधः सम्यगेकान्तो मिथ्यानेकान्त इति । तत्र सम्यगेकान्तस्तावत्प्रमाणविषयीभूतानेक-धर्मात्मकवस्तुनिष्ठैकधर्मगोचरो धर्मान्तराप्रतिषेधकः । मिथ्यैकान्तस्त्वेकधर्ममात्रावधारणेनान्याशेषधर्मनिराकरणप्रवणः । एवमेकत्रवस्तुन्यस्तित्वनास्तित्वादिनाना-धर्मनिरूपणप्रवणः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमा-विरुद्धस्सम्यगेकान्तः । प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धानेक-धर्मपरिकल्पनं मिथ्यानेकान्तः इति । तत्र सम्यगेकान्तो नयः, मिथ्यैकान्तो नयाभासः । सम्यगेकान्तः प्रमाणं; मिथ्यानेकान्तः प्रमाणाभासः । इति व्यपदिश्यते ।

105. Here a question is raised : whether the *septad* of

propositions, of the form of assertion and negation, stands applicable in case of the non-absolutist philosophy, or not. If it is applicable, then in holding the negation (of it) we get the absolutism alone. Thus, there results the flaw mentioned in favour of that thesis; and also there will occur the fallacy of *argumentum et infinitum* on admitting another non-absolutism, for such absolutisms assertion and negation will become expressible. If the fallacy of *argumentum et infinitum* does not find application, then there will be the destruction of the principle that the entire reality is governed by the principle of the septad of propositions. If so held, the position is not like this, because by a distinction of application of comprehensive knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and partial knowledge (*naya*) that (septad of propositions) comes into existence or finds validity. And verily absolutism is of two kinds : true (*samyak*) absolutism and false (*mithyā*) absolutism. There, true absolutism is one that perceives a single trait residing in an entity having manifold traits which are subject of comprehensive knowledge, and one which does not negate other traits (in the same locus). The false absolutism is competent for (aims at) negating all the other traits by cognizing only one trait. The true absolutism alone is competent to expose the manifold traits like existence, non-existence, etc. in a (single entity and is also not contradictory to perception (*pratyakṣa*), reasoning *anumāna* and the tradition (*āgama*), based on authority. The false non-absolutism is positing manifold traits (in an entity), contradicted by (organs of knowledge) as perception, etc. There the true absolutism is the partial cognition (*naya*), and the false absolutism is the deceptive partial cognition (*nayābhāsa*). The true non-absolutism is the comprehensive knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and the false non-absolutism is the deceptive comprehension (*pramāṇābhāsa*). Such is the exposition (of the problem under

consideration).

106. तथा च—सम्यगेकान्तसम्यगनेकान्तावाश्रित्य प्रमाणनयार्पणाभेदात्, स्यादेकान्तः, स्यादनेकान्तः, स्यादुभयः, स्यादवक्तव्यः, स्यादेकान्तश्चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यादनेकान्तश्चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यादेकान्तोऽनेकान्तश्चावक्तव्यश्चेति सप्तभंगी योज्या । तत्र नयार्पणादेकान्तो भवति, एकधर्मगोचरत्वान्नयस्य । प्रमाणादनेकान्तो भवति, अशेषधर्मनिश्चयात्मकत्वात्प्रमाणस्य । यद्यनेकान्तोऽनेकान्त एव नत्वेकान्त इति मतम् । तदा, एकान्ताभावे तत्समूहात्मकस्यानेकान्तस्याप्यभावप्रसंगः, शाखाद्यभावे वृक्षाद्यभाववत् । इत्येवं मूलभंगद्वये सिद्धे उत्तरे च भंगा एवमेव योजयितव्याः ॥

106. And further, resorting to the true absolutism and the non-absolutism and with reference to the application of comprehension knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and partial knowledge (*naya*), the septad of propositions (*saptabhaṅgī*) is formulated as 'somehow there is absolutism, somehow there is non-absolutism, somehow there is the dual (of the two), somehow there is inexpressibility, somehow there is absolutism and inexpressibility, somehow there is non-absolutism and inexpressibility and somehow there is absolutism, non-absolutism and inexpressibility.' There it becomes absolutism by an application of partial knowledge (*naya*), because the *naya* is capable to perceive only one trait; it becomes non-absolutism by an application of comprehensive knowledge, because it is identified by a determination of the entirety of traits. Though non-absolutism is admitted to be non-absolute only, then there will be an occasion for the absence of non-absolutism of the nature of the collocation of absolutisms, on account of the absence of the non-absolutisms, like the absence of the tree, etc. on the absence of the (its) branches etc. Thus, the two primary propositions being established, the latter prepositions should be formulated in the same way.

यथा—स्यान्नित्यो घटः, स्यादनित्यो घट इति मूलभंगद्वयं, घटस्य द्रव्यरूपेण नित्यत्वात्पर्यायरूपेणानित्यत्वात्।

तदुक्तम्—

“समुदेति विलयमृच्छति भावो नियमेन पर्ययनयेन।
नोदेति नो विनश्यति द्रव्यनयालिङ्गितो नित्यम्॥” इति ॥

107. This *septad* of prepositions should be formulated in respect of the traits like permanence (*nityatva*), transitoriness (*anityatva*), oneness (*ekatva*), manifoldness (*anektva*), etc.; as the two primary propositions ‘somehow the pitcher is permanent and somehow the pitcher is impermanent’ are admitted, because the pitcher is permanent quâ substance and impermanent quâ mode. The same has been said as :

The existent, as a rule, originates and gets extinct as seen under the modal point of view (*pariyāyārthika naya*), and it does neither originate nor meet (its) destruction and is thus permanent as seen under the demarcation by the the point of view of substance.

108. ननु—स्यान्नित्यो घट इत्यत्र स्याच्छब्दः कथञ्चिदर्थकः, अवच्छिन्नत्वं संसर्गः, द्रव्यरूपावच्छिन्ननित्यत्ववान् घट इति बोधश्च प्रथमवाक्यस्य युक्तः। द्वितीयवाक्ये चानित्यपदस्य नित्यभेदोऽर्थः, एवं च पर्यायरूपावच्छिन्ननित्यभेदवान् घट इति बोधः प्राप्नोति। स चायुक्तः। द्रव्यरूपेण नित्ये घटे नित्यभेदस्य बाधितत्वात्; भेदस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्। इति चेदुच्यते;—मूले वृक्षसंयोगी नेत्यबाधितप्रतीत्या भेदस्याप्यव्याप्यवृत्तित्वमङ्गीक्रियत एव। अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वं च प्रकृते प्रतियोगिवृत्तित्वम्। संयोगिभेदस्य प्रतियोगी संयोगवान् वृक्षः; तद्वृत्तित्वं संयोगिभेदस्याक्षतम्; वृक्षे मूलावच्छेदेन संयोगिभेदस्य सत्त्वात्। तथा चे घटेऽपि पर्यायावच्छेदेन नित्यभेदो वर्तत इति। पर्यायरूपावच्छिन्ननित्यभेदवान् घट इति बोधे न कापि क्षतिरिति बोध्यम्।

108. Here in the proposition ‘somehow the pitcher is permanent’ the word *syāt* (somehow) means in some ways, and differentiation seems to be the contact (*saṁsarga*). Thus

the cognition of the first proposition that the pitcher is possessed of permanance differentiated by being substance, is also consistent. In the second proposition the meaning of the word 'anitya' (impermanence) is (its) distinction from 'nitya' (permanence). Thus we get a cognition of the pitcher as the possessor of distinction differentiated by the modal form. That is not consistent; because the distinction from permanence in the pitcher, permanent as substance, is contradicted, and because distinction is all pervasive (in the locus). If so, the explanation follows. By the uncontradicted experience that the tree has no contact (or relation of anything else like the monkey), the presence of distinction without pervasion is certainly accepted. In the present context the function without pervasion is the pervasion by the opposite. The opposite of the associated distinction from one associated with it continues undestroyed, for (this) distinction from one associated with it is seen in the tree as differentiated by the root (or trunk). And in this way the distinction from permanence is found in the pitcher as differentiated by a mode. It should be understood that nowhere there is a breach (disturbance) in the cognition that the pitcher exists as distinct from permanence by its differentiation through modes.

109. एकत्वानेकत्वसप्तभङ्गी, यथा—स्यादेको घटः, स्यादनेको घट इति मूलभङ्गद्वयम् । द्रव्यरूपेणैको घटः, स्थासकोशकुसूलादिषु मृद्द्रव्यस्यैकस्यानुगतत्वात्, तस्योर्ध्वतासामान्यरूपत्वात् । पर्यायरूपेणानेको घटः, रूपरसाद्यनेकपर्यायायात्मकत्वात् घटस्य ।

109. The septad of propositions in respect of oneness and mainfoldness is as follows. The pitcher is somehow one, and it is somehow many are the two primary propositions. As substance the pitcher is one, for the substance of earth as one

substance the pitcher is one, for the substance of earth as one runs through all the stages like *sthāsa* (lump of earth) *kośa* (hollow conical of shape), *kusūla* (shape appraoching completion) etc., for it is of the form of a vertical universal (*urdhvatā sāmānya*). The pitcher is manifold by its modal forms, because it is identical with many modes like form (colour), taste, etc.

110. नन्वेवमपि सर्वं वस्तु स्यादेकं स्यादनेकमिति कथं संगच्छते ? सर्वस्य वस्तुनः केनापि रूपेणैक्याभावात् । न च—सत्त्वादिरूपेण सर्वस्यैक्यं सम्भवतीति वाच्यम्; सत्त्वस्यापि सकलवस्तुव्यापिन एकस्य सिद्धान्तविरुद्धत्वात् । सदृशपरिणामस्यैकैकव्यक्तिगतस्य तत्तद्व्यक्त्यात्मकस्य प्रतिव्यक्तिभिन्नस्यैव सिद्धान्तसिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—‘उपयोगो लक्षणम्’ इति सूत्रे तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवार्तिके—
“न हि वयं सदृशपरिणाममनेकव्यक्तिव्यापिनं युगपदुपगच्छामोऽन्यत्रो-
पचारात्” इति ।

110. In spite of this how does it go consistently that all reality is somehow one and somehow many, for all the reals oneness is not possible in any form whatsoever? Nor can we say that oneness is possible for all the reals by the forms of existence etc. for oneness of existence pervading all the reals being contradictory with the established truth (and reality). The established truth holds up similarity (alone) in change, entering the constitution of reals taken severally with distinct forms according to (each and every) individual and thus being distinct from each other. So has been said in the *Ślokavārtika* (by Vidyānanda) under the commentary of the aphorism ‘*upayogo lakṣaṇam*’ (consciousness in action is the differentia of *Jīva*): Verily we too do not hold simultaneously the (existence of) similarity in change (as one) which pervades manifold reals, for it is so accepted elsewhere only in a concessional way.

111. सूत्रितं च माणिक्यनन्दिस्वामिभिः—

“सदृशपरिणामस्तिर्यक्खण्डमुण्डादिषु गोत्ववत्” इति ।

विवृत्तं चैतन्मार्तण्डे—

“सदृशपरिणामात्मकमनेकं तिर्यक्सामान्यम्” इति ।

तस्मात्सत्त्वस्यापि तिर्यक्सामान्यरूपस्य प्रतिव्यक्तिभिन्नत्वात् कथं सर्वस्य वस्तुनस्सत्त्वेन रूपेणैक्यम् ? इति चेत्,—अत्र ब्रूमः । सत्तासामान्यमेकानेकात्मकमेव सिद्धान्ते स्वीकृतम् । सत्त्वं हि व्यक्त्यात्मनाऽनेकमपि स्वात्मनैकं भवति । पूर्वोदाहृतपूर्वाचार्यवचनानां च सर्वथैक्यनिराकरणपरत्वात् । अन्यथा सत्तासामान्यस्य सर्वथानेकत्वे पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्ष एवादृतस्स्यात् । तथा च ‘पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेपि’ इत्यादि स्वामिसमन्तभद्राचार्यवचनं तद्व्याख्यानभूतमकलंकादिवचनं च विरुद्ध्यते । अनेकव्यक्त्यनुगतस्यैकधर्मस्यानङ्गीकारे सादृश्यमेव दुर्वचनम्, यतस्तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तदगतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वम् सादृश्यम् । यथा—चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताह्लादकरत्वादिमुखे चन्द्रसादृश्यम्, एवं घटयोरपि परस्परसाधर्म्यं घटत्वरूपैकधर्ममादायैवोपपद्यते । अन्यथा साधारणधर्मासाधारणधर्मव्यवस्थैव न घटते । अनेकव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वमेव हि साधारणत्वम् । तस्मात्सत्त्वादिना सर्वस्यैक्यम् जीवादिद्रव्यभेदेनानेकत्वम् चोपपन्नम् ।

111. Maṇikyanandi Svāmī has also written an aphorism as : The horizontal universal is the manifestation by similarity like cow-ness (prevading) in the cows of the *khaṇḍa* the *muṇḍa* (type) etc.

It has also been emphatically explained in *Mātarṇḍa* (*Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*) as :

The horizontal universal is manifold and is of the nature of similar manifestations.

Therefore, existence, with the nature of the horizontal universal, too, being distinct in case of every individual (real), how is there oneness of all the entities possible? If so held, we say like this. The universal of existence has been accepted as one-cum-mainfold in the scriptures of

established truth. Existence, verily, inspite of being manifold with reference to individuals, is one by (in) itself, for the quoted statements of the Āchāryas mentioned before are meant to negate absolute oneness in all forms, Or, on admitting absolute manifoldness of the universal of existence, the absolutism of distinction alone will stand as respected (accepted). And thus, the statement of Svāmī Samantabhadra raised in the couplet beginning as ‘*prthktvaikānta-pakṣepi*’ and the commenting statement of Akalaṅka, etc. will be contradicted. Even similarity will be difficult to express on not accepting the oneness of a trait running through manifold individuals, for similarity being distinct from the (the other traits), is the presence of many traits inhabiting them (the individual entities). For example, being distinct from the moon, the similarity, with the moon, is admitted in the face (of a demsel) causing pleasure etc. found in the moon. In this way the agreement of traits between two pitchers is generated by accepting a single trait of being a pitcher; or there will be no regulation of traits of the general type and those of the special type. The universal type is verily the pervasion in manifold individuals. It is why oneness of all is consistent with respect to existence etc. and manifoldness, by the (distinct) substances of the *jīva*, etc.

112. तदिदमाहुः स्वामिसमन्तभद्राचार्याः—

“सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्द्रव्यादिभेदतः ।

भेदाभेदविवक्षायामसाधारणहेतुवत् ॥” इति ।

यथा—हेतुः पक्षधर्मत्वादिभेदविवक्षायामनेकः हेतुत्वेनैकश्च । तथा सर्व सत्त्वादिभिरेकं जीवद्रव्यादिभेदेनानेकमिति तदर्थः । प्रपञ्चितश्चायमर्थो देवागमालंकार इति नेहोच्यते ।

112. The same has been stated by Svāmī Samantabhadra as : The oneness of all (entities) is there with reference to the universal of existence; and distinction is maintained (among them) with reference to the difference of substances etc., as it is there in the expressions of the special cause by distinction and by non-distinction.

Just as the cause is manifold with reference to its expression in terms of agreement with the thesis, etc., but as being a cause it is one; in the same way all (entities) are one with reference to the universal of existence and distinct with reference to the difference of substances of the *jīva*, etc. It is the meaning. As this meaning is discussed in *Devāgama-alāṅkāra* (*Āpta Mīmāṃsā*), it is not being explained here.

113. अत्राप्यनेकपदस्यैकभिन्नार्थकतया एकस्मिन् घटादावेकभेदः कथं वर्तत इति चोद्ये, पर्यावच्छेदेन वर्तते—यथा वृक्षे मूलावच्छेदेन संयोगिभेद इति, पूर्ववत्परिहारो बोध्यः ।

एवमयं स्याज्जीवः स्यादजीव इति मूलभंगद्वयम् । तत्रोपयोगात्मना जीवः, प्रमेयत्वाद्यात्मनाऽजीव इति तदर्थः ।

तदुक्तं भट्टकलंकदेवैः—

“प्रमेयत्वादिभिर्धर्मैरचिदात्मा चिदात्मकः ।

ज्ञानदर्शनतस्तस्माच्चेतनाऽचेतनात्मकः ॥” इति ।

अजीवत्वं च प्रकृतेऽजीववृत्तिप्रमेयत्वादिधर्मवत्त्वम्, जीवत्वं च ज्ञानदर्शनादिमत्त्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

113. Here also, on account of the difference of meaning of the term ‘*aneka*’ (manifold) from the term ‘*eka*’ (one), how can distinction from one reside in an entity like the pitcher, etc? On raising such a vicious reasoning, the answer is that the distinction as differentiated by mode is there; just as in the tree, as differentiated by the root or trunk, there is distinction of the entity associated by contact (of the monkey) from that to

which (i.e. the tree) it is so associated. The dissolution (of the fallacy) may be understood as before.

Thus, there are two primary propositions: somehow the *jīva* is and somehow the *jīva* is not. There the meaning is that the *jīva* is by being identical with *upayoga* (consciousness in activity), and it is not with reference to its identity with knowability, etc.

The same has been mentioned by Akalaṅka Deva as :

The soul is unconscious with reference to its traits like knowability etc., it is identical with consciousness with reference to knowledge and conation. (Therefore) the *jīva* is conscious-cum-unconscious.

In the present context, being non-*jīva* is constituted by its possession of the traits like knowability etc. which pervade the non-*jīva* (also); and being *jīva* is constituted by its possession of the traits like knowledge, conation. etc. It is to be so seen.

114. नन्वयमनेकान्तवादश्छलमात्रमेव, तदेवास्ति तदेव नास्ति, तदेव नित्यं तदेवानित्यमिति प्ररूपणारूपत्वादानेकान्तवादस्य । इति चेन्न;—छललक्षणाभावात् । अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणाभिधानं छलमिति छलसामान्यलक्षणम् । यथा नवकम्बलोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्यस्य नूतनाभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य कश्चिद्दूषयति, नास्य नवकम्बलास्सन्ति दरिद्रत्वात्; न ह्यस्य द्विकम्बलवत्त्वमपि सम्भाव्यते; कुतो नवेति । प्रकृते चानेकान्तवादे तादृशछललक्षणस्य प्रसक्तिरेव नास्ति, अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरपरिकल्पनाभावात् ।

114. Now a question is raised. (The philosophy of) non-absolutism is only a deceit (*chhala*), because its announcements are of the form that whatever is existent the same is non-existent, whatever is permanent the same is transitory. If so supposed, it is not (like this) because the differentia of deceit is not applicable (there). The general definition of deceit is to effect predication by taking some other meaning in the

interpretation of a term used with a different purpose (aim) from one used for some other meaning. For example, someone finds fault with the proposition used with a different purpose initially as a new (*nava*) blanket, from that of the proposition that Devadatta is '*navakambala*' there in the word '*nava*' meaning 'nine' (i.e. he possesses nine blankets or a new blanket). He does not possess nine blankets being poor; there is no possibility of possessing even two blankets, where to hope for possession of nine blankets by him. In the present context there is no implication of that type of deceit in the philosophy of non-absolutism, because there is no implication of a different meaning (or aim) of a word from one used with some other purpose.

115. अथ संशयहेतुरनेकान्तवादः, एकस्मिन्वस्तुनि विरुद्धानामस्तित्व-
नास्तित्वादिधर्माणामसम्भवात्; एक वस्तुविशेष्यकविरुद्धानाधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानं हि
संशयः। यथा—स्थाणुर्वा न वेत्याकारकज्ञानम् एकधर्मिविशेष्यकस्थाणुत्वतद-
भावप्रकारकज्ञानत्वासंशयः। तथा चास्तित्व-नास्तित्वादिरूपविरुद्धानाधर्म-
प्रकारकघटादिरूपैक- वस्तुविशेष्यकज्ञानजनकत्वात् संशयहेतुरनेकान्तवादः। इति
चेन्न; विशेषलक्षणोपलब्धेः। संशयो हि सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषाप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषस्मृतेश्च
जायते, यथा स्थाणुगुरुषोचिते देशे नातिप्रकाशान्धकारकलुषायां वेलायामूर्ध्वमात्रं
सामान्यं पश्यतः, वक्रकोटरपक्षिनीडादीन् स्थाणुगुणतान्विशेषान्वस्त्रसंयमनशिरः
कण्डूयनशिखा-बन्धनादीन्युरुषगतांश्चानुपलभमानस्य तेषां च स्मरतः पुरुषस्यायं
स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति संशय उपपद्यते। अनेकान्तवादे च विशेषोपलब्धिप्रतिहतैव,
स्वरूप-पररूपादिशेषाणां प्रत्यर्थमुपलम्भात्। तस्माद्विशेषोपलब्धेरनेकान्तवादो न
संशयहेतुः।

115. Further, the philosophy of non-absolutism is the cause of (creating) doubt, because there is no possibility of contradictory traits like existence, non-existence etc. in the same real. Doubt means the cognition of the type which implies many contradictory traits in a single entity qualified

(by them). For example, the cognition of the type whether (the object under perception) is a trunk (of a tree) or not is called doubt. The reason is that it implies a cognition of being a trunk or the absence of the same about a single real as a qualified entity. In the same way non-absolutism is the cause of (generating) doubt, for it generates the cognition of (generating) doubt, for it generates the cognition of the type which implies contradiction of many traits like existence, non-existence, etc. in respect of a single entity like the pitcher etc. as the qualified one. If understood so, it is not like this for some distinct differentia being available. Verily, a doubt is generated by a special perception different from a general one and accompanied by a specified memory. For example, the doubt whether it is a trunk (of a tree) or a man emerges in case of a perceiver perceiving the universal (similarity) only, the height at a time obscured by the absence of extreme light or extreme dark at a spot expected to accommodate the trunk as well as the man, (and) not catching the particulars as uneven cavity, the nests of birds, etc. belonging to the trunk, and (also not catching) the particulars like covering by clothes, removal of skin irritation (itch) of the head, the knot of the tuft of hair, etc. belonging to the man, and remembering them (all at the very moment). According to the philosophy of non-absolutism the perception of the particulars is not disturbed or destroyed, for the self identity, (and the) other identity, etc. for particulars being available in respect of every activity. Therefore, the particulars being available, the concept of non-absolutism is not the cause of a doubt.

116. अथैवमपि संशयो दुर्वारः, तथा हि—घटादावस्तित्वादिधर्माणां साधकाः प्रतिनियता हेतवस्सन्ति वा न वा? न चेद्विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति प्रतिपादनासम्भवः। सन्ति चेदेकत्र वस्तुनि परस्परविरुद्धास्तित्व-नास्तित्वादिसाधकहेतुसद्भावात्संशयो

दुर्वारः ? इति चेन्न; अस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोरवच्छेदकभेदेनार्थमाणयोर्विरोधाभावात् । यथा—एकस्यैव देवदत्तस्यैकापेक्षया पितृत्वमन्यापेक्षया पुत्रत्वं च परस्परमविरुद्धम्, यथा चान्वयव्यतिरेकिधूमादिहेतौ सपक्षे महानसादौ सत्त्वं विपक्षे महाह्लादावसत्त्वं च परस्परमविरुद्धम् । तथास्तित्वनास्तित्वयोरपि । तयोर्विरोधश्चानुपदमेव स्पष्टं परिहरिष्यते ॥

116. Further in this way too, the doubt it difficult to dispel. Further, verily, are there the settled causes to prove the traits of existence, non-existence etc. in the entities like pitcher etc.? If not, then the exposition of the reals for those not understanding them is impossible. If they are there, then also doubt is difficult to remove, because of the presence of causes accounting for the mutually contradictory traits like existence, non-existence, etc. in the single real (or entity). If so understood, the position is not like this, as there is no contradiction between the traits of existence and non-existence being applied with a distinction of determinants. For example, incase of the same (person) Devadatta, fatherhood with one reference and being a son with another reference are mutually non-contradictory, and as existence in case of the smoke as a cuase in agreeing instances like kichen etc. and non-existence of the same (smoke) as a cause in disagreeing instances like the tank, etc. are mutually uncontradictory. The same is the position in case of existence and non-existence. The contradiction between them will be got rid of clearly in accordance with the use of the terms.

117. ननु—अनेकान्तवादे विरोधादयोऽष्टदोषास्सम्भवन्ति । तथा हि—एकत्रार्थे विधिप्रतिषेधरूपावस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्मौ न सम्भवतः, शीतोष्णयोरिव भावाभावयोः परस्परं विरोधात् । अस्तित्वं हि भावरूपं विधिमुखप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् । नास्तित्वं च प्रतिषेधरूपं, ननुल्लिखितप्रतीतिविषयत्वात् । यत्रास्तित्वं तत्र नास्तित्वस्य विरोधः,

यत्र नास्तित्वं तत्रास्तित्वस्य विरोधः, इति विरोधः ॥ अस्तित्वस्याधिकरणमन्यन्नास्तित्वस्याधिकरणमन्यदित्यस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोर्वैयधिकरणम् । तच्च विभिन्नाधिकरणवृत्तित्वम् ॥ येन रूपेणास्तित्वं येन च रूपेण नास्तित्वं तादृशरूपयोरपि प्रत्येकमस्तित्वनास्तित्वात्मकत्वं वक्तव्यम्, तच्च स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां तयोरपि प्रत्येकमस्तित्वनास्तित्वात्मकत्वं स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यामित्यनवस्था । अप्रामाणिकपदार्थपरम्परापरिकल्पनाविश्रान्त्यभावश्चानवस्थेत्युच्यते ॥ येन रूपेण सत्त्वं तेन रूपेणासत्त्वस्यापि प्रसंगः, येन रूपेण चासत्त्वं तेन रूपेण सत्त्वस्यापि प्रसंगः, इति संकरः । 'सर्वेषां युगपत्प्राप्तिस्संकरः ।' इत्यभिधानात् ॥ येन रूपेण सत्त्वं तेन रूपेणासत्त्वमेव स्यान्न तु सत्त्वं, येन रूपेण चासत्त्वं तेन सत्त्वमेव स्यान्नत्वसत्त्वम्, इति व्यतिकरः । 'परस्परविषयगमनं व्यतिकरः' इति वचनात् सत्त्वासत्त्वात्मकत्वे च वस्तुन इदमित्थमेवेति निश्चेतुमशक्तेस्संशयः ॥ ततश्चानिश्चयरूपाऽप्रतिपत्तिः ॥ ततस्सत्त्वासत्त्वात्मनो वस्तुनोऽभावः ॥ इति ॥

117. But in the non-absolutistic philosophy the eight flaws or blemishes like contradiction, etc. are possible. And further, verily, in the same real the traits of existence and non-existence of the form of assertion and negation are not possible to reside, for existence and non-existence are contradictory like cold and heat. Existence is of the form of assertion being an object of cognition by the initiation of position. Non-existence is of the form of negation being an object of experience pointed out by the use of 'no or not' (*nañ*). Where there is non-existence, there is its contradiction with existence. Thus the contradiction is noticed. The locus of existence is something and the locus of non-existence is some other entity. Thus there is the vitiation of locus *vaiyadhi karaṇya* for existence and non-existence; that (vitiation of locus) too is the pervasion in different bases. The form by which existence is seen and the form by which non-existence is seen, this form of dual type must be admitted (expressed) in case of existence and non-existence both taken severally. That too is admitted (expressed) of existence and non-existence, both taken severally.

That too is admitted through the self-identity and the other-identity. For them (two) too, when taken severally, existence and non-existence by self-identity and other-identity, must be accepted. Thus, there the fallacy of *argumentum et infinitum* occurs (leading to no conclusion). This fallacy arises when there is no end of the chain of thoughts (hypotheses) based on the chain of unproved (unestablished) entities implied by the (various) terms. The form by which existence is admitted, by the same form non-existence also has to be admitted. Such a situation will have to be faced. The form by which non-existence is admitted, by the same form existence also has to be admitted. Such a situation will be there. It will the flaw of *saṅkara* (all mixed-up). All the entities apprehended simultaneously is the meaning of the flaw of *saṅkara*, so (it) has been said. The form which implies existence, non-existence alone will be implied there by it, and not existence; the form which implies non-existence existence alone will be implied there by it, and not non-existence. Thus, there will the flaw of *vyatikara* (mutual transgression among entities). The mutual transgression in entities is called the flaw of *vyatikara*, being so mentioned. The flaw of doubt is there because, on holding a real as of the nature of existence-cum-non-existence, it becomes difficult to determine that the entity is this or is of this type. Then follows the flaw of non-cognition of the nature (type) of non-determination. In the same chain there will be the flaw of absence of the entity of the nature of existence-cum-non-existence.

118. अत्र वदन्त्यभिज्ञाः । कथंचित्प्रतीयमाने स्वरूपाद्येपक्षया विवक्षितयोस्सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः प्रतीयमानयोर्न विरोधः । अनुपलम्भसाध्यो हि विरोधः । न हि स्वरूपादिना वस्तुनस्सत्त्वे तदैव पररूपादिभिरसत्त्वस्यानुपलम्भोस्ति । स्वरूपादिभिस्सत्त्वस्येव पररूपादिभिरसत्त्वस्यापि प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् ।

118. Here the learned persons say (like this). There is no contradiction between existence and non-existence (somehow experienced) made object of expression and experience somehow with reference to self-identity etc. (actually) perceived in some ways. Verily, the contradiction is proved by non-attainment (of an entity). Certainly the absence of existence with reference to the other-identity etc. it not obtained at that moment, where the existence of an entity with reference to self-identity is obtained. (Our) experience certifies existence only with reference to self-identity, etc. and non-existence alone with reference to the other-identity, etc.

119. न खलु वस्तुनस्सर्वथा भाव एव स्वरूपं, स्वरूपेणेव पररूपेणापि भावप्रसंगात्। नाप्यभाव एव, पररूपेणेव स्वरूपेणाप्यभावप्रसंगात्।

119. Certainly the identity of a real is not absolute existence, for (then) existence will be proved even by the other-identity like the self-identity (of an entity). Nor is absolute non-existence the identity (of an entity), for (then) there will occur non-existence with reference to self-identity like the other-identity.

120. ननु—पररूपेणासत्त्वं नाम पररूपासत्त्वमेव। न हि घटे पटस्वरूपाभावे घटो नास्तीति वक्तुं शक्यम्। भूतले घटाभावे भूतले घटो नास्तीति वाक्यप्रवृत्तिवत्। घटे पटस्वरूपाभावे पटो नास्तीत्येव वक्तुमुचितत्वात्। इति चेन्न;—विचारासहत्वात्। घटादिषु पररूपासत्त्वं पटादिधर्मो घटधर्मो वा? नाद्यः व्याघातात्। न हि पटरूपासत्त्वं पटेऽस्ति। पटस्य शून्यत्वापत्तेः। न च स्वधर्मः स्वस्मिन्नास्तीति वाच्यम्, तस्य स्वधर्मत्वविरोधात्। पटधर्मस्य घटाद्याधारकत्वायोगाच्च। अन्यथा वितानविवितानाकारस्यापि तदाधारकत्वप्रसंगात्। अन्त्यपक्षस्वीकारे तु विवादो विश्रान्तः, भावधर्मयोगाद्भावात्मकत्ववदभावधर्मयोगाद्भावात्मकत्वस्यापि स्वीकरणीयत्वात्, एवं च घटो नास्तीति प्रयोग उपपन्नः। अन्यथा यथैवाभावधर्मयोगेऽप्यसन्न स्यात्तथैव

भावधर्मयोगेपि सन्न स्यात् ।

120. But, the non-existence with reference to the other-identity is certainly the absence of the other identity. It is not possible to say that the pitcher is non-existent, when the identity of cloth is absent in the pitcher. The reason is that, like the usage that the pitcher is non-existent on the surface of the ground where it is not there, the usage that the cloth is non-existent in the pitcher where it is not, it is not justified. If so held, the position is not like this, because it cannot be so thought of. Is the absence of the other-identity in the pitcher, etc. the trait of the pitcher or of the cloth, etc? The former alternative cannot be admitted for the other-identity itself being destroyed. Verily, the absence of the identity as cloth cannot be there in the cloth, then the cloth will meet its extinction. We cannot say that the self-identity does not reside in the self-same entity, then it will meet contradiction with being its own trait, and (also) for there being no possibility of the locus as the pitcher, etc. for the traits of cloth, or we shall have to admit weaving and the weaver as the locus of that (cloth). On accepting the last (second) alternative the difference of argumentation comes to a stop, as existence is accepted by the trait of existence (in a real) and non-existence, by the trait of non-existence (in a real). And thus the usage as the pitcher is not (existent) becomes consistent. Otherwise, just as on the association of the trait of non-existence it is not held as non-existent, so also in the association of the trait of existence it must not be held existent.

121. ननु—घटे पटरूपासत्त्वं नाम घटनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । तच्च पटधर्मः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र भूतलनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव भूतले नास्तित्वं, तच्च घटधर्मः । इति चेन्न;—तथापि पररूपाभावस्य घटधर्मत्वाविरोधात्, घटाभावस्य

भूतलधर्मत्ववत् । तथा च घटस्य भावाभावात्मकत्वं सिद्धम् ।
कथंचित्तादात्म्यलक्षणसम्बन्धेन सम्बन्धिन एव स्वधर्मत्वात् ।

121. It may be doubted like this. In the pitcher the non-existence in the form of the pitcher is the opposition of the negation residing in the pitcher. That comes out to be the trait of the cloth. To give an example here in the situation that the pitcher is not on the ground, non-existence on the ground is certainly the opposition of the trait of negation residing in the ground. That comes out to be the trait of the pitcher. If so considered, it is not like this. In spite of it there is no contradiction of the negation of the other-identity with the trait of being a pitcher, like the negation of the pitcher being the trait of the ground. In this way the identity of the pitcher as existent-cum-nonexistent is established, because by dint of the relation of conditional (referenced) identity, it becomes a trait of the entity itself (so) related.

122. नन्वेवं रीत्या घटस्य भावाभावात्मकत्वे सिद्धेऽपि घटोऽस्ति पटो नास्तीत्येव वक्तव्यम् । पटाभावप्रतिपादनपरवाक्यस्य तथा प्रवृत्तेः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति घटाभावप्रतिपादनपरं वाक्यम् प्रवर्तते—न तु भूतलं नास्तीति, तथा प्रकृते पटाभावस्य घटात्मकत्वेऽपि पटो नास्तीत्येव प्रयोगो युक्तः । अभावबोधकवाक्यस्य प्रतियोगिप्रधानत्वात् । यथा घटप्रागभावस्य कपालात्मकत्वेऽपि कपालदशायां घटो भविष्यतीत्येव प्रागभावप्रतिपादकः प्रयोग दृष्टः, न तु कपालो भविष्यति । यथा च घटध्वंसस्योत्तरकपालात्मकत्वेऽपि घटो नष्ट इत्येव प्रयोगः, तथा प्रकृतेऽपि । इति चेदुच्यते,—घटस्य भावाभावात्मकत्वे सिद्धेऽस्माकं विवादो विश्रान्तः, समीहितसिद्धेः । शब्दप्रयोगस्तु पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगानुसारेण भविष्यति । न हि पदार्थसत्ताधीनशब्दप्रयोगः । तथा हि—देवदत्तः पचतीति प्रयोगो वर्तते । तत्र देवदत्तपदार्थशरीरं वा ? आत्मा वा ? शरीरविशिष्टात्मा वा ? आद्ये देवदत्तस्य शरीरं पचतीति प्रयोगापत्तिः । द्वितीये देवदत्तस्यात्मा पचतीति प्रयोगापत्तिः । शरीरविशिष्टात्मा पचतीति प्रयोगाभावात्तृतीयपक्षेऽपि नोपपत्तिः । तथा च प्रतिपादित-प्रयोगाभावे पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगाभाव एव शरणम् । तथा च पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगानुगुण्येन

122. By way of a question it may be said. Following this way, even on proving the existent-cum-non-existent nature of the pitcher, the expression should be as the pitcher is certainly and it is not certainly, because the proposition which aims at the exposition of the absence of the pitcher follows such a way. For example, the proposition that the pitcher is not there on the ground proceeds with the exposition of the absence of the pitcher, not with the exposition that the ground is not there. In the same way in the present context, even on accepting the absence of the cloth as the nature of the pitcher, the usages as 'the cloth is not' alone is justified. In case of a proposition potent to generate cognition of negation there is the prominence of the pitcher, being of the nature of the shreds (of its body) the usage as the pitcher will be in the form of such shreds, which aims at the exposition of the pre-negation, is seen, and not as shreds it (pitcher) is the pieces (themselves). And just as the usage that the pitcher is destroyed, even on its being of the nature of the shreds after the destruction of the pitcher, is justified (seen); in the same way the position should be understood in the present context. If so held, the answer follows. On the establishment of the pitcher of the nature of existence-cum-non-existence, our difference of contentions has come to a stop, because of the establishment of what we aimed at.

The usage of words will follow the fore running-chain of the running usages. Verily the usage of words is not dependent on existence (of things). In the same way, as an example, the usage as Devadatta cooks is in vogue. There, is the entity, implied by term Devadatta, the body (of Devadatta), the soul (of Devadatta), or the soul qualified by the body of Devadatta?

In case of the first alternative, it comes to 'the body of Devadatta cooks.' In case of the second alternative it comes to 'the soul of Devadatta cooks'. The question of the third alternative does not arise on account of absence of the usage as 'the soul qualified by the body cooks'. And thus in the absence of the usage so desired for exposition, the only resort is the absence of the chain of the fore-running usages. And thus the usages of words being in accordance with the chain of fore-running usages, it (the tradition) does not deserve (invite) any questioning.

123. किञ्च—घटादौ वर्तमानः पररूपाभावो घटाद्भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा? यदि भिन्नस्तस्यापि परत्वात्तदभावस्तत्र कल्पनीयः। अन्यथा तस्य परत्वानुपपत्त्या घटादेः कथंचिदसद्रूपत्वासिद्धेः। तदभावकल्पनायां चानवस्था, तस्यापि परत्वात्। घटादिषु पररूपस्यातानवितानाकारस्याभावाभावपरिकल्पनायां तेषां घटत्वापत्तिश्च, निषेधद्वयेन प्रकृतरूपसिद्धेः। यद्यभिन्नस्तर्हि सिद्धं स्वस्मादभिन्नेन भावधर्मेण घटादौ सत्त्ववदभावधर्मेण तादृशेनासत्त्वमपि स्वीकरणीयमिति।

123. Further, it can said. Is the (under discussion) negation of the other-identity residing in the pitcher etc. distinct from the pitcher etc. or not? If it is distinct, the negation of that is also thinkable for being of the nature of other-identity; otherwise the conditional (somehow) non-existence of the pitcher etc. will not be proved because of the absence of a proof for the other-identity. If its negation is supposed, then there will the fallacy of '*argumentum et infinitum*', because of admission of the other-identity for it. On the admission of the other-identity of the nature of 'weaving and the weaver' in the pitcher etc. the being of a pitcher will have to be admitted of them also, for only the positive entity is established by a double negation (i.e. negation of negation). If it is not distinct, then, by the trait of negation of the same status, non-existence will also be

proved like existence, proved by the trait of position not distinct from the entity itself in the pitcher etc.

124. ननु—स्वरूपेण भाव एव पररूपेणाभावः पररूपेणाभाव एव च स्वरूपेण भाव इति भावाभावयोरेकत्र वस्तुनि भेदाभावाद्वस्तुनः कुतस्तदुभयात्मकता, इति चेत्; भावाभावापेक्षणीयस्य निमित्तस्य भेदादिति ब्रूमः। स्वद्रव्यादिकं हि निमित्तमपेक्ष्य भावप्रत्ययं जनयत्यर्थः, परद्रव्यादिकं चाभावप्रत्ययम्, इत्येकत्वद्वित्वादिसंख्यावदेकवस्तुनि भावाभावयोर्भेदः। न ह्येकत्र द्रव्ये द्रव्यान्तरमपेक्ष्य दित्वादिसंख्या प्रकाशमाना स्वात्ममात्रापेक्ष्यैकत्वसंख्यातो न्या न प्रतीयते। नाप्येकत्वद्वित्वरूपोभयसंख्या तद्वतो भिन्नैव, द्रव्यस्यासंख्येयत्वप्रसंगात्। संख्यासमवायाद्द्रव्यस्य संख्येयत्वमिति तु न, कथंचित्तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकेण समवायासम्भवात्। तस्मात्सिद्धोऽपेक्षणीयभेदात्संख्यावत्सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्भेदः। भिन्नयोश्चानयोरेकवस्तुनि प्रतीयमानत्वात्को विरोधः।

124. But how is the dual nature of a single entity possible in face of the situation that existence alone is prehended by self-identity, non-existence alone is admitted by the other-identity, and existence, by the self identity, because of the absence of distinction between existence and non-existence in the same real? If so, we (also) hold it is (so), because of the necessity the auxiliary causation of (the traits of) existence and non-existence. The real generates the cognition of existence (or position) by the auxiliary causation of its own substance, etc.; and it generates the cognition of non-existence (or negation) by the auxiliary causation of the other's substance, etc. Thus, there is the distinction between position and negation in one single entity like being one, two etc. in numeration. Verily, in the same real, the clear numeration as two etc. with reference to the other substance is not experienced as different from numeration as one with reference to the self-same entity only. Nor, numeration as one, two and dual is not distinct exclusively from the possessor (the enumerated) of those

numbers, then substance will become un-numerable. But numerability of a substance cannot be accepted on the inherent relation (*samavāya*) (of numeration) with the substance, because the inherence (*samavāya*) will not be possible without conditional (somehow) identity (between the two). Therefore the distinction between existence (position) and non-existence (negation) is established on the distinction of reference like the numeration. What contradiction will result there, if these mutually distinct traits are experienced in the same real?

125. ननु—सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकवस्तुनि प्रतीतिर्मिथ्येति चेन्न; बाधकाभावात् । विरोधो बाधक इति चेन्न; परस्परराश्रयापत्तेः, सति हि विरोधे प्रतीतेस्तेन बाध्यमानत्वान्मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः । ततश्च सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्विरोधसिद्धिः इति ।

125. But if the experience of existence and non-existence in the same real is held to be false, it is not so for there being no obstruction (for such an experience). The contradiction between them is obstructive. If such is the supposition, it is not so for the occurrence of the fallacy of mutual dependence. On the appearance of contradiction (in a real) and on experience being obstructed by it the falsity of experience is possible to be proved; and then the contradiction between existence and non-existence will be proved.

126. किञ्च—विरोधस्तावत्त्रिधा व्यवतिष्ठते, वध्यघातकभावेन, सहानवस्थानात्मना वा, प्रतिबद्धचप्रतिबन्धकरूपेण वा । तत्राद्ये त्वहिनकुलाग्न्युदकादिविषयः । स चैकस्मिन् काले वर्तमानयोस्संयोगे सति भवति, संयोगस्यानेकाश्रयत्वात् द्वित्ववत् । नासंयुक्तमुदकमग्निं नाशयति, सर्वत्राग्न्यभाव-प्रसंगात् । ततस्सति संयोगे बलीयसोत्तरकालमितरद्बाध्यते । न हि तथाऽस्तित्व-नास्तित्वयोः क्षणमात्रमप्येकस्मिन्वृत्तिरस्तीति भवताभ्युपगम्यते, यतो वध्यघातक-भावरूपो विरोधस्तयोः कल्प्येत । यदि चैकस्मिन्स्तयोर्वृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते, तदा तयोस्तुल्यबलत्वान्न वध्यघातकभावः ॥ नापि सहानवस्थानलक्षणो विरोधः, स

चैकत्र कालभेदेन वर्तमानयोर्भवति, यथा आम्रफले श्यामतापीततयोः । उत्पद्यमाना हि पीतता पूर्वकालभाविनीं श्यामतां नाशयति । न हि तथाऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वे पूर्वोत्तरकालभाविनी । यदि स्याताम् अस्तित्वकाले नास्तित्वाभावाज्जीवसत्तामात्रं सर्वं प्राप्नुवीत । नास्तित्वकाले चास्तित्वाभावात्तदाश्रयो बन्धमोक्षादिव्यवहारो विरोधमुपगच्छेत् । सर्वथैवासतः पुरानात्मलाभाभावात्, सर्वथा च सतः पुनरभाव-प्राप्त्यनुपपत्तेर्नैतयोस्सहानवस्थानं युज्यते ॥ तथास्तित्वनास्तित्वयोः प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकरूपविरोधोऽपि न सम्भवति । यथा—सति मणिरूपप्रतिबन्धके वह्निना दाहो न जायत इति मणिदाहयोः प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धक भावो युक्तः, न हि तथाऽस्तित्वकाले नास्तित्वस्य प्रतिबन्धः, स्वरूपेणास्तित्वकालेऽपि पररूपादिना नास्तित्वस्य प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात्, इति ॥

126. There is something more to say. Contradiction (between the two) arises in three ways as : one being (weak) fit to be killed and the other being the killer, as (the two) not existing simultaneously (together), and as one being to be obstructed and the other being the obstructor. The first kind of contradiction is upheld in the case of a serpent and a mongoose (and) that of fire and water, etc. And another (contradiction) takes place on the meeting and the presence of the two at the same time, for the contact depends on manifoldness like numeration as two. Water, not in contact or meeting depends on manifoldness like numeration as two. Water, not in contact with fire, does not extinguish fire, for there being an occasion of emergence of the absence of fire everywhere, then on their meeting the other is killed by the stronger one in the following time (moments). Verily you do not hold the meeting of existence and non-existence in a single entity even for a moment on the basis of which the contradiction of the type 'one is to be killed, another being a killer or the violater,' both of them being possessed of equal strength; nor is there contradiction of the form of not existing together, it emerges between the two existing together with a difference

of time as between black and yellow hues in a mango. The yellowness in (its) appearing destroys (its) blackness existing during the previous moments. And verily, the existence and non-existence are not the entities existing during the former and later time. If the two are so supposed then on account of the absence of non-existence in the time (presence) of existence all will become identical with only the existence of *jīva*. In the time (presence) of non-existence absence of non-existence in the time (presence) of existence, the processes of bondage and liberation dependent on them will meet contradiction (impossibility). The co-existence of the two is also not consistent because the absolutely existent entity cannot gain again its non-existence. And further, for existence and non-existence the contradiction of the type of 'the obstructed and the obstructor' is also not possible. For example, there being the obstruction by a (particular) jewel burning is not generated by fire, so the form (of contradiction) as 'the obstructable and the obstructor' between the jewel (*maṇi*) and the burning is justified. Verily, in the same way there is no obstruction of non-existence in the time (presence) of existence, for the experience of non-existence with reference to the other-identity stands established in the time of existence by its own identity.

127. यत्तु शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तकथनम्, तदसत्। एकत्रधूपघटादाव-
वच्छेदकभेदेन शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोरुपलम्भात्तयोरपि विरोधासिद्धेः।

यथैकत्र चलाचलात्मनोर्वृक्षादौ रक्तारक्तात्मनोर्घटादावावृतानावृतात्मनो-
श्शरीरादौ चोपलम्भादविरोधस्तथा सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरपि।

एतेन वैयधिकरण्यमपास्तम्, सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकाधिकरणतया प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात्।

127. The example as 'like cold and heat' (given in support of contradiction) is also untenable because cold and hot sensations are available in a single entity with a distinction

of determinants as the (hot) sunlight and the (cold) pitcher. Therefore the contradiction between the two stands unproved.

Just as mobility and immobility in case of the tree, etc. redness and (its) opposite in case of the pitcher etc., being covered and being uncovered in case the body etc. are uncontradictory on account of their availability, in the same entity; in the same way there is non-contradiction between existence and non-existence.

By it (what is said before) the flaw of vitiated locus (*vaiyadhikarāṇya*) also stands refuted because existence and non-existence are experienced as residing in the one (same) locus..

128. यच्चानवस्थानदूषणमुक्तम्, तदपि नानेकान्तवादिनां दोषः । अनन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनः स्वयं प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्, अप्रामाणिकपदार्थ-परम्परापरिकल्पना-विरहात् ।

128 . The flaw of *argumentum et infinitum*, as has been mentioned, is not a flaw for the followers of the philosophy of non-absolutism, a real itself possessed of infinite (number of) traits being accepted as prehended (known) by comprehensive type of knowledge, and also being exempt from hypotheses related with the chain of unestablished entities for lack of cognitive evidence.

129. एतेन संकरव्यतिकरावपि निरस्तौ, प्रतीतिसिद्धेऽर्थे कस्यापि दोषस्याभावात्, दोषाणां प्रतीत्यसिद्धपदार्थगोचरत्वात् । संशयादयश्च पूर्वमेव निरस्तप्रायाः । इत्यन्यत्र विस्तरः ।

129. By this the flaws of mutual mixing-up (*saṅkara*) and mutual differentiation (*vyatikara*) also stand refuted, for no flaw is possible in an entity established by experience, and the

flaws are seen in entities not established by experience. The flaws of doubt etc. are mostly refuted even earlier. Their detailed discussion is already available at other places

130. अथैवमुपपत्त्या विरोधादिदोषाभावे प्रतिपादितेऽपि मिथ्यादर्शनाभिनविशात्तत्त्वमप्रतिपद्यमानं पुरुषं सार्वलौकिकहेतुवादमाश्रित्योच्यते । स्वेष्टार्थसिद्धिमिच्छता प्रवादिना हेतुः प्रयोक्तव्यः, प्रतिज्ञामात्रेणार्थसिद्धेरभावात् । स च हेतुः स्वपक्षस्य साधकः परपक्षस्य दूषकश्च । येन रूपेण हेतोस्साधकत्वं येन च रूपेण दूषकत्वं न तादृशे रूपे हेतोरत्यन्तभिन्ने, तयोर्हेतुधर्मत्वेन हेत्वपेक्षया कथञ्चिदभिन्नत्वात् । न हि तयोर्हेत्वपेक्षयाऽनन्यत्वाद्येन रूपेण साधकत्वं तेन रूपेण दूषकत्वं च सम्भवतीति संकरः, येन रूपेण साधकत्वं तेन रूपेण दूषकत्वमेवेति व्यतिकरो वा, साधकत्वदूषकत्वयोर्विरोधो वा सम्भवति; तथाऽनेकान्तप्रक्रियायामपि विरोधादिदोषानवतारः ।

130. Further, in this way, even on the refutation of the flaws like contradiction etc. being explained with proofs, it is (now) explained to the person not knowing the reality on account of the obsession of the false faith (*mithyādarśana*), after resorting to (aiming at) the popular theory of causation. The reason (*hetu*) is to be used by a contestant desiring (aiming at) the establishment of a required entity (or subject), for (such) an establishment is not possible only by stating the problem. Such as reason proceeds to prove the thesis pointed out for proving, and disprove or to find fault with the opposite thesis about the same. By whatever form a reason goes to prove (something) or by whatever form it goes to disprove (something), these two forms for the reason (in common) are not absolutely distinct for they are somehow non-distinct (as well) for both of them being a reason and thus with reference to the trait of being a reason.

Both of them being non-distinct, the form by which it goes to prove (a thesis) and the form by which it goes to

disprove it being distinct there is no flaw of mutual mixing-up (*saṅkara*); or the form by which it goes to prove (a thesis) and by the same form it goes to disprove it, such a flaw of false differentiation (*vyatikara*) is not there; or the contradiction between forms, one going to prove and the other going to disprove, is also not possible there. In the same way there is no possibility of the flaws like contradiction etc. in the process adopted in accordance with the philosophy of non-absolutism.

131. वस्तुतस्तु—अनेकान्तप्रक्रियायां सर्वेषां प्रवादिनामपि प्रतिपत्तिरेव । एकानेकात्मकस्य वस्तुनस्सर्वसम्मतत्वात् ।

131. In reality, in the process adopted in accordance with the philosophy of non-absolutism, there is certainly (the gain of) knowledge for all the (differing) contenders, because all agree in accepting the nature of reality as one-cum-many.

132. सांख्यास्तावत्—सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रधानमित्याहुः । तेषां मते प्रसादलाघवशोषतापवारणादिभिन्नस्वभावानामनेकात्मनामेकप्रधानात्म-
कत्वस्वीकारेणैकानेकात्मकवस्तुनः स्वीकृतत्वात् । ननु प्रधानं नामैकं वस्तु नास्ति,
साम्यावस्थामापन्नास्सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणा एव प्रधानम्, सत्त्वरजस्तमसां समूहे
प्रधानपदशक्तेस्स्वीकारादिति चेन्न; तथाप्येकानेकात्मकवस्तुस्वीकारस्याक्षत-
त्वात् । समुदायसमुदायिनोरभेदात्समुदायिनां गुणानामनेकेषां समुदायस्य
चैकस्याभेदाभ्युपगमात् ।

132. We take the case of the Sāṅkhyas. They hold *pradhāna* (basic reality) as the equilibrium of the pure and fine (*sattva*), the active (*rajas*) and the stolid (*tamas*). In their philosophy the non-absolute nature of reality in the form of *pradhāna* is accepted, for they posit (accept) the capacities for different natures like delight (*prasāda*), levitation —(*lāghava*), evaporation (*śoṣa*), being hot (*tāpa*), warding off (*vāraṇa*), etc.

in one single entity of the nature of (*pradhāna*). It may be said the *guṇas* of the pure (*sattva*), the active (*rajas*) and stolid (*tamas*) obtaining an equilibrium constitute the basic reality (*pradhāna*) and also because the potency of the word '*pradhāna*' is acceptable in the collocation of the pure (*sattva*), the active (*raja*) and the stolid (*tamas*). It is not so, because, even then the acceptance of a real as one-cum-many stands understroyed. (Further) the reason is that non-distinction between the single collocation and the so collected manifold attributes has been accepted.

133. नैयायिकास्तु—द्रव्यत्वादिकं सामान्यविशेषमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अनुवृत्ति-
व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययविषयत्वाद्द्रव्यत्वादिकं सामान्यविशेषः । द्रव्यं द्रव्यमित्यनुगतबुद्धि-
विषयत्वात्सामान्यम् । गुणो न द्रव्यं कर्म न द्रव्यमिति व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिविषयत्वाद्विशेष
इति । एवं च सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वमेकस्याभ्युपगतम् । एवं गुणत्वं कर्मत्वं च
सामान्यविशेष इति बोध्यम् ।

133. We now take the case of the Naiyayikas. They hold the reals like substance etc. as universal-cum-particular. The substance etc. are of the nature of universal-cum-particular, because they are the objects of agreeing and differing cognitions. The universal is there as an object of the agreeing (repeated) cognitions as substance. The particular is there as an object of differing cognitions effected by our intellect because an attribute is not a substance, and an action is not a substance. Thus, the nature of universal-cum-particular is admitted of a (single) entity. Thus, being an attribute and being an action should be known as possessed of the nature of universal-cum-particular.

134. सौगतास्तु—मेचकज्ञानमेकमनेकाकारमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । पञ्चवर्णात्मकं
रत्नं मेचकम् । तज्ज्ञानं नैकप्रतिभासात्मकमेव, चित्रज्ञानत्वविरोधात् । नीलपीता
दिनानाकारज्ञानं हि चित्रज्ञानं नत्वेकाकारमेव । नापि मेचकज्ञानमनेकमेव, मेचकज्ञान

मिदमित्यनुभवविरोधात्, इमानि मेचकज्ञानानीत्यनुभवप्रसंगाच्च । ततश्च तदेकानेकात्मकं चित्रज्ञानं सौगतादीनामभिमतम् ।

134. Let us take the case of the Saugatas. They accept the cognition of a (prismatic) jewel (*mechaka*) as constituted by many specialities (of hues). The (*mechaka*) is a jewel having the nature as unity of the five hues. Its cognition is not of the nature of (single) enlightenment, then it will contradict the cognition of varied enlightenment. The varied enlightenment is verily of the manifold hues like blue, yellow etc; but not certainly of a single speciality. Nor is the cognition of the jewel *mechaka* only manifold, because then it will contradict the experience as it is the cognition of the (singular) *mechaka*, and also because of the experience that these cognitions of the *mechaka* are manifold. For this reason the knowledge of a varied type comes out to be of the nature of one-cum-many for the Saugatas.

135. चार्वाकास्तु—“पृथिव्यपस्तेजोवायुरिति चत्वारि तत्त्वानि, तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं, किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवत्” इति बार्हस्पत्यसूत्रानुरोधात्पृथिव्यादिभूतचतुष्टय-परिणामश्चैतन्यमिति वदन्ति । तच्च न पृथिव्याद्यपेक्षयाऽतिरिक्तमेकं तैरभ्युपगम्यते, तत्त्वान्तरप्रसंगात्, भूतचतुष्टयवादव्याघातात् । नापि पृथिव्यादिकमेकैकमेव तत्, घटादेरपि चेतनत्वापत्तेः । किन्तु पृथिव्याद्यनेकात्मकमेकं चैतन्यमिति ॥

135. We take the case of the Charvakas. They hold that earth, water, fire and air are the four realities; consciousness is produced by them as the power for intoxication is produced by rice of a lower kind, etc. under the pressure of the aphorisms written by Vṛhaspati. They hold that consciousness is the manifestation of the material tetrad of earth etc. That is not accepted by them as an additional single entity with reference to earth etc., otherwise they (will) have to accept one more

entity different from the four (already propounded); and also (will face) the destruction of the theory of four material elements. Nor is it certainly one (single) like several entities of earth etc. taken severally, then the single objects like the pitcher etc. will become conscious. But consciousness is one and (also) of manifold nature of the earth etc.

136. मीमांसकास्तु—प्रमातृप्रमितिप्रमेयाकारमेकं ज्ञानम्, घटमहं जानामीत्यनुभवात्; ज्ञानानां स्वतः प्रकाशत्वात्, इति वदन्ति । तत्रानेकपदार्थनिरूपित-विषयताशाल्येकं ज्ञानं स्वीकृतम् । विषयतानां च ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात्तादृश-विषयतात्रयात्मकमेकं ज्ञानं स्वीकृतमिति । एवरीत्या मतान्तरेष्वनेकान्तप्रक्रिया बुद्धिमद्भिरुह्येति सर्वमवदातम् ।

136. Now we take the case of the Mīmāṃsakas. They say that knowledge is of the united single form of the knower, the knowledge and the knowable, because the experience goes as I know the pitcher, and (also) because the self-enlightenment is admitted of all the cognitions. There, a cognition is accepted as one (and rich) with the exposition of manifold objects. And the objects of knowledge being of the cognitive nature, knowledge is accepted as one, of the nature of the trio of objectivity of that type. Following this way, the process of the non-absolute philosophy should be considered in case of other contentions (up-holdings) by the wise. Thus the position, (in the non-absolute philosophy), is free from all the flaws (and fallacies).

137. अनेकभंगैराक्रान्ता सिद्धान्ताम्बुधिसंगता ।
करोतु विद्वदानन्दं सप्तभंगीतरंगिणी ॥

137. The rivulet of the Septad of propositions, which is swelling with manifold propositions and is consonant with the

ocean of principles (relating to reality and its comprehension), may grant the bliss of the learned (to all).

138. श्रीमत्पंचगुरुदेवेभ्यो नमः । प्लवंगसंवत्सरे वैशाखशुद्धेऽष्टम्यां तिथौ बृहस्पतिवासरे पुष्यनक्षत्रे सुकर्मनामयोगे राजीवकरणे एवंविधशुभमुहूर्ते 'तंजा' नगरे श्रीमदादितीर्थेश्वरस्वामिसन्निधौ कर्कटलग्ने वीरनामग्रामवासिना श्रीमदनन्तसेनदेवस्वामिनां प्रियाग्रशिष्येण विमलदासेन सप्तभङ्गी नाम तर्कग्रन्थो लिखितः ।

करकृतमपराधं सन्तुमर्हन्ति सन्ताः ।

जिनागमेभ्यो जिनमुनिभ्यो नमो नमः ॥

138. Obesiance to the revered five teachers (*pañcha gurus*). This logical treatise, known by the title *Sapta bhaṅgī* has been composed (and completed) by Vimaladāsa, who was a favourite and the ablest pupil of Revered *Anantadeva svāmī* and who belonged to a village named *Vīra grāma*, in *karkata lagna*, under the presence (of the patronage) of Revered first *Tīrthaṅkara Svāmī* in the town of *Tanja* on Thursday, dated 8th of the bright half of *Vaiśākha* (month) of the *Plavaṅga* era, the *nakṣatra* being *punya*, *nāma yoga* being *sukarma* and *karaṇa* being *rājīva* and thus at an auspicious moment.

The wrong actions, done with hand, are forgiven by the noble (persons).

Repeated obeisance to the Scriptures of Jina, and to the saints (followers) of *Jina*.

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